KernelCallbackTable - T1574.013 (a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde)

Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)

An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading or Process Injection into another process.

A pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() Native API function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.

Cluster A	Galaxy A	Cluster B	Galaxy B	Level
KernelCallbackTable - T1574.013 (a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde)	Attack Pattern	Hijack Execution Flow - T1574 (aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6)	Attack Pattern	1